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Finding One’s Way in Global Social Space
Peter Wagner
1. Faraway, so close: the South
The terms ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’ are the latest in a long series of conceptual distinctions that serve as attempts at 
world-interpretation and world-ordering. By now they are widely used 
without further explanation, in particular the term ‘Global South’, 
showing that they have entered common language in global public 
debate. A recent bibliometric study showed that the use of the term 
‘Global South’ in the social sciences and humanities has been stead-
ily increasing from 19 in 2004 to 248 in 2013 (Pagel et al. 2014; for 
general reflections on this rise, see Hylland Eriksen 2015). There are 
now scholarly journals that carry the term in their title, such as The 
Global South, published by Indiana University Press and already in its 
tenth year, or the open access online journal Bandung: Journal of the 
Global South. Higher education institutions have started to honour the 
concept by institutionalising it, such as through the Global South Unit 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science or the Global 
South Studies Center at the University of Cologne. If rapid diffusion is 
a measure, the apparently geographical distinction between South and 
North is a great success.
At the same time, this distinction is problematic in numerous 
respects. Indeed, the stream of publications in which the term ‘South’ 
is used as a concept – or, some might prefer to say: in place of a concept 
– as if it had an evident and generally accepted referent keeps being 
accompanied by a debate about the very meaning and usefulness of 
the term, in which numerous and not at all consonant voices can be 
heard. To give just a few illustrations: conceptually, the distinction 
between North and South has multiple – overlapping, but not  identical 
–  meanings. North/South may be taken to be a distinction between the 
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rich and the poor, the dominant and the dominated, the centre and 
the periphery, the ‘advanced industrial societies’ and the ‘developing’ 
ones, among others. Empirically, the Global South is not identical with 
the southern hemisphere, in which societies of the Global North, such 
as Australia, are located, and vice versa. Beyond the spatial appro-
priateness of the terms themselves, there are also important cases of 
societies that cannot easily be placed into these categories: is China, 
the second-largest economy in the world, part of the Global South; or 
is Russia, highly dependent on exportation of raw materials, part of the 
Global North? Finally, and maybe most importantly, these concepts 
may also be just another misplaced attempt at conflating conceptual 
signification with bounded geographical space. This has always been 
problematic, one of the most widely discussed cases being the confla-
tion of ‘Europe’ and ‘modernity’ (see Stråth and Wagner 2017). In the 
contemporary world, marked by unprecedented degrees of intercon-
nectedness, often called ‘globalisation’, such an attempt may be even 
less fruitful than at other moments.
Concept-formation is always open to objections. Given that the 
South/North distinction fails on so many counts, however, it may be 
more flawed than other, earlier attempts at world-ordering. On first 
reflection, one may just conclude that South and North are useless cat-
egories in the work at understanding the contemporary world within 
the social sciences and the humanities. This book, in turn, suggests that 
one should not arrive at such a conclusion prematurely. Rather than 
decreeing uselessness, it is worthwhile to explore the uses to which 
these categories are actually put and to see whether they are useful for 
certain purposes. In the social sciences and the humanities, concepts 
are not meant to ‘map’ empirical reality – even though confusion may 
easily arise when concepts use geographical terms. Rather, they inter-
pret experiences and suggest ways of acting in the light of experiences. 
The interesting question, therefore, is not whether a South exists, but 
from and to which experiences the coining and acceptance of this term 
speaks and what avenues of action it opens up. This book intends to 
contribute to answering this question.
Doing so, the contributors to this volume pursue two different 
avenues of investigation. Some of them stay close, at least to start with, 
to the recent conceptual transformation in ways of world- interpretation, 
as sketched at the outset. They explore the usefulness as well as the 
limits of the South/North distinction by looking at the varieties of ways 
in which it has been cast: by emphasising its performative character 
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(Cláudio Pinheiro on BRICS); by widening the historical context for 
specific world-regions (Jacob Dlamini on Southern Africa, Maxim 
Khomyakov on Russia); and by elaborating elements of a political 
philosophy of planet and world (Gerard Rosich). In contrast, the other 
contributors approach the current debate from afar, to continue on the 
spatial metaphor. They identify and retrieve features that underlie this 
topical debate and are crucial for understanding it, but are normally not 
visible. Thus, they suggest: that that which was to be called the South is 
at the origins of political modernity, thus is constitutive of the North 
and of the very distinction (Lorena Fuster); that, going beyond opposing 
a Southern epistemology to the colonial imposition of Northern knowl-
edge, world-interpretation is better advanced by displacements than by 
staying within locations (Aurea Mota); that South is a term for the place 
from which one is not but has to go to or intends to go to, South as exile 
and as a remedy for exile (Nathalie Karagiannis).1
This short introductory chapter will follow the contributors on this 
dual trajectory, looking at the distinction between South and North 
from close and from afar. In the first part, the current use of Global 
South and Global North is investigated by looking contextually (2) at 
its conceptual implications, by testing in how far it supports (3) a criti-
cal analysis of our present time, and by exploring and questioning (4) 
the claims that are often associated with its use. In the second part, the 
South is seen in longer and wider perspective. The argument about (5) 
the co-originality of the South and political modernity is mirrored in 
a reflection about the possible end of the South in our time. In the time 
in-between, which is and will always be our time, the place of the South 
has never been stable: with changing socio-political constellations, the 
South kept being restructured; however, the South also turned out to 
be (6) a moving target, escaping from any fixation. Thus, in conclusion, 
we will find that (7) the South is ubiquitous, but also always elsewhere.
2. The disappearance of the other North
As a conceptually driven attempt at world-ordering, the distinction 
of Global South and Global North is an updating of the distinction 
between a First, Second and Third World after the implosion of the 
Second World. The three-world distinction was arguably the first one 
in a long time in which the globe was provided with a comprehensive 
conceptual mapping, only preceded by the distinction between the 
Old World and the New World that emerged in the early sixteenth 
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century at the moment when more geographical sense was made of the 
so-called discoveries. Other distinctions were also intended to signal 
the most significant boundary, often in binary terms, such as between 
‘Hellenes’ and ‘barbarians’ or between ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’. But they 
were less comprehensive given that they either acknowledged areas of 
the globe that were not covered or displayed such a lack of knowledge 
about the other that any conceptual use was impeded. The term ‘Third 
World’, in contrast, first coined in 1952 by Alfred Sauvy with broader 
connotations (see Pinheiro in this volume), acquired a clear conceptual 
meaning when it was connected with theories of economic develop-
ment in the course of the following two decades. When the term ‘South’ 
first emerged in a global-institutional sense in the report of the Brandt 
Commission in 1980, headed by the former West German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt, it was used in exactly the same sense: the South was com-
posed of countries that failed to base their economies on high added-
value manufactured products and, thus, to overcome widespread 
poverty. For global justice and security, they should benefit from 
resource transfers from the North. In line with Brandt’s earlier foreign 
policy, the report eliminated what for three decades had been seen as 
the most significant distinction, the one between Western democratic 
capitalism and Soviet socialism, between First and Second World. 
Brandt’s credo in ‘peaceful coexistence’ did not foresee the disappear-
ance of Soviet socialism, but was based on the expectation that the gap 
between the two underlying world-views would shrink, not least due to 
functional requirements to which he added politico-moral demands.
When Soviet socialism collapsed a decade later, the ground had 
therefore already been prepared for a new comprehensive conceptual 
distinction, now a binary one. But it is necessary to review the use of 
the earlier triple distinction to understand the variety of meanings that 
can be associated with the new set of counter-concepts, Global South 
and Global North. Conceptually, the three-worlds image was based 
on an economic view of society with industrialism at its centre, in the 
First World seen as advanced predominantly by market exchange and 
embedded within moderately democratic politics and in the Second 
World steered by a state apparatus acting in the name of the working 
class. Importantly, there was a clear view of progress, namely steadily 
better satisfaction of needs due to industrialisation, only disagreement 
as to how such progress was to be brought about. The Third World 
related to the First and to the Second Worlds in equally asymmetric 
ways. In current terminology, the South had two Norths to which it was 
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oriented. The question then is what changes when one of those Norths 
disappears.
The conceptual consequences are ambiguous. The coexistence of 
democratic capitalism and state socialism meant a limited plurality of 
viable modes of socio-political organisation. The disappearance of one 
of those modes can be seen as entailing the evidence that only one of 
those was truly viable in the long run. This conclusion was readily drawn 
by evolutionary thinkers in the social sciences who thought to identify 
in these processes the selection of the functionally superior model. But 
rather than the end of plurality, this transformation can also be seen as 
spelling the end of the limits of plurality. In this sense, the flourishing 
of the debate about ‘multiple modernities’ (Shmuel N. Eisenstadt) after 
1990 is closely connected to the fall of existing socialism. These varieties 
of modernity have either been seen as rooted in long-term civilisational 
legacies, under the heading of ‘multiple modernities’, or they have been 
identified with projects for societal organisation, not least in the face of 
a hegemonic model of liberal-capitalist modernity, then more typically 
described as ‘alternative modernities’ (Dilip Gaonkar). In both these 
versions, the idea of a linear trajectory of societal development is aban-
doned. Following these approaches, the end of the other North entails 
the end of all possible North.
But can there be a South without a North? The reflections above sit 
uneasily with the rise of the term ‘Global South’. To consider the latter’s 
usefulness further, we need to add its critical and normative purposes 
to the conceptual ones.
3. Beyond globalisation?
Critically, the proposed terminology objects against the idea of a 
‘flattening’ of the earth through processes of globalisation and indi-
vidualisation, as sociological theories used to see it, or through the 
finally global diffusion of the universal principles of human rights and 
democracy, as political theory and political science tended to put it. 
These scholarly discourses have had wide impact on public debate for 
some time. They have provided elements for a novel reinterpretation of 
the global socio-political constellation with very characteristic features. 
The theorem of globalisation and individualisation combined with the 
discourse on human rights and democracy in suggesting that there 
is – and: should be – little or nothing between the individual human 
being and the globe. Every social phenomenon that stands in-between 
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tends, in sociological terms, to be annihilated by the ever more wide-
spread use of new information and communication technology and, 
in political terms, to be considered as having freedom-limiting effects. 
Significantly, the notion of democracy, which presupposes a specific 
decision-making collectivity and thus appears to stand necessarily in 
an intermediate position between the individual and the globe, tends 
to be redefined. Rather than referring to a concrete, historically given 
collectivity, processes of democratic self-determination are, on the one 
side, related to social movements without institutional reference, and 
on the other side, projected to the global level as the coming cosmo-
politan democracy. We can characterise this conceptual tendency as 
the erasure of meaningful space. In a second step, we can identify a 
similar tendency towards the erasure of historical time. The individual 
human beings in question are seen as free and equal, in particular as 
equally free. Thus, their life-histories and experiences are no longer 
seen as giving them a particular position in the world from which they 
speak and act. And political orders are seen as associations of such 
individuals who enter into a social contract with each other, devoid of 
any particular history (for more detail on the above see Wagner 2015).
This imagery provided significant orientation for much political 
action after the implosion of the Second World. And, arguably, it is 
against the hegemony of this imagery that the coining of the term 
‘Global South’ critically reacts. Rather than only one world, it appears 
to suggest, there are two worlds on the globe. Against the conceptual 
erasure of space, in particular, it proposes a dual spatiality. In the 
political and intellectual context of the late twentieth century, it was 
highly important to insist on the fact that something that one used 
to call social structures persisted even under the new conditions. The 
question, however, is how well the South/North distinction serves this 
purpose.
It is useful to recall the sites of debate. The heyday of globalisation 
has been monitored and interpreted by the World Economic Forum 
since 1987, having been preceded by the European Management Forum 
since 1974, at the moment of the first serious economic crisis of the 
post-Second World War order. As a critical alternative, the World 
Social Forum started to meet in 2001, first in Porto Alegre, having 
been preceded by encuentros in Latin America since 1996. The two fora 
can be seen to embody – or: as having for some time embodied – the 
major sites at which reflection about the current global socio-political 
constellation takes place, the one in deliberate contrast with the other. 
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Can the one be seen as representing the North and the other the South? 
At a closer look, the alternative forum works with a critical conceptu-
alisation that is quite at odds with the two-world image. According to 
its principles, the participants in the World Social Forum ‘are opposed 
to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any 
form of imperialism’. Thus, the starting assumption rather is that a 
single world has already been created under the auspices of capital. 
The answer to this challenge, so the principles continue, is the commit-
ment ‘to building a planetary society . . .’ (World Social Forum 2001). 
Thus, the social structures that are identified are planetary structures of 
domination that have to be overcome by building ‘another world’ that, 
or so it appears, has similarly a planetary dimension. If the forum were 
to present the Global South, this would be nothing but the other half of 
the Global North, coinhabiting not only the same planet, but also the 
same world (for a nuanced discussion of ‘world’ and ‘planet’ see Rosich 
in this volume).
In such understanding there is little room for a ‘South’ as being 
involved in a process of world-making (Karagiannis and Wagner 2007) 
nor for one that truly has a significant spatial meaning. If it is the case 
that neo-liberal global capitalism imposes itself in a homogenising way 
across the planet, then it will destroy any South that may have existed 
and, broadly following Marx’s critical attitude, resistance to it will 
rebuild a world after the complete erasure of meaningful space (for a 
critique of such a view of history, see Chakrabarty 2000). And indeed, 
in recent debates about the Global South one can recognise that the 
link to a concrete spatiality becomes more and more tenuous – and this 
now no longer merely for reasons of the very imperfect geographical 
mapping, mentioned at the outset, but also because of the difficulty of 
matching spatial reference with a critique of domination (see recently 
Trefzer et al. 2014).
4. The South as an alternative
Obviously, one does not have to follow this particular approach to the 
critique of domination. But the preceding reflections underline the 
necessity to reflect carefully on the link between spatiality and concep-
tuality. When emphasising the economic aspect in terms of a critique 
of capitalism, the supposed South is nothing but a mirror image of the 
North, it has no features of its own (unlike the mirror image created by 
William Kentridge, discussed by Nathalie Karagiannis in this volume). 
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In contrast, when the focus in understanding the emergence of the 
Global South has been particular claims for Southern knowledge, they 
have regularly been associated with some notion of otherness of the 
South, an otherness, furthermore, that can be considered as an alterna-
tive to the North. It will suffice here to discuss three contributions to 
this debate as examples each for one approach to the question: Raewyn 
Connell’s Southern Theory (2007); Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s epis-
temologies of the South (see most recently the collection Santos 2014); 
and Jean and John Comaroff’s Theory from the South (2012).2
Southern Theory is a work in retrieval. Against the background of 
a contextual analysis of the rise of European social theory, Raewyn 
Connell rediscovers authors from other continents whose works have 
been eclipsed by the dominance of ‘Northern’ theory. Underlining 
the socio-theoretical nature of these works, she provides a corrective 
to the implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – still dominant view that 
‘Northern’ theory prevailed because it offered superior conceptualisa-
tions and explanations of social relations and their transformations. 
What she cannot fully do is to reconnect the theoretical work from 
the South with the one in the North and to confront the two with 
each other (see Aurea Mota in this volume). This is indeed a huge task 
for two main reasons: first, even though the world-regional strands 
of theorising did not develop in complete isolation from each other, 
they evolved in rather pronounced separation, the only exception 
being the closer relation between Latin American and European 
theorising. Thus, conceptual connections would need to be carefully 
constructed through analyses of contextual specificities. Second, the 
greater continuity from nineteenth-century European social theorising 
to late-twentieth-century ‘Western’ social theory created an asym-
metrical relation to the various strands of Southern theory that can 
hardly be undone. For these reasons, the retrieval makes a strong case 
for recognising greater plurality of world-interpretations and serves as 
an inspiration for overcoming blind spots of Northern theory, but it 
cannot provide the contours of an alternative to the latter.
Theory from the South has a rather different agenda. Focusing on 
the present, its analyses are set in a context of a high degree of world-
regional interconnectedness. Where Connell’s starting assumption 
is one of differences in experiences that lead to varieties of forms of 
knowledge, Jean and John Comaroff presuppose a degree of similar-
ity between world-regions that permits transfers of knowledge and 
insights. This is a standard assumption of theory from the North, a 
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key example being the sociology of modernisation and development 
during the 1950s and 1960s. The originality of the book lies in the inver-
sion of the perspective: rather than African societies evolving towards 
Europe and North America, the Comaroffs see the North following the 
recent social transformations of the South. Furthermore, there is also 
what we may call a perversion of the traditional Northern perspective: 
rather than things getting better over time, indeed through processes 
of modernisation and development, the Comaroffs see them as getting 
worse as the North keeps following the South. What has changed is the 
vantage point from which global social change can best be observed 
and analysed and the direction of such change, but the change itself 
keeps being considered as global and rather unidirectional.
Epistemologies of the South makes a much stronger claim. In con-
trast to the Comaroffs, the difference between North and South lies for 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos not in that which can be observed but in 
the ways of observing and interpreting. In earlier works, which made do 
without spatial connotations, he had distinguished between knowledge 
for domination and knowledge for emancipation. These were two basic 
epistemologies, both of which were at work in the North, the former 
dominant in the service of power and the latter expressing resistance 
against domination. Associating now such epistemological reasoning 
with a history of capitalism and colonialism, the knowledge for domina-
tion comes to be seen as predominantly located in the North and the 
knowledge for emancipation as prevailing in the South. This spatialisa-
tion of epistemology goes along with a second shift: while knowledge for 
emancipation had earlier been seen as one epistemological approach, 
Southern epistemologies are now based in the plurality of experiences of 
oppression and resistance, thus occurring themselves in a plural form. In 
this latter sense, Santos connects more closely with Connell and envisages 
varieties of alternatives emerging from the South, and importantly: posi-
tive alternatives, not merely an inversion of direction of a linear history.
As different as these proposals for Southern theories or episte-
mologies are, they all have in common that they link the generation of 
knowledge back to experiences made. Saying this, they do not oppose 
experience to theorisation. They rather suggest that what they call 
Northern theories or epistemologies are the historical crystallisations 
of specific experiences, made at the neglect or suppression of other 
experiences. As a consequence, false claims to universality or gener-
alisability are made that can be challenged by theorising in the light 
of different experiences. But to be effective, such challenge needs to 
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overcome exactly those claims to universality or generalisability that 
insulate Northern theory from any impact of new experiences. While 
this move is to be strongly appreciated, a major question remains: all 
three proposals for reopening practices of knowledge generation in the 
social sciences had already been made before within the North, so to 
say, but without attaching spatial significance to them. The question 
thus is: what is so specific about Southern experiences that new theo-
ries and epistemologies arise from them? And in what sense are those 
experiences truly Southern; in what way does the concept ‘South’ link 
these multiple and different experiences to each other?
5. Origins and end of the South
As stated at the outset, the current distinction between South and 
North can be seen as the latest of a comprehensive conceptual mapping 
in view of world-ordering, with the distinction of the New World from 
the Old World in the early sixteenth century as the first one. In the 
preceding section, furthermore, we have seen how claims for Southern 
knowledge were inscribed into the history of European global domina-
tion that started with the moment of ‘discovery’ of the so-called New 
World. This domination is characterised with different terms such as 
colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, often without making clear dis-
tinctions, which is not a minor problem. But before touching on this 
issue, it is important to underline that the South is thus given a history, 
and significantly a history that is different from other histories. Thus, 
it is possible to relate conceptuality to historicity, and to delineate a 
certain trajectory of the South.
For a long time, the crucial debate about ‘the rise of Europe’, the 
onset of modernity, and the beginning of a basically linear process of 
modernisation was focused on the world-historical transformations 
around the year 1800, namely the cumulated effects of the scien-
tific revolution and the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and 
the Industrial Revolution. The period that historians of Europe call 
‘early modern times’ only stood in the background; it had little sig-
nificance of its own. What happened between 1500 and 1800 was ‘early’ 
because it gained meaning only as events in preparation of modernity. 
Furthermore, these centuries were analysed in terms of largely endog-
enous European developments, sparked by the Renaissance. The rest 
of the world had only a minor role in the rise of European modernity 
(see Jacob Dlamini, in this volume, bringing historical social structures 
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in Africa into world-history and into sociological theory). Ironically, 
however, it is exactly this account in which Europe is isolated from the 
rest of the world and, subsequently, imposes itself on it, that lent itself 
to the elaboration of postcolonial and decolonial theories that reason 
against the background of a caricature of European modernity.
The more recent focus on the period between 1500 and 1800 allows 
to alter the picture. It helps recognising that European self-under-
standing was transformed as a consequence of the encounter with the 
unknown others in America, with human beings whom one did not 
expect and about whom one did not know anything, not even whether 
they are human. That way of thinking that is often called the European 
political philosophy of modernity, elaborated by scholars such as Las 
Casas (often forgotten in standard accounts), Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau 
and Kant, drew its main questions and conceptual inspirations from 
the encounter with the New World other (Dussel 2003). It is in this 
sense that the South is most fruitfully seen to constitute itself during 
this period (Lorena Fuster in this volume). As a consequence, this 
moment also sees the origins of the distinction between South and 
North. We cannot understand the history of the North and Northern 
epistemologies without its origins in the South and in the encounter 
with the South.3
While highly asymmetrical in many respects, the moment of origins 
is an encounter that is faced in the absence of adequate tools for 
cognition and recognition by both sides. Fundamental questions are 
without an answer but in need of an answer, most clearly acknowl-
edged in the Valladolid–Salamanca debate of 1550–1. Even though the 
debate remained without conclusion, further practice denied native 
Americans equal treatment as full human beings. This was an orienta-
tion that prevailed, with considerable variety, during all of the colonial 
period until the late twentieth century. It justified the denial of the right 
to self-determination to the Southerners, and it justified the domination 
of the North over the South. In the Marxian tradition, ‘reification’ is the 
term used for the process in which relations between human beings 
transform into relations between things. The North/South relation is a 
case of what one may call unilateral reification: the dominated others 
are considered as if they were things, but not the same is true the other 
way round. Keeping the reciprocal uncertainty of the first encounter 
in mind, we may apply to the relation between North and South what 
Axel Honneth (2005) said in more general terms:  reification is the 
 forgetfulness of the original act of recognition.
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If reification is forgetfulness, what happens when one remembers, 
or better: when one is reminded? The anti-colonial struggle has been 
highly successful, even though it has taken a long time and caused many 
victims. Most of the territories that were governed at some time between 
the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries by Northern powers have 
gained independence. Within those territories, the relation between 
descendants of settlers, of indigenous peoples and of slaves is mostly 
governed by formal equal freedom. This has been a struggle that has 
moved close to its final point only very recently. The end of apartheid 
in South Africa marks the moment at which any domination of one 
category of persons over another one has become utterly unjustifiable 
(which is not to say that it does not exist any longer at all). Elsewhere I 
have referred to this moment as the moment of the end of formal domi-
nation (Wagner 2016). As we have seen before, however, the concept of 
the South has mostly been used as an ‘asymmetrical counter-concept’ 
(Koselleck 1979) that helped to grasp the relation of domination between 
North and South. The end of formal domination between North and 
South then will necessarily have consequences for the persuasiveness of 
a concept that is built on the notion of such domination.
Thus, one may have reason to assume that the South will turn out 
to be an only temporarily significant concept for world-ordering. The 
moment of its explicit emergence already contains the signs of its 
imminent demise. The Global South was needed to express and criticise 
the restrictedness of ‘Northern’ world-interpretations and to underline 
the transformative potential of the ‘Southern’ alternatives, but also the 
latter’s lack of actual power of transformation. Currently, the rise of 
BRICS (as discussed by Cláudio Pinheiro) is part of a new interpreta-
tion that draws on the tradition of ‘the South’ but radically alters it. In 
the centre of this reinterpretation, the BRICS alliance includes key soci-
eties of the former South, but also former embodiments of Northern 
world-interpretations. Furthermore, BRICS refers to states of consider-
able power, and the BRICS discourse is no longer one of dependence 
and powerlessness. One may say that, despite topical doubts, BRICS is 
more powerful than any former ‘South’, but at the same time consider-
ably less ‘Southern’.
6. The South as a moving target
Nevertheless it is unlikely that the South will disappear even in the case 
of a further rise of BRICS and the emergence of what is now called 
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multi-polar world-politics. What is currently referred to as the Global 
South and what Southern theories and epistemologies claim does not 
exhaust the meaning of the South. In a first step we can approach the 
broader significance of the term by looking at a case that still stays close 
to issues of global politics.
During the immediate aftermath of decolonisation, the European 
Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union, 
acknowledged its historical responsibility towards the former colonies 
and made this debt and duty the underlying rationale for its develop-
ment policy. Already during the 1980s, however, the policy orienta-
tion changed, and the responsibility of each society for its own fate 
under conditions of market exchange was increasingly emphasised 
(Karagiannis 2004). With the formation of the European Union, the 
particular nature of the relation between Europe and its former colo-
nies was further de-emphasised. The EU as a new actor positioned itself 
more neutrally, devoid of any historical burden, in the field of global 
politics and global commerce. This shift can be analysed as a move 
from a paternalistic self-understanding as promotor of modernisation 
and development abroad, consonant with the domestic Keynesian 
democratic welfare state, towards a view of oneself as a market actor 
guided by self-interest, consonant with the enterprise culture of neo-
liberalism. Furthermore, though, it has consequences for what one 
means by South.
During the colonial period, the South was closely connected with 
Europe. This is visible, for instance, in the fact that integration of 
metropole and colonies on equal terms was considered in Portugal 
and France at the moment of decolonisation, even though this pro-
posal never came close to realisation except for small territories. The 
immediate postcolonial arrangement was a relation between formally 
equal states with the former coloniser assuming debt and responsibil-
ity towards the former colonies. The more Europe started to consider 
itself as a unit, rather than an alliance of nation-states, however, the 
more distance was taken from the South. The acceleration of European 
integration after the Maastricht Treaty also was an attempt to finally 
shed the moral debt towards the former colonies entirely. The South 
was from now on clearly seen as outside Europe in territorial terms; it 
became a Global South allegedly without particular historical relation 
to Europe.
By now one recognises, though, that the establishment of a bound-
ary of moral responsibility did not succeed. The South re-emerged 
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within the territory of Europe: through urban protest by descendants of 
immigrants from the former colonies; through refugees; and through 
the widening of politico-economic heterogeneity in the current Euro 
crisis creating an intra-European South.4 These recent developments 
can be seen as an act of intended domination of the North over the 
South, which significantly tried to fix the South in space. However, that 
which was to be dominated escapes from control; it cannot be fixed in 
space, rather becomes a moving target.
7. The South is elsewhere: space, direction and movement
Thus, it may be wrong to ask where the South is. Looking for the South 
may not – or at least, not necessarily – entail looking for a geographi-
cal space, it may mean asking for directions (Karagiannis 2016). North 
and South are categories of direction as much as of space, thus lend 
themselves to analysis of both place and movement. A comprehensive 
analysis of the rise of the distinction between South and North as social 
categories, therefore, needs to widen the perspective and consider 
movement and direction beyond location in space.
A first observation concerns the change of connotations compared 
with preceding related terms. Terms such as ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ 
or ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ emphasised social change over time. 
‘North’ and ‘South’, in turn, privilege space over time. This has several 
consequences. The apparent symmetry of spatial terms, on the one 
hand, eliminates some of the evaluative intentions: the North is not 
as such ‘advanced’ over the South; but neither do the terms ‘North’ 
and ‘South’ contain a hint of domination, in contrast to the centre/
periphery distinction, for instance. On the other hand, the abolition 
of evident asymmetry allows for novel uses: the South can become a 
site of conceptual superiority and innovativeness or greater adequacy, 
in terms such as ‘Southern theory’ or ‘epistemology of the South’. As 
seen above, however, the case for linking geographical space closely to 
conceptual claims cannot entirely convince. As Aurea Mota (in this 
volume) argues, the advance of knowledge may arise from displace-
ment between spaces rather than from location in space.
As corporeal human beings can only be in one space at a time, any 
such displacement is always both a movement in space and in time. 
The conflation of temporality and spatiality has a long history in socio-
political thought. ‘In the beginning all the world was America’, as 
John Locke famously and erroneously claimed, referring to presumed 
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life before the social contract (see Jacob Dlamini in this volume). A 
key example is the conceptual relation between individual and com-
munity, guided by the notion that individualisation is a dominant 
historical trend and that culturally strongly integrated communities 
are a phenomenon either of the past or of a different space. Claiming 
to state the inevitable, this assumption has often also led to nostalgic 
longings for a past place or utopian expectations of a future place. 
Significantly, disputes over these interpretations show normative 
ambiguity: individualisation is supposed to increase freedom and pos-
sibilities for self-realisation, but it also leads to conformism, anomie 
and disorder.
While not without validity, most such conceptualisations suffer 
from two problems: they work with some teleological notion of social 
change (for a forceful critique, see Sewell 2005), and they conceptualise 
social change as an aggregate of supposed experiences that are not 
actually researched and reflected upon. Looking at the latter by other 
means, from poetry, philosophy and psychoanalysis, one recognises in 
the condition of exile a loss of one’s space and a movement towards 
another space that create a quest for a return that cannot happen as 
such, because it would entail a move back both in space and in time. 
The South, as Nathalie Karagiannis (in this volume) shows, is indeed 
imagined as a return from such exile. It provides direction at a time 
when the coordinates of global social space have been upset so that to 
find one’s way has become difficult.
Notes
1. Most of the contributors address more than one of the aspects mentioned. Their 
names are here given as an indication for the key appearance of these themes. 
Overall, the volume may be seen as a self-exercise by the contributors at finding 
their ways in global social space (paraphrasing Boltanski and Thévenot 1983), an 
exercise that has become more difficult not only owing to recent social change but 
also to the authors’ own contradictory spatio-temporal locations (to paraphrase 
Wright 1978).
2. The authors of these works are kindly asked to excuse the somewhat schematic 
presentation of their reasonings for present purposes.
3. An observation of a different kind needs to be added: recent debates tend to deny 
or overlook that a great variety of South/North constellations – of colonial con-
stellations, we may say – were forming between the sixteenth and the twentieth 
centuries and that it is this variety that makes it difficult to conceive of a single 
South opposed to a homogeneous North. If we consider for a moment the so-
called Brandt line, the implicitly most often used way to geographically define 
South and North, two main outliers are immediately visible. The more recent one 
is Russia whose association with BRICS locates it today sometimes in the South, 
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but which has placed itself historically much more clearly in the North, indeed 
in its own context of colonisation (Maxim Khomyakov in this volume). And the 
much more familiar one is Australia, geographically clearly in the South, a society 
emerging from colonisation, and nevertheless unequivocally seen as part of the 
North. Comparing Australia with colonised or so-called settler societies in Africa, 
America and South Asia, its condition for becoming Northern is arguably the near 
extinction of the indigenous population. This is what it has in common with North 
America, which becomes Northern for the same reason (for a related comparative 
reasoning, in different conceptual terms, see already Hartz 1964).
4. The latter has been reflected in attempts at looking at Southern Europe in terms of 
versions of Southern theory. See Dainotto (2011); Cassano (2012).
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Does the World Have a Spatio-political Form? 
Preliminaries
Gerard Rosich
1. Framing the question
From a global perspective, democracy seems to be nowadays the political regime that in discursive terms is implicitly considered the 
sole legitimate political order. Now, in contrast to the past, whenever 
democracy is not acknowledged as the only suitable regime to insti-
tute an order, either explicit ad hoc justifications have to be provided 
to show why temporarily democracy should not rule, or resistance 
to democracy is associated locally with resistance to domination.1 
Paradoxically, at the moment in history when the reputation of democ-
racy is at its best globally, a series of elements seem to suggest that its 
workings are in trouble (Rosich and Wagner 2016). Or, in other words, 
the constitution of a new global order that connects all human beings, 
arising as a response to the crisis of the previous order and possessing a 
commonly understood need to be democratic in its outlook, appears as 
tension-ridden. It is the first time in history that a socio-political order-
ing of the totality of human beings has to be normatively justifiable on 
democratic premises. Thus, it is an urgent task to collectively recon-
struct socio-political thinking in the light of this present challenge.
Nevertheless, in both intellectual and historical terms the chal-
lenge itself is not new. Cosmopolitanism is the intellectual tradition 
that focuses on this problématique, though until very recently it did 
so only from a normative point of view and addressed it as a politico-
philosophical project. However, Immanuel Kant, who remains the 
most representative thinker of this cosmopolitan project, did not 
believe that it was reconcilable with democracy (Kant [1784] 1989).2 
From a historical point of view, the two ‘world’ wars of the twentieth 
century gave birth to two consecutive global political institutions, first 
the League of Nations and afterwards the United Nations. The failure of 
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the Wilsonian utopia of ‘making the world safe for democracy’ after the 
First World War led the founders of the United Nations to envisage a 
much less ambitious political programme, putting human rights at the 
centre of their normative project and leaving to the principle of state 
sovereignty the political regime of member states. Additionally, both 
projects were still informed by a political theory that has conceptual-
ised from time immemorial the political form in relation to that which 
was the source of power and to the question of who, where and how 
to rule. In this regard, political theory has assumed a deep connection 
between politics and spatiality that has shaped the way polities are self-
understood. Moreover, our historical periodisations are largely done 
by identifying continuities, transformations and inventions regarding 
the form and the place of polities and how they interrelate.
Two intertwined present facts suggest that the assumptions and 
methods of this time-honoured approach are no longer appropriate to 
an interpretation of the political realm. First, the growing interconnect-
edness between human beings has reached a level in the present that 
unsettles the boundaries defining the internal and external relations of 
a polity, rendering indeterminate its substance and spatial dimension. 
Though a new ordering seems to be at the moment self-instituting, we 
still do not know how to best conceptualise it and if it will be demo-
cratically constituted in political terms. The emerging categories such 
as the Global South in relation to a still hegemonic North work on the 
assumption that the globe is ‘a’ unified whole, though its constitution 
is conflictive and it is not democratically shaped (Connell 2011). In 
addition, the global or regional institutions that have been in place 
since the first half of the twentieth century have hitherto been unable 
to address this ‘reordering’ democratically because they are not able or 
do not want to self-transform. The Global North/South debate, a divi-
sion spatial in origin, has the virtue of assuming new collective subjects 
but is unable to address the current reconfigurations because, as I will 
argue, it still works with a conceptual and empirical framework that is 
in tension with the democratic regime and that possesses a reductionist 
understanding of world-formation, as is also the case with the contem-
porary globalisation discourse.
Second, scientific evidence suggests that the biogeochemical condi-
tions under which the life of Homo sapiens has flourished on planet 
Earth are transforming dramatically due to human-induced climate 
change and the mastery of ‘nature’. The dialectic between nature and 
environment has always been considered a trans-historical condition 
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for human political ordering. Historical change could be observed in 
the transformations of particular practices and interpretations of this 
relation, with nature being the independent aspect of the relation, 
and the environment the transformation of nature by human agency. 
The difference now is that we as species (still?) cannot adapt to it and 
it negatively affects the planet as a whole, not only regions of it. This 
transformation seriously jeopardises the continuity of the human 
species on this planet. The relevance of this fact in the context of this 
chapter relates to the kind of political action that has to be performed 
in order to address this challenge and the ‘structural’ conditions such 
action imposes on a world ordering. To be successful, this political 
action has to be global in nature, but it is far from clear that it can be 
democratic. Even more, democracy may have boosted the deteriora-
tion of the environment (Chakrabarty 2009).
Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to make a con-
tribution to the reconstruction of socio-political theorising. First, I will 
succinctly introduce the basic theoretical distinction of spatial concepts 
used politically to refer to totality. This is a fundamental requirement 
that has to be met if the ‘ordering of the world’ is to have any meaning. 
These concepts will help us to think, in a second step, whether a new 
spatio-political ordering of human totality is gradually taking form and 
under what conditions. Assuming such a transformation can be identi-
fied, we also have to inquire into its basic contours in order to assess the 
challenges that tensions in the current political spatial reordering pose 
for democracy considered as a political regime.
2. Comprehensive spatial concepts
The concepts that have been used to refer to an ‘ordering’ which 
includes all human beings are spatial: the West/East opposition, 
centre and periphery, globalisation and now the Global South/
North, at the moment a technical term of scholarship that has not 
reached the level of public opinion. The spatial representation of 
human totality has been a fact common to a wide variety of civilisa-
tions at different times in history, and it did not necessarily imply a 
political human ordering articulated in spatial terms, as the history of 
nomadic peoples attests. Moreover, in contrast to the past, nowadays 
all humans are considered ‘humans’ and there is no justifiable divi-
sion among human beings that circumscribes totality to a particular 
qualitative interpretation of what makes a human being ‘human’: 
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‘humanity’ is the sum of all human beings, which corresponds with 
the ‘human’ as a biological category, namely to the human as a species 
or as a ‘race’.3 It is important to specify that I am not referring strictly 
speaking to the different cosmologies or representations of the struc-
ture of the universe that humans have produced, as old as rock art, but 
to the particular way humans have understood themselves spatially in 
relation to what today we call ‘humanity’. True, both representations 
can intersect, as we will see later, but geography and the natural sci-
ences devoted to the study of geological and astronomical phenomena 
are two different ways of representing totality: one includes humans 
and the other not.
One cautionary note is important in this context. The concepts to 
be discussed − world, globe and Earth − are used interchangeably, not 
only in ordinary language, but also in scholarly debate. The conceptual 
distinctions discussed below are analytical, insofar as this is possible, 
and are intended to denote significant ontological differences between 
these concepts that have an impact on the way we create/represent 
human totality. Though my discussion is excessively concise for the 
deep implications it triggers, the only purpose of the distinctions drawn 
here is to prepare the ground for the following section. The reasoning 
is conceptual, though I will trace back at some moments the respective 
cultural-historical lineages.
World
The concept of ‘world’ is central to metaphysics and to ‘world’ history 
from the comparative civilisational perspective. Indeed, the difference 
in both uses, despite disputes between schools of thought or intel-
lectual traditions, relates to whether a more conceptual or empirical 
approach is adopted. The tradition inaugurated by phenomenology 
and hermeneutics, mainly initiated with the work of Martin Heidegger 
and Edmund Husserl and further pursued by Hannah Arendt and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, opened new avenues for rethinking the rela-
tion between the human being and the world. The concept of ‘world’ 
refers to one of the fundamental structures of human existence. It 
does not designate a constitutive element of the human considered as 
a living being or, insofar as this is possible, of the individual human 
being. A ‘world’ is possible wherever the existence of human beings is 
collectively constituted. From this angle, the main contours of what a 
world consists of are as follows: (1) a world makes relations possible; 
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(2) it is created by a collectivity of humans; (3) it is an incomplete, com-
mensurable whole.
(1) Relations between human beings, and even the constitution of 
selfhood, do not take place without mediation and ex nihilo. When 
we come into existence, a framework upon which social significations, 
a meaningful language and attitudes and/or frontiers between the 
living and non-living beings hangs, is in place. Moreover, as Hannah 
Arendt has indicated ([1958] 1998: 136), the necessary work that has 
to be realised to adapt ourselves to nature and make it safe for human 
dwelling creates an ‘objective’ world that stands in front of us as if it 
were independent but nevertheless our own. This is the immanent field 
that implicitly or explicitly mediates any kind of reflexivity or social 
relation.
(2) This leads us to the second fundamental element, the fact that 
in spite of always preceding us, the world is a human creation. The 
world is neither atemporal nor necessary for human existence. It may 
occur or not. The fact that it is not atemporal means that the world can 
disappear, be created anew, or transform. It also means that there is the 
possibility of losing the world or ‘worldlessness’ in specific situations 
where the immanent field that mediates human relations disappears. 
As a human creation, the world is the work of human imagination, as 
Cornelius Castoriadis has pointed out, and is thus the result of a par-
ticular dialectical movement. It is created by human beings by means of 
‘social imaginary significations’ and in turn it becomes the world within 
which human beings relate to each other. It points both to the creativity 
of human beings in shaping their own world, without assuming that 
meaning is given or preordained in the act of instituting the world, and 
to the impossibility of reducing or deriving the meaning human beings 
attach to the social world from any systemic logic (Castoriadis 1997: 
359). Following Arendt, in creating the world, the human being creates 
something that will last beyond actual human lives: the world endures. 
The fact that the world will persist creates a particular relation between 
immanence and transcendence. The world is the collective creation of 
human beings but transcends the duration of actual human lives, thus 
it appears as if the world were independent of us.
(3) This dialectical condition is what makes the world incomplete. 
This may sound paradoxical given that the creation of a world aims 
also at stabilising the immanent field in order to reduce the degree of 
uncertainty and fragility to which human life is subject. A world is what 
holds together and sustains a collective self-understanding. It presup-
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poses wholeness and unity (Castoriadis 1997: 149). However, contin-
gency and the workings of human imagination make the aspiration to 
absolute completeness a hubristic ambition. A world is neither closed 
nor self-contained. The incompleteness of a world is also what allows 
for the experience of another world or other worlds, or the simultane-
ous coexistence of different worlds. All these elements together are 
what make communication and exchange between different worlds not 
only possible, but also a necessary condition for sustaining a world. A 
world closed to the unexpected and to novelty does not need the actual 
engagement of human beings in its mise en forme: it is a world driven by 
a self-propelled logic. A world is a historical creation of human beings, 
and as such it is subject to contingency. This historical contingency, 
together with the fact that a world is what mediates relations between 
human beings, is what makes commensurability and reciprocal inter-
action possible. And yet, since a world is an immanent field, there is no 
position of exteriority that allows for a universal form of comparability. 
The efforts to theoretically reduce this variability to a common and 
single matrix impoverish our comprehension of ‘what there is’. Other 
worlds need to be interpreted and translated, and this can only happen, 
in the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer, if a ‘fusion of horizons’ of both 
worlds occurs, namely if a hermeneutical situation is created through 
their encounter, a situation which should not be taken for granted and 
also can lead to mutual indifference or conflict (Arnason 2006). This 
does not mean that both worlds are fused into one through the encoun-
ter.4 From this perspective, each world-formation entails a concrete 
interpretation of human spatiality.
Globe
In contrast, the globe is a concrete imaginary signification of space 
produced very recently in historical terms and is at least as old as the 
invention of the armillary sphere by ancient Greek astronomy, placing 
a globe representing the Earth at the centre of the celestial sphere. The 
globe is the spherical representation of the surface of the planet where 
humans live. It is a geometrical reduction made by human imagination 
in order to represent on a human scale the space it occupies. It trans-
forms the terrestrial body into a human-scale model. The ‘actual globe’, 
the planet Earth, cannot be represented by means of human perception 
(Husserl [1913] 2014: §27). Its three-dimensionality and its volume do 
not permit that humans grasp it completely. Scaling the planet into a 
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globe allows for the fiction that one can master it. Indeed, our basic cat-
egories for geographical orientation are based on this assumption: the 
hemisphere, the poles, equators, meridians, parallels, and so on. The 
mastering of the globe is based on the superposition over the terrestrial 
surface of a mathematical construct that makes the horizontality of 
this surface legible independently of the observer’s position. It converts 
the infinitude of the horizon into the finitude of the sphere. It allows 
for a radical change of perspective. What was unknown because it was 
beyond one’s own experience, and therefore was limited by all sorts 
of constraints, now becomes knowable because it can be modelled in 
advance and is finite. In turn, it is the universe that becomes infinite. 
The mathematical modelling of the terrestrial surface has several con-
ceptual implications. The planisphere, the projection of the globe onto 
a map drawn on the plane, radically transformed the continuity of 
plural world-cartographies.
Once the complete circumnavigation of the surface of the globe was 
achieved by Magellan–Elcano, the geometrical and the cartographi-
cal imagination began to merge. This was first achieved by the global 
map made by Diogo Ribeiro in 1529, considered the first ‘scientific’ 
map, whose main intention was to determine the exact position of 
the raya, the geometrical demarcation line that divided the globe into 
two hemispheres of imperial domination between Spain and Portugal. 
The map’s aim was to settle territorial disputes between them. Global 
maps were incorporated as legal documents, for the first time, in the 
Treaty of Saragossa in 1529, which put an end to the disputes between 
both crowns arising from the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas (Brotton 2013: 
186–95).
The geometrical cartography of the globe, which permitted the 
abstraction of the actual surface of the Earth and the people living in 
it, was the first attempt at transforming the varieties of human inter-
pretations of space into an empty and homogenous construct filled 
with points and lines that correspond to positions, limits and areas on 
the surface of the Earth. This understanding aims at overcoming the 
resistance of earthly matter to wilful exploitation through techniques 
premised on the physical and mathematical sciences. The Copernican 
revolution, the introduction of the coordinate system by Descartes 
together with his concept of res extensa, and the concept of absolute 
space by Newton radicalised this trend in making space an infinitely 
divisible and measurable scientific construct and positions within it 
relative and qualitatively indifferent (Rosich 2018).
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Planet Earth
In opposition to world and globe, and despite the past association of 
the globe with the Earth as a planet, techno-physical ‘progress’ has 
emancipated the planet Earth from this connection. Today it has 
become a purely objective one. The planet called Earth would exist 
even if humans did not. The place of this planet is the universe. This 
representation was not evident to other comprehensions of the planet. 
In many civilisations, the ‘planet’ was a religious concept lying at the 
core of a cosmogony in which humans were an integral part. Indeed, 
the name ‘Earth’ refers to an imaginary with different historical mean-
ings according to the various historical formations of worlds. It may 
indicate relations to soil, nurturing (as in ‘Mother Earth’), rootedness 
and dwelling (Cosgrove 2001: 7). Until very recently, the heavens 
were above because we as humans were attached to Earth. Now, what 
is relevant is the fact that the Earth is a ‘planet’ as it is understood in 
astrophysics, and that its biogeochemical structure has made possible 
the evolution of living organisms.
There have been two major recent transformations in the represen-
tation humans have made of the planet Earth. The first one, as Hannah 
Arendt pointed out brilliantly, is related to the representation that 
humans had of the planet in relation to the universe. Once the first 
human-made object was launched into the universe and later humans 
travelled to space and landed on the Moon, humans were no longer 
bound to the Earth as a planet.5 They could imagine themselves for 
the first time in history as no longer conditioned by a deep evolution-
ary and anthropological fact. Moreover, when a real photographic 
picture of the planet Earth was made from the Moon by the Apollo 8 
spacecraft in 1968,6 it ‘fuelled representations of the world as a distinct, 
unified global entity whose constituent parts are fitted together into 
a single whole’ (Herod 2009: 27). This picture reinforced visions of 
eternal movement without time at a human scale and it miniaturised 
the planet. The human scale moved from the Earth to the entire uni-
verse. Units of cosmic time and distance were no longer measurable by 
human imagination.
The second development did not refer to the actual view of the 
planet from outside, but to biogeochemical internal processes that have 
transformed the Earth into a unified, single human environment.7 The 
enormous potency of the instrumental mastery of ‘nature’ by humans 
and its effects on the Earth system have reached such a level that, in 
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contrast with the past history of the Earth, natural processes are no 
longer independent of human agency. This means that humans have 
become a ‘biogeochemical force’. Humans have been able to alter, 
by means of the mastery of nature, the structure of the Earth when 
considered as a planet. We no longer adapt ourselves to nature, but 
rather transform nature in order to adapt it to ourselves. Geologists 
and climatologists suggest that we are moving out of the Holocene, the 
historical epoch in which we have been living for the last 12,000 years 
from the perspective of Earth history, because the climate and the bio-
geochemical conditions that defined it have changed radically and are 
transforming the Earth ‘system’. They propose calling this new histori-
cal epoch the ‘Anthropocene’ because it has been induced by human 
action. Paradoxically, this reintroduces imaginary significations of the 
Earth as a living being with agency (Latour 2014).
3. What, if anything, makes us a totality?
It is when we understand the concepts defined in the previous section 
historically that the frontiers between them become fuzzy and thorny. 
In order to keep the historical limits between them analytically clear, 
I suggest considering the history of civilisations as the history of how 
worlds are (trans)formed (Arnason 2014: 293–5), the history of the 
globe as the history of globalisation, and the history of the planet Earth 
as what is usually called in broad terms ‘natural history’. This will help 
us to assess what kind of relations mediate the interconnectedness of 
human beings together with the intensity and quality of different layers 
at play in human interaction, that is, to investigate historically whether 
all such relations secure the same level of interconnectedness for all and 
do so in the same way. At the same time, it will offer ways to compare 
the different historical trajectories of such relations and relate them to 
the question of democracy.
The world is modern
At this point, we should admit that the concept of world, in contrast to 
the other two, is hardly a spatial one in spite of the spatial metaphors we 
use. It does not refer to a bounded unit identifiable in spatial terms and 
it cannot be apprehended as a substance. It is a metaphysical concept 
that forms the interpretative horizon that encompasses all the dimen-
sions of social life. It is the ‘horizon of all horizons’ (Husserl [1913] 
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2014: 48–50). As such, it is a concept that does not refer to concrete 
collectivities or to a sum of them, to political entities or cultural forma-
tions or particular regions, but to a shared imaginary that informs the 
ways social, political and cultural formations are established. From this 
perspective, we should bear in mind that different worlds can coexist in 
singular spatio-temporal settings.
In historical terms, the research questions are: what are the basic 
constituents that shape a world, how does it transform, and to what 
level and degree is it shared among different social configurations? 
It is only having answered these that spatio-temporal settings can be 
established. From this angle, the history of civilisations seems to be the 
best empirical access to the study of this metaphysical dimension of 
social life.8 As Martin Heidegger has suggested, we should not identify 
the world in relation to the concept of civilisation with the idea of 
world-view. A world-view presupposes the idea that representing the 
world is possible, that is, that the world is an object, even if it is the 
totality of what one stands in front of.9 It also implies that there is a 
subject who has a view of the world. The idea of a world-view makes 
sense only within a particular historical constitution of a world.10 For 
Heidegger, it corresponds to the scientific constitution of the world 
in the modern period. In the context of this chapter, what we have to 
ask is whether there is a shared social imaginary among all the differ-
ent social formations that allows us to say that there is currently only 
one single civilisation. Indeed, the concept of civilisation, as it is here 
thought, implies a plurality of worlds. From this perspective, the idea 
of a single civilisation is tantamount to the existence of a single world, 
which is logically the same as saying that there are no longer civilisa-
tions given that we can no longer make synchronous comparisons 
between them because there are no other coexisting worlds.11 In any 
case, ‘modernity’, regardless of whether it is a new civilisation or not, 
is the concept proposed for representing this new globally shared 
social imaginary.12
Modernity’s fundamental constituents are reflexivity, in the sense 
of openness and uncertainty, autonomy and mastery. The signification 
of this social imaginary does not lend itself to being interpreted, either 
conceptually or historically, in a unidirectional way, since there are a 
variety of possible interpretations of this signification. The fact that the 
modern social imaginary is open to reinterpretation by human beings 
leads to the view that it cannot be interpreted univocally, therefore 
there will always be conflict surrounding the interpretations that are 
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attached to the modern social imaginary. This multiplicity of possible 
interpretations is, in the words of Shmuel Eisenstadt, ‘beset by inter-
nal antinomies and contradictions’ (Eisenstadt 2003: II, 499) which, 
according to Arnason, constitute ‘a field of tensions that can neither 
be absorbed by a system nor by a strategy of transformation’ (Arnason 
1991: 186); or, as Peter Wagner points out, the ‘elements of this signifi-
cation are ambivalent each one on its own and tension-ridden between 
them’ (Wagner 2008: 10). Moreover, in order to empirically assess the 
varieties of modern imaginary significations while escaping from the 
unidirectional and convergent view, a distinction between economic, 
political and cultural/epistemic realms is suggested, without collaps-
ing the content of these realms into specific institutional domains, or 
assigning any functional/structural capacities to them, or deriving the 
practices belonging to one realm from the others (Arnason 2003: 197; 
Wagner 2012: 74). This allows for the study of trans-historical human 
experiences while making it possible to distinguish between different 
civilisations, to separate modern and non-modern experiences, and 
to open up the historical question of whether the answers given to 
the problems arising in each realm differ and whether they represent 
different solutions to the modern constitution of the world. From 
this perspective, modernity in itself is not a spatio-temporal concept. 
Elements of it can be found in other historical periods and in different 
places of the globe (Therborn 2014).
North/South and the global spatialisation of the world
This approach to modernity allows us to escape from positivist institu-
tional approaches, like the ones proposed by modernisation theories, 
and from reductionist and univocal interpretations of the commitment 
to modernity. However, answering the question of why we are now 
all modern, with its basic assumption of a world-ordering including 
the totality of human beings, becomes a hard task when proceeding to 
discuss historically the creation of the modern world, that is, where, 
how and when it is spatio-temporally instituted in such a way that a 
shared social imaginary can become ‘global’, irrespective of the plural 
spatio-temporal interpretations of this social imaginary. A quotation 
from Carl Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth will help me to outline in a 
clear and concise way the generally accepted hypothesis of the idea of a 
complete modern spatial ordering of human beings. This explanation 
is normatively bifacial. One can highlight the elements of domination, 
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as critics of modernity do, or put the emphasis on the exceptionality of 
European civilisation in contrast to other civilisations:
No sooner had the contours of the earth emerged as a real globe – 
not just sensed as myth, but apprehensible as fact and measurable 
as space – than there arose a wholly new and hitherto unimaginable 
problem: the spatial ordering of the earth in terms of international 
law [. . .] From the 16th to the 20th century, European international 
law considered Christian nations to be the creators and representa-
tives of an order applicable to the whole earth. The term ‘European’ 
meant the normal status that set the standard for the non-European 
part of the earth. Civilization was synonymous with European civili-
zation. (Schmitt [1951] 2006: 86)
In the terminology used in this chapter, Carl Schmitt’s influential 
view can be translated as a theory suggesting that only in a context 
where the planet Earth was represented as a globe, namely as a spheri-
cal, physically divisible mathematical surface, a spatial ordering of 
totality could be envisaged. This understanding would correspond to a 
particular representation of a civilisation. Paradoxically, it is a civilisa-
tion that would connect a particular world-formation, the Christian 
one, to a particular region of the globe, Europe. What is at stake is that 
this particular civilisation has an understanding of world-ordering that 
is connected essentially with spatial ordering. When the planet Earth 
appears as a globe, the Christian world can be globalised, or in other 
words, European civilisation civilises the other ‘civilisations’ thanks to 
its particular understanding of law and science.13 One singular world 
is extended to the whole Earth, that is, a world is globalised, which is 
the process by which one world becomes the globe. This process would 
merge the globe, the world and the planet Earth into a single imaginary.
What Carl Schmitt is suggesting is that if another civilisation had 
circumnavigated the globe, the question of a spatial ordering of the 
Earth would not have emerged because they did not have the same 
understanding of space, law and science. This particular explana-
tion associates the history of globalisation with a particular world-
formation, the Christian European one, and relates the current degrees 
of connectedness that sustain a view of the globe as a unified totality 
with the history of spatial domination of the ‘non-European part of the 
globe’.
From this angle, the history of modernity starts with the domination 
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of the other by means of the destruction of their own worlds through 
the imposition of the European world upon them (Fuster and Rosich 
2015). It is a double process of wordlessness. First, it triggers internally a 
self-destruction of the European world by converting it into the globe, 
and second, to transform the world into the globe it needs to erase 
other worlds. As Hannah Arendt put it, ‘World alienation, and not 
self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the modern 
age’ (Arendt [1958] 1998: 254). This is the historical development that 
makes it possible to think of globalisation in totalising terms. The other 
side of the coin is that the social bond that connects all human beings 
globally is possible because it is based on a dialectic of domination and 
resistance to domination shaped by a modern social imaginary linked 
to the developments of European history.14
Before pursuing this line of reasoning, it is worth reminding the 
reader that Carl Schmitt’s book is a theoretical landmark both for 
postcolonial scholars, like Enrique Dussel (2007) or Walter Mignolo 
(2012), and for American neoconservatives.15 Thus, the modern world 
is linked to the history of globalisation: it began in Europe at the begin-
ning of the sixteenth century and was spread to the rest of the globe by 
the modern domination of non-Europeans. Transformations within 
the history of modernity occur thanks to the progressive emancipation 
from domination, with the Enlightenment being a significant moment 
in this history (Rosich 2018). This particular kind of relation defines 
in a clear manner what constitutes a collectivity and its position in the 
social order, namely its ‘identity’, its spatial location and how domina-
tion is achieved. This extremely concise outline16 helps me to illustrate 
what lies at the core of general theories that divide the globe politically 
in spatial terms. The division of the globe between a North and a South 
reflects in geopolitical terms the political relation that has created the 
globe as the absolute space from where social relations based on a dia-
lectic of domination are established. The North–South divide allows for 
a hierarchical positioning of collective actors or for an all-embracing 
social stratification in spatial terms. The answer given to this spatial 
political ordering will depend on the normative standpoint of the 
actors, but both assume the view that the globe, as previously defined, 
is the framework for understanding an exclusive world-formation.
In spite of all the ideological and violent presuppositions, the 
previous political ordering based on the three-world model that 
disintegrated with the collapse of the communist bloc suggested the 
simultaneous coexistence, even at the same place and time, of a plural-
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ity of worlds not based on a binary distribution. Their interrelations 
were based on different, even opposed, social imaginaries, which for 
the most part were not signified in spatial terms. The assumption that 
there is one single world implies its globalisation, namely its absolute 
spatialisation. Depending on the emphasis, it is divided in a binary 
fashion if it is in conflict or it is represented as an aggregated whole if 
it is a network. In either case, its boundaries are spatial and, to put it 
ironically, they correspond to the atmosphere.
Confronted with the question of what makes us an interconnected 
totality, we have to boldly answer that we all as humans occupy space 
upon the spherical surface of the globe, which is politically shaped as 
the outcome of a history of modern domination.17 In metaphorical 
terms, a new raya divides the globe into two separate but interdepend-
ent parts. Once the structure of past domination is over but its effects 
in the present are still at work, the struggle between North and South 
becomes a contest between opposing interpretations of how the globe 
has to be politically constituted in the present. This is the reason why 
the South has also become global: it aspires to challenge the current 
hegemony of the North in the globe, that is, of the past imperial powers. 
The main objective of the societies of the South is to achieve full recog-
nition from the North by means of a redress of the historical injustice 
of global imperialism. Paradoxically, in order to attain this goal, the 
Global South has to work on the same assumption with which past 
imperialism worked: there has to be only one world that corresponds to 
the globe. This globalisation of the world is in radical conflict with the 
understanding of the world as suggested above: it looks for complete-
ness and total unity. From this angle, a world-in-common that medi-
ates relations between all human beings can only be sustained if a world 
is reduced to the globe.18 Moreover, what mediates social relations is 
domination, not collective human agency. In this context, agency is 
only recognised as belonging to those that globalised the world, namely 
the European world and its different settler colonists.
Reinterpretation of the world
But with all its persuasiveness, and even if we share the view that 
domination is a key feature of the constitution of the modern world, 
this narrative is not sufficient for the purpose of understanding what 
elements of the European world, if any, triggered its transformation 
into the globe and why the rest (read: the Global South) succumbed, 
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adopted it or reshaped it according to its own historical trajectory. 
Contemporary historical scholarship has provided enough empirical 
evidence to show that European civilisation was not modern according 
to its own criteria. In addition to these generally overlooked historical 
developments, world-historians are challenging in a radical way the 
view that the rise of Europe to world hegemony has to be equated with 
the birth of modernity.19 They test and nuance the premise that the 
European world is the site of the birth of modernity. On the contrary, 
drawing on their empirical work one can make a conceptual distinction 
between the constitution of the social imaginary significations of the 
modern world and the power relations within it. Thus, to see relations 
of domination within modernity makes it possible to break with any 
substantive notion of modernity as domination and to invalidate the 
view that interprets the end of Western global hegemony as the end of 
modernity. Power relations are a trans-historical dimension of human 
existence that cannot erase any meaningful understanding of history, 
change and transformation and the different and plural historical 
human self-understandings that have constituted historical worlds. 
These historians situate European modernity in a global context 
and look at how modernity originally emerged as a phenomenon in 
response to the new level of interdependence and interaction between 
worlds (Stråth and Wagner 2017).
Additionally, a closer examination of the history of ideas shows 
that the social imaginary that constituted the European world during 
the sixteenth century does not lend itself to be interpreted univocally 
as triggering its own globalisation. On the contrary, different oppos-
ing imaginaries were at work and only further developments, which 
took place above all during the nineteenth century, can explain the 
expansionist model. The methodology consists in confronting the self-
understanding of the European world with the empirical record that 
derives from its own interpretation of history (Wagner 2012: 84–90). 
The misleading assumption that the commitments to modernity were 
fully realised exclusively in Europe much before the Second World 
War is a kind of self-distorted understanding which was to some extent 
required to justify its role as global hegemon. This question points to a 
major problem when understanding why during Europe’s hegemony 
Europeans misinterpreted their own history. In my view, this is not 
due to a problem of falsity, error or alienation, but rather to a particular 
hermeneutical and phenomenological difficulty. The question is why 
Europe did not comprehend what she was when the sufficient historical 
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evidence and the conceptual apparatus to do so were already available. 
This tension makes it necessary to question the historical constitution, 
interpretative framework and actual availability of archives and canons 
from the perspective of the European histoires des mentalités.20 In my 
view, the intellectual sources where we have to investigate the reasons 
for this self-distorted interpretation are precisely the same that have 
been used to explain why modernity appeared first in Europe and why 
it was diffused globally. I have no space to discuss in detail the ascend-
ancy of these approaches, but the common root that lies at the core 
of the majority of them, critical or self-flattering, is based on the two 
worlds dualism and the associated conceptions of how these worlds 
interrelate.21
Three main intellectual traditions are singled out in this self-under-
standing: the constitution of philosophy in classical Greece, best rep-
resented by Plato’s distinction between the visible and the intelligible 
world; the transition to Hellenism in combination with the creation of 
Christianity (Assmann 2008: 77), namely a particular interpretation of 
God as creator of the world, as exemplified in the Augustinian distinc-
tion between the City of God and the City of Man (Eisenstadt 2003: I, 
45); and lastly, the transition to modernity understood as rationalisa-
tion and secularisation, which is generally associated with the Cartesian 
distinction between res cogitans and res extensa when questioning 
nature, in combination with the teachings of the Protestant reformers 
creating a gap between the ‘worldly’ world and the otherworldly world. 
The many versions of the philosophies of history that stem from the 
assumption of this dualism are a privileged site for investigating the 
origins of the distorted European self-understanding. This philosophy 
had to reconcile the outcomes of European agency in this world with 
the European comprehension of the contents of the other world.
This problem moves the discussion again to the level of world-
formation in relation to the civilisational dimension. As stated earlier, 
I have to insist on the idea that the temporality, contingency and 
incompleteness that constitute the world are the elements that allow 
for its transformation, namely the idea that despite being a meta-
physical concept, it is historical. In methodological terms, this imposes 
hard conditions when engaging in historical-interpretative analysis 
of worlds-formation.22 However, even when ‘the search for origins’ 
is a futile activity (Wagner 2016b), or even if teleological assumptions 
necessarily have to be made in order to pursue this search, if we have 
to understand the historical relation between different worlds, we 
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should look at those particular events that created the conditions for a 
global, not only regional, worlds-encounter and its codependent his-
torical transformations. The problem here is not the study of the rela-
tion between intra-civilisational developments and inter-civilisational 
interactions, that is, whether the notion of encounter or entanglement 
is more fruitful to understand worlds-(trans)formation. The current 
historical evidence seems to suggest that this is a question that cannot 
be answered without making a priori anthropological conjectures.23 
What is relevant is that there has been only one event in the history of 
civilisations, as Carl Schmitt also points out, that created the condi-
tions for a global, not only regional, worlds-encounter: the arrival of 
Europeans on American shores in 1492. Moreover, the nature of this 
event − radically contingent, novel, unexpected and unintended − had 
a huge impact, precisely because an encounter of that sort was com-
pletely unknown up to that moment. Only from then on is it plausible 
to interpret the history of civilisations and their transformations as 
interconnected while keeping at the same time a comparative opera-
tional concept of unit of analysis. This should provide a firm ground 
for the question of an eventual fusion, assimilation, conflict or parallel 
coexistence of horizons.
And yet, when it comes to the history of concepts and to the 
understanding of the modern imaginary as it is here defined, a major 
problem emerges insofar as the current historical sources suggest that 
the relation between what we call the European world and the modern 
imaginary, even if it is tension-ridden, seems to be different than with 
other worlds. This is still a major difficulty that has to be addressed 
even when one does not want to equate the history of modernity with 
the history of Europe. Regarding the question of the local context in 
which the modern imaginary emerges and the widening of its sig-
nificance, even though the European developments that produced a 
radical conceptual rupture with its own past did not produce historical 
modernity and thus were not diffused to the rest of the world, it is true 
that some important conceptual transformations related to the modern 
imaginary occurred in Europe from the fifteenth to the seventeenth 
centuries. To avoid the classical explanations offered for the appear-
ance of the modern imaginary, which are based on path-dependency 
and endogenous explanations, further historical and conceptual efforts 
should be devoted to investigating the interdependence between the 
inter-civilisational perspective – the ‘discovery of America’  − and the 
‘intra-civilisational’ one – in the case of Europe, the Reformation. 
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These events have not been analysed as deeply interrelated because 
historiographical research agrees that the impact on Europe of the ‘dis-
covery of the New World’ at the level of the imaginary was almost non-
existent up to the seventeenth century (Ryan 1981). However, though 
this may be true, when approaching the ideas and concepts that inform 
the modern imaginary and register the significance and relevance of 
events, research is needed in the history of ideas which aims at looking 
into the context of their appearance as constituted simultaneously by 
the interrelation of these two events. From this angle, it is essential to 
question the archives as if the transformations produced by these two 
major historical events were interdependent in conceptual terms. One 
should investigate all the intermediate levels of interaction between the 
different categories of social actors and the social imaginaries at play 
during this period in relation to the onset of the globalisation of the 
world (Cheah 2016: 5), without assuming their substitution or assimila-
tion to this totalising logic as postcolonial scholars do.
In sum, when interpreting what, if anything, interconnects all 
human beings, I have aimed at showing the need not to reduce the 
world(s) to the globe or the other way around. This approach requires 
interrelating both dynamics historically, conceptually and methodo-
logically. This cannot be done without proposing ways of reading 
the connection between processes of globalisation and worlds (trans)
formation. For instance, Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) distin-
guish between world-history, understood as the comparative study 
of civilisations, and global-history, which studies their interactions. 
Maintaining this distinction offers new insights when interpreting 
the history of human interconnectedness as driven by a dynamics of 
globalisation– deglobalisation–reglobalisation. Additionally, they do 
not identify one single globalising logic (either capitalism or imperial-
ism), but rather identify different logics at work that can be mutually 
contradictory and produce different outcomes. The concrete periodisa-
tion, spatialisation and (de)structuring will depend on the concrete 
interpretation of the interrelation between world and globe, that is, 
between common or divergent answers to processes of globalisation 
of different civilisations, as well as different degrees of (de)globalising 
agency depending on the varieties of categories of social groups and 
their relation at the intra- or inter-civilisational level (such as elites, 
migrants, religious groups, economic actors, and so on).
From the critical perspective adopted in this chapter regarding 
the insufficient but inescapable globalist understanding of the world, 
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I consider Dipesh Chakrabarty’s distinction between two different 
human histories – ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ is his labelling – a promis-
ing interpretative framework.24 If I adapt his distinction for my own 
purposes − which I think can be done despite the logical dependence 
of his distinction on an interpretation of capitalism from a Marxist 
perspective − one can read History 1 as the history of globalisation and 
History 2 as the history of worlds-formation. These histories should 
not be read as ‘past’, but as belonging to the historical period where 
the idea of a socio-political ordering of the totality of human beings 
is meaningful, which is still the case. What is decisive in his analysis is 
that both histories are not independent of each other despite different 
temporal and spatial logics being at work. It allows for the simultane-
ous presence of two divergent ontological realms determining the same 
phenomena: a ‘fact’ can be seen as fitting at the same time and place 
either into a global order or the particular world order where the global 
is embedded. The codependence of both histories makes the aspiration 
of History 1 to override History 2 hyperopic and the other way around, 
myopic: a full achievement of globalisation would undermine the con-
ditions that make it possible, and vice versa, acting as if globalisation 
were not a fact, one would be self-disoriented. In contrast to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, who sees History 1 as parasitical on History 2 and History 
2 as interrupting and deferring History 1, we should not identify any 
particular logic between them,25 and instead leave open to investiga-
tion for each concrete world the shape of this dynamic. The aim of a 
world(s)-history, from this perspective, is thus the comparative study of 
the interconnection of historical difference.
Planet Earth and the geological turn
The ‘Anthropocene’ hypothesis is transforming our epistemic under-
standing of the relation between the planet Earth and humans as living 
beings. It is difficult to know at this stage whether its current relevance 
is a symptom of a paradigm shift, whether it is related to the function-
ing of the academic market, or whether both dynamics are at work. 
Paul Crutzen, the Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist, coined 
the concept Anthropocene to suggest:
(i) that the Earth is now moving out of its current geological epoch, 
called the Holocene and (ii) that human activity is largely respon-
sible for this exit from the Holocene, that is, that humankind has 
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become a global geological force in its own right. (Steffen et al. 2011: 
843)
This condensed statement has a wide range of implications in all 
the spheres of human life, which can be summarised with two main 
‘ideas’: first, the ‘fact’ that it is not nature ‘who’ is progressively making 
the Earth inhospitable to human beings, but the same human beings 
through intensive use of fossil fuel for energy consumption and the 
mastery of nature,26 as if it were self-inflicted; second, this agency 
would also have (self-)cancelled the modern gap between nature and, 
for lack of a better word, artifice (Chakrabarty 2009). That is, natural 
history and human History 1 and 2 will have to be read from now on as 
interdependent. The alleged difference between objective things inde-
pendent of us, the natural realm, and what we create with the help of 
our own capacities and will, is no longer sustainable from the moment 
that we become a ‘geological force’. From this perspective, we will have 
to complement History 1 and History 2 with a third history, that is, the 
history of the evolution of human beings into a geological force in rela-
tion to the history of Earth as a system.
From the perspective of the spatial ordering that connects all human 
beings, the Anthropocene hypothesis represents a strong challenge. 
This hypothesis appears extremely controversial when interpreting 
historically when and how the Anthropocene emerged as well as 
who the subject/object is; depending on the answers given to these 
questions, different orderings may appear.27 That is, if we define this 
history as History 3, geo-archives and human archives will have to be 
read in conjunction. The idea that the frontier between natural and 
human history has been blurred due to anthropogenic transformation 
of the Earth is not very convincing. It corresponds to a very restric-
tive reading of the archives that constitute the intellectual history of 
modernity. The blurring hypothesis proceeds in a largely teleological 
fashion: it retrieves from the past one particular historical tradition 
among others – the one that created an insurmountable gap between 
natural and human history – in order to justify the hypothesis of a deep 
transformation in the present that has cancelled this distinction due 
to the effects of human agency. The question of the relation between 
nature and history has been very problematic from the beginning of 
modern times and is much more open and ambiguous than is affirmed 
in the philosophy of history of the Anthropocene.28 The intellectual 
tradition that created such a gap between nature and history appeared 
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during the so-called Age of Revolutions in connection to a particular 
strand of the Enlightenment and was already severely criticised from 
many perspectives during the second half of the nineteenth century.29 
Moreover, while it is true that in modernity nature is being constantly 
‘humanised’ by an expansionist philosophy that constitutes nature, in 
the words of Martin Heidegger, as a standing-reserve, this does not 
imply that the distinction is completely blurred. For this to be true, one 
should prove that humans have not only become a ‘geological force’, 
but an ‘all-encompassing absolute force’, which means that there is 
nothing which does not depend for its existence on the existence of 
the human beings. This is the classical position reserved for God in 
theological understandings of the place human beings occupy in the 
universe. What today seems plausible is only to claim that we can no 
longer separate Earth history from human history because human 
agency is transforming the biogeochemical conditions that make life 
possible on Earth.30 The delicate problem begins when interpreting this 
particular dialectical relation.
The question of subjectivity, of who is the ‘anthropos’ in the 
Anthropocene, has three dimensions: it refers to the question of who is 
responsible for triggering this process, who has in the present to respond 
to this challenge and who is affected by this process. These are not easy 
questions, and can by no means be answered from a ‘scientific’ point of 
view. The scientific account of the Anthropocene reintroduces a posi-
tivist philosophy of science as if ‘facts’ were independent of interpreta-
tions and as if ‘scientists’ have the qualitative differential knowledge 
required to address this situation (Bonneuil 2015). They read History 
1 and 2 only as constitutive elements of History 3. They postulate an 
undifferentiated and ahistorical human subject in answering questions 
related to the agency problem: that is, humankind as a species. This 
kind of answer also does not allow for posing the question of the rela-
tion between concrete civilisations and their relation to nature as quali-
tatively different from others when understanding the instrumental 
mastery of nature, that is, what History 2 does. Furthermore, it evades 
the question of the asymmetrical relation between global actors, which 
History 1 approaches by looking at the relations of domination between 
different collectivities as mediated by the globalising process of expan-
sion and the exploitation of nature. From this scientific perspective, the 
scientific hegemony in the interpretation of the Anthropocene erases 
any dimension of human spatiality. It makes it very difficult to read the 
Anthropocene as the outcome of a history of intra-species dominations, 
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not inter-species. South and North, from this critical angle, are spatial 
layers that refer to the subjectivities involved in the Anthropocene, 
understood as a further step in the modern history of human domina-
tion. As Christophe Bonneuil has suggested (2015), the scientific view 
depoliticises and naturalises History 3. The destabilisation of the rela-
tion between nature and artifice provoked by the hypothesis is fixed by 
reducing the artificial to the natural. The vulgarised Gaia hypothesis, a 
metaphor for considering the Earth as a living being, or labelling the 
Earth as a ‘system’, are attempts to relocate the human as one of its fun-
damental natural elements and convey a sense of totality where living 
and non-living entities are structurally combined as a self-regulating 
device. Another strategy would be to consider the Anthropocene as 
an ‘interpretative category by which contemporary societies reflect 
upon themselves and upon life itself . . . [that] contains strong norma-
tive elements, including imaginary significations’ (Delanty and Mota 
2017). This would allow us to avoid the dichotomy between facts and 
interpretations. However, there are as yet no empirical studies available 
that support this view. Additionally, as I will try to briefly explain, the 
Anthropocene framework does not allow too much room for thinking 
in terms of ‘societies’ and of the possibilities they have of acting upon 
themselves. On the contrary, it seems an interpretation of the current 
transformation that dissolves the possibilities of thinking individual or 
collective autonomy.
In contrast to world and globe, it seems almost impossible to refute 
the idea that the global deterioration of the environment affects literally 
all human beings. The history of becoming a geological force is thus 
the history of the actual interconnection of all past, present and future 
humans. There is no political, economic or epistemic escape from this 
condition that does not involve all human beings. Thus, to the question 
of what is the bond that equalises all human beings, the answer can 
only be the fact that all their lives are at risk because they are affected by 
climate change. Indeed, this bond equalises all living beings, not only 
humans. It is as if we are in the process of inventing a new collectivity, 
which is neither the sum of all individuals nor a new humanitas, but 
a sort of Leviathan that acts as unified species among others (Clark 
2015: 15–16).31 However, this answer becomes more problematic when 
we try to respond to the question of who has to face this challenge. 
Allegedly, if we are all affected, we should all act collectively to redress 
this risk. This answer suggests that the self who acts reflexively is the 
same self upon which the action is performed. This is the classical 
The Moral Mappings of South and North
40
example of autonomous action. In historical terms, this view would 
be supported by what has been labelled as the Great Acceleration, that 
is, the geobiochemical indicators used to quantify the deterioration of 
the environment exploded exponentially in relation to human inputs, 
above all fossil fuel, affecting the Earth soon after the end of the Second 
World War. As Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests, this is the same period of 
decolonisation, developmentalism and the globalisation of democratic 
patterns of consumption (Chakrabarty 2014). This hypothesis suggests 
that the South and the North have to share the burden when interpret-
ing who fostered the Anthropocene. Thus, if this is true, all human 
beings should be asked to collectively react at the same level. And yet, if 
we adopt the long-term perspective required when looking at epochal 
change from a geological angle, have all human histories actually con-
tributed equally to the constitution of the human living entity, of our 
species, as a geological force?32 Do we all have the same responsibilities 
even if all human beings act as a geological force? A recent article pub-
lished in Science, which aims at justifying the Anthropocene hypothesis 
stratigraphically, dilutes plural human historicity into an evolutionary 
logic that starts with the beginning of agriculture. Significant moments 
are the Columbian Exchange, using the title of Crosby’s book, and the 
Industrial Revolution (Waters et al. 2016). But how can one reconcile 
these extremely divisive social events in political, economic and epis-
temic terms with the view of a single and equal humanity assumed by 
the Anthropocene hypothesis?
4. Concluding overture: democracy and totality
The current historical constellation has brought into prominence an 
inescapable condition of our times. It is based on two observations. 
Historical injustice, in contrast to the past, has become an issue waiting 
for an answer now that non-European collectivities that in the past 
were dominated by Europeans are politically on an equal footing. As 
the history of globalisation aims to show, there are no humans in the 
present who are not heirs of this legacy of past domination: either as 
dominated or as dominant or both at the same time. From that angle, 
the distinction between a Global South/North aims at making visible 
the opposed subjectivities constituted by this legacy. This injustice 
was justified largely by the Global North on the grounds that they 
represented the interests of ‘humanity’. What in the past was a justi-
fication based on mere normative-conceptual reasoning that could be 
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mobilised at will depending on the context of domination, now appears 
to be a ‘fact’: a ‘real interest’33 of humanity exists which consists in the 
preservation of the geochemical conditions that allow the biological 
reproduction of human life. These two dimensions, as stated at the 
outset, have to be addressed democratically given that no other legiti-
mate regime of political justification is in competition with democracy, 
at least up to the present. Past democratic action, as it was embedded 
in the former ordering of the world, did not have to explicitly face the 
challenge of political totality, precisely because colonialism was still a 
reality and knowledge of climate change was not yet available. Every 
time that political action targeted human totality it was undemocratic.
The relations between democracy and totality have been extremely 
problematic in historical and conceptual terms. This is due to the fact 
that democracy entails a double process of exclusion/inclusion, which 
occurs simultaneously during the (re)constitution of new democracies: 
first, it establishes an external boundary, even if it is porous and flexible 
– namely, if ‘identity’ is not given and fixed – between the demos and 
the other; and second, the internal workings of a democratic regime 
presupposes a division between party and people. This double process is 
tension-ridden: in order to constitute the demos as the collectivity that 
creates the necessary external boundary in order to determine oneself, 
the internal division between party and people has to be cancelled and 
the people has to appear phenomenologically as one, as an indivis-
ible whole. This representation creates an internal conflict because it 
imposes limits on the possibilities of the self to transform, that is, the 
self that is actually determining must correspond to the representation 
of the people-as-one, thus the possibilities of democratic action are 
restricted; and at the same time, the political division between parties is 
established as a contest to represent the people-as-one, the indivisible 
whole: a part aspires to become the whole. To make matters more com-
plicated, when the demos is seen from the perspective of its interaction 
with the others, it appears as a divided part that excludes itself from the 
whole in order to self-determine. In sum, democracy presupposes some 
degree of wholeness but precludes totalisation. Or in other words, it 
requires divisiveness but posits oneness.34 Against the background of 
the previous sections, this brief outline of the democratic form ques-
tions any straightforward democratic socio-political ordering of the 
totality of human beings. It is an ordering that, as I have tried to show, 
has three different historical and conceptual frames: world politics, 
geopolitics and Earth politics. If this is true, then the question of who is 
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the collectivity that acts upon itself democratically becomes a complex 
issue with no clear answer. For lack of space, I will address the issue 
from only the perspective of Earth politics.35 The following reasoning is 
only conceptual. This is partly due to the fact that the event to which it 
refers is currently taking place.
When we are confronted with this problem from the perspective of 
humans as a ‘geological force’, the answer to the question of who is the 
people-as-one seems simple: humanity considered as a living being, 
namely humanity as a particular species. Therefore, what constitutes 
us as a collectivity is the fact that our biological life is threatened. The 
first difficulty with this answer is that it assumes that no human col-
lectivity is excluded from this demos: all human beings are included 
by the mere fact of belonging to the human species. If an exclusion is 
created through self-determination,36 either a qualitative interpretation 
of the human species has to be provided that contradicts the idea that 
all ‘humans’ belong to this species, or on the contrary, the wholeness 
from which humans exclude themselves as a part is the totality of all 
‘living beings’, of all species. Both solutions do not seem adequate: the 
former because it gives room to a eugenic politics that questions the 
ground from which it emerges from the moment it threatens the life 
of a part of humanity, and the latter because it assumes that all species 
can interact reciprocally on equal and democratic terms, which appears 
not to be the case. The Hobbesian paradigm seems to offer the best nor-
mative solution to this problem, but we can hardly say that it is based 
on democracy. Rather, it is based on the idea of absolute sovereignty 
whose purpose is the preservation of life: human beings cede their 
‘natural’ force to the sovereign in order to protect their lives.37
If we look at the same problem from the perspective of who is the 
self that could act upon the human as a species, as Dipesh Chakrabarty 
contends, ‘we humans never experience ourselves as a species’ (2009: 
220). If, nevertheless, we want to know what party would appear phe-
nomenologically as the people-as-one in the contest for representing 
the human species, the problem would be what might happen to the 
other parties when the representation of the people-as-one is based on 
the idea of ‘securing life’. Will they represent a threat to this attaining 
objective? The solution to this potential risk is already in place: it corre-
sponds to the concept of human rights and their constitutionalisation. 
The problem with this solution is, first, that this constitution would 
have to be global; second, that individuals would be those protected by 
human rights; and third, that these rights could not be transformed by 
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democratic action. Again, this may lead to the advocacy of a global state 
to confront this challenge, but it is mainly based on views of the state as 
having a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organised violence 
(Wendt 2003), not as the outcome of democratic self-transformation.
To conclude, and by way of illustration, I would like to quote one of 
the paragraphs of the preamble to the 2015 Paris Agreement reached 
between UN members ‘to combat climate change and to accelerate 
and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low 
carbon future’.38 This agreement has been labelled as historical. At this 
stage, we do not know how, if at all, it will be implemented, namely 
we do not yet know the impact of realpolitik. As Martti Koskenniemi 
has recently explained, there is no institutional measure or policy that 
does not appear to be shaped by a particular strategy of a singular 
actor to respond to a particular context. ‘Humanity’ does not talk and 
act; someone has to speak on its behalf. In this regard, he states that 
the conflict between a developed North and the Global South is the 
political translation in the present reflecting the implicit bias of any 
cosmopolitan project (Koskenniemi 2012). However, it is worth noting 
that this paragraph surprisingly recognises the three levels that mediate 
interconnectedness − world, globe and planet Earth − that I have aimed 
at articulating. The paragraph says:
Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, 
including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognised by 
some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting the importance for some 
of the concept of ‘climate justice’, when taking action to address 
climate change [. . .] (United Nations 2015: 2; my emphasis)
Alas, in this twenty-seven-page document with twenty-nine articles, 
not a single instance of the word ‘democracy’ appears. One is tempted 
to think that the reason why the signatory parties did not refer to 
democracy in the agreement was because they believed that democracy 
cannot ‘ensure the integrity of all ecosystems’ and produce ‘climate 
justice’.39
Notes
 1. This may appear to be an unqualified statement given that China, representing 
a significant part of the global population, is not considered a democracy from 
a Western perspective. Despite the opacity of Chinese politics for a Western-
trained mind, I am here interested in the justifications offered to support or 
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challenge a political regime. In this context, it is important to outline that the first 
article of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 1982, 
states that China is a ‘socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship’. 
See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, available at <http://english.
gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474982987458.htm> (last 
acc essed 11 January 2017).
 2. See Benhabib (2004) for a contemporary effort to make them compatible.
 3. Therefore, what makes a human being ‘human’ is the outcome of a particular 
representation of biological and evolutionary sciences.
 4. Raimon Panikkar has called this fusion of horizons ‘diatopical hermeneutics’. It 
‘stands for the thematic consideration of understanding the other without assum-
ing that the other has the same basic self-understanding. The ultimate human 
horizon, and not only differing contexts, is at stake here’ (1979: 49; original 
emphasis).
 5. Arendt identified this fact as evidence of a human desire to escape from the 
human condition.
 6. Other pictures were taken before, but not in colour and showing the complete 
spherical surface of the planet.
 7. The environment, in contrast to space, refers to nature as modified by humans.
 8. It is important to specify that I am referring to the concept of civilisation from 
the perspective of the history of world formation, not the other way around. No 
spatio-temporal assumptions should be made when associating collectivities with 
particular civilisations. As Arjomand and Tiryakian point out, ‘civilizations are 
not fixed in time and space’ (2004: 4).
 9. In the history of Western philosophy, this is the core tension that separates Kant 
from idealism and created two opposing interpretations of epistemic modernity. 
Hegel aims at overcoming the limits that Kant established in relation to the pos-
sibility of ‘knowing’ the world, namely the need to assume the idea of the abso-
lutely unconditioned in order to know actual phenomena, which confronts the 
logical and metaphysical impossibility of knowing the unconditioned by means 
of knowing the totality of phenomena. Hegel starts the other way round: he 
ontogenetically postulates the unconditioned, Reason, and he derives the totality 
of phenomena from it.
 10. ‘As soon as the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as a 
world view’ (Heidegger 1977: 134).
 11. This is the theoretical assumption that makes the idea of a world-history possible.
 12. The following lines are based on the understanding of modernity elaborated 
by Johann Arnason, Shmuel Eisenstadt and Peter Wagner. The three of them 
base their conceptual approach, on different levels, on the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis.
 13. See Duchesne (2011) for an updated defence of this position, combining concep-
tual and empirical arguments, against all the revisionist historiography that ques-
tions any normative superiority of the Western world for explaining its global 
supremacy in the last two centuries.
 14. See Wagner (2016a) for a nuanced version of this argument.
 15. In my view, the main problem with the Nomos of the Earth is that it connects a 
historical occurrence, the ‘discovery of the New World’, which had huge implica-
tions for the construction of a world order and the formation of global empires, 
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with a normative view on the political, namely with the idea that it allowed the 
bracketing of war among European powers because they could wage war in 
unoccupied territories where only the law of the stronger applied. I agree with 
many elements of Schmitt’s analysis of the impact of the ‘discovery of the New 
World’, but not his normative interpretation, which is based on a particular 
political philosophy and on a biased narrative on the history of Europe (Rosich 
2018).
 16. See Rosich (2018) for an extended version of this argument.
 17. Raewyn Connell, talking about spatial divisions of the globe, states that ‘[a]ll these 
expressions refer to the long-lasting pattern of inequality in power, wealth and 
cultural influence that grew historically out of European and North American 
imperialism’ (2007: 2012).
 18. The distinction, very widely used in the Francophone scholarship, made between 
mundialisation – making a human world common to all, though there are dif-
ferent ways of doing it – and globalisation, has the same result, namely the idea 
that universalism has to be understood in spatial and totalising terms and as it 
is defined in set theory: either as a shared world of which every single human 
being is a part, or as the whole extension of the globe’s surface where human 
beings reside. See Derrida and Rottenberg (2002: 371, 386); Nancy (2007). I have 
suggested elsewhere that this is only possible if we consider the individual as the 
primary political and social actor.
 19. Among them: Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), Jürgen Osterhammel (2014), Jack 
Goldstone (2009), Christopher Bayly (2004), John Darwin and David Armitage 
(Armitage and Subrahmanyam 2009).
 20. Another strategy would be to contend that in order to justify European domina-
tion, elites had to produce a particular ideology to legitimise it. However, this 
explanation is too simplistic regarding the relation between ideas and experience.
 21. This dualism, as the Axial Age hypothesis has aimed to show, was consti-
tuted simultaneously in different civilisations during the first millennium bce 
(Arnason et al. 2005). The particular understanding of the relation between both 
worlds and the respective historical trajectory is what, supposedly, makes Europe 
unique (Eisenstadt 2003: I, 349).
 22. I have discussed the main methodological problems in Rosich (2018). They are 
related to diffusionism, reductionism, positivism, path dependency, overgeneral-
ising and inference methods.
 23. Historical evidence in this context means those empirical elements that allow for 
the interpretation of ‘social imaginary significations’.
 24. I think it is worth quoting Chakrabarty at length: ‘On one side is the indispensa-
ble and universal narrative of capital— History 1, as I have called it. This narrative 
both gives us a critique of capitalist imperialism and affords elusive but necessar-
ily energising glimpses of the Enlightenment promise of an abstract, universal 
but never-to-be-realised humanity. Without such elusive glimpses, as I have 
said before, there is no political modernity. On the other side is thought about 
diverse ways of being human, the infinite incommensurabilities through which 
we  struggle—perennially, precariously, but unavoidably—to “world the earth” in 
order to live within our different senses of ontic belonging. These are the strug-
gles that become—when in contact with capital—the History 2s that in practice 
always modify and interrupt the totalizing thrusts of History 1’ (2000: 254).
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 25. Capitalism is a particular understanding of ‘life’; it corresponds to a concrete 
social imaginary signification and in other settings their dynamic is not inter-
preted as conflictive but as complementary.
 26. Crossing the ‘planetary boundaries’ – a set of thresholds that should not be 
overcome if the Earth is to be a ‘safe operating space’ for humanity – is the con-
sequence of mastering nature. For the scientific concept of planetary boundaries, 
see Rockström et al. (2009).
 27. I can only discuss here the ‘who’ question. The interdependent issues related to 
how and when cannot be addressed here in detail. They refer to what has been 
the global human driver of this epochal transformation – capitalism, imperialism, 
emancipation from domination, freedom − and what dimension of the human 
condition − cultural, genetic, evolutionary, economic, political, epistemic, and so 
on − is implied in this new sort of agency called ‘geological force’.
 28. For instance, the philosophy of history of Immanuel Kant, one of the most 
influential thinkers of modernity, is based on the idea that ‘the means which 
Nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of 
antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run 
the cause of a law-governed social order’ (Kant [1784] 1989: 44). I see no way of 
disconnecting nature from society in such a statement. Indeed, I believe that 
Kant’s works are the first attempt to read, as Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests we 
have to do, both histories as interdependent.
 29. Christophe Bonneuil and Jean Fressoz (2016) offer a summary with examples of 
these different intellectual critiques.
 30. To respond that it is natural selection and historical contingency that have 
endowed humans with the required ‘natural force’ to transform the Earth may 
blur the distinction between self-made and non-self-made history, but it just 
displaces the discussion onto other sorts of oppositions concerning, for instance, 
whether mathematical laws govern nature or not.
 31. In relation to this invented collective subject, Timothy Clark quotes a telling par-
agraph of Michel Serres, one of the first thinkers to talk about the Anthropocene 
without using the word: ‘Seen from above, from this new high place, Earth con-
tains all our ancestors, indistinguishably mingled: the universal tomb of universal 
history. What funeral service do all these vapour plumes herald? And since, from 
up here, no-one perceives borders, which are abstract in any case, we can speak 
for the first time of Adam and Eve, our first common parents, and thus of broth-
erhood. One humanity at last’ (2015: 4).
 32. The reference to the concept of ‘force’ in these texts is puzzling. Their aim is to 
equate human performance with natural events having the capacity to alter the 
shape of the Earth, ‘the forces of nature’ like volcanoes, earthquakes or orbital 
changes. This may suggest that when the outcome of human performance is 
‘intended’, we are fully responsible agents, and when it is negative, it is unin-
tended and is determined by natural laws that we did not know of.
 33. As long as this is anthropologically true, and this is not evident at all. For 
instance, Freud identified two different, contradictory anthropological instincts. 
He called them ‘Eros’ and ‘Thanatos’. One is directed towards life and the other 
towards destruction.
 34. Political theory has theorised democracy from the internal perspective as if the 
external one was a consequence of its workings. In historical and conceptual 
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terms, this is not justifiable. Even Claude Lefort, the inspiration from which my 
reflection starts, seems to assign ontogenetic priority to the inner workings of the 
democratic polity. The reappearance of the democratic imaginary in historical 
terms, the so-called Age of Revolutions, is a phenomenon that has to be inves-
tigated from its beginnings as a response to global developments. The dialectics 
between empire and claims to independence are of paramount importance for 
that purpose. See Rosich (2018).
 35. See Rosich (2016) for an analysis from the perspective of historical injustice.
 36. To determine is to establish a limit. Without determination, there is nothing.
 37. The philosophical trend known as biopolitics stems from this tradition. See 
Fuster (2014) for a critique on the same grounds of the ‘left oriented’ politics of 
vulnerability based on the idea of precarious life, best represented by the current 
work of Judith Butler.
 38. See the United Nations website on climate change, available at <http://unfccc.int/
paris_agreement/items/9485.php> (last accessed 11 January 2017).
 39. Indeed, this is what past communist countries claimed during the ‘Cold War’. 
Now it is a justification offered as well by some voices in China. See Purdy (2015: 
256).
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3
The BRICS Countries: Time and Space in Moral 
Narratives of Development
Cláudio Costa Pinheiro
Modernity has not only been merely preoccupied with progress and advance, 
but also loss and disappearance. Loss is also good to think in regard to what it 
means to be Modern.
Sumathi Ramaswamy, The Lost Land of Lemuria
In November 2001, an economist at a London investment bank was going over lists of international GDP indicators, comparing the 
developed countries of the G7 with what he called ‘some of the largest 
emerging market economies’. He concluded that Brazil, Russia, China 
and India would be the world’s leading economies by 2050, surpassing 
the six most prosperous countries of the West. Although the statement 
was bold, it came within a brief seven-page working paper brightly 
titled ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’ (O’Neill 2001). The 
very suggestion of a ‘better world’ right around Christmas time was a 
welcome relief after a fiscal year marked by the impact of the September 
11 attacks.
Time has passed and Jim O’Neill’s argument has gained resonance. 
Since 2001, his futurological forecast has attracted its share of fans. 
International media brought together market economists and govern-
ment technocrats for live debates, skyrocketing online sales of self-help 
literature on global developmentalism. At the heart of the argument, an 
old question persisted: can peripheral countries play leading roles on 
the world’s political and economic agenda for promoting development 
and progress?
In further articles and interviews O’Neill, senior analyst at Goldman 
Sachs Bank, insisted that the BRICs would be the new global locomotive, 
moving down the target date of the forthcoming future, from 2050 to 
2039 and then to 2032 – sustained by the projection of the huge annual 
growth rates of those countries between 2001 and 2012, and aspects like 
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the Brazilian discovery of offshore oil reserves, in 2006. BRICs eventu-
ally became the topos of discussions that associated emerging countries 
with a new developmental wave. The BRICs idea turned O’Neill into 
a celebrity of neo-developmentalism and a bestselling author (O’Neill 
2011, 2013). Beyond the author’s persona, this concept has also helped 
reorganise the political agenda of all the peripheries of international 
capitalism, not just the BRIC countries. Of course, not everyone agreed 
with O’Neill’s exercise in predicting such a future. It has received much 
criticism and has even been disregarded as fortune telling.
Nevertheless, others have taken this prediction seriously and in 2006, 
the first summit of the BRIC countries coincided with the UN General 
Assembly. Shortly after that, the financial crisis of 2007–8 would ratify 
O’Neill’s forecast, paralysing North Atlantic economies and sparing 
emerging markets. As a result, the importance of the BRICs grew sig-
nificantly. Later, in 2011, South Africa – part of IBSA, another bloc of 
emerging countries that included Brazil and India – was incorporated 
and BRIC became BRICS, though the addition was questioned by 
several experts, including O’Neill himself, who had suggested Mexico 
or Turkey instead. In any case, O’Neill’s acronym evoked a metaphor 
of bricks that would rebuild the architecture of the world’s economy 
and politics, and BRICS ultimately became reality. This should not be 
surprising; after all, as Robert Merton once said, representations are 
‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ (1948).
Recent reaccommodations in world geopolitics and global econom-
ics, however, seem to have changed expectations about the capacity of 
these emerging countries to address development and promote wealth 
distribution. Some analysis has gone as far as announcing the end of 
the BRICS bloc. These forecasts emerged in 2013 and gained momen-
tum in 2015, coinciding with the downturn of GDP taxes in the BRIC 
countries. Actually, the present contribution does not aim to discuss 
what the future of the BRICS will be – nor even if there will be one. 
After all, as the famous quote attributed to John Kenneth Galbraith 
says, ‘the only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology 
look respectable’.
This piece, on the contrary, aims at taking Merton’s statement one 
step further, observing how representations and prophecies are assimi-
lated into an agenda that comprises development theories, narratives 
of modernity and exercises of place-making.1 This chapter considers 
revisiting these three axes, observing how vocabularies of development 
were largely organised around binary oppositions (identified with the 
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rhetoric of progress or the absence thereof) and contributed to defin-
ing a certain semantics of inequality. Furthermore, these vocabularies 
referred to modernity as an encompassing condition that concurs in 
conceiving development indistinguishably in terms of time and space, 
associating areas of poverty (or the absence of wealth) with the past, 
and a cartographic imagination of futures with expectations of prosper-
ity. In addition, developmental analysis not only helped to consolidate 
readings of progress in terms of cartographies of time and chronologies 
of space – ultimately illustrated through concepts like Third World, 
Global South or Developed Countries – but also conceptualised time 
and space as variables provided with moral attributes, a dimension 
emphasised by some authors (Sack 1997; Smith 2000; Lee and Smith 
2004). With that in mind, this chapter then turns to the relevance 
of BRICS for social sciences, analysing how the acronym describes 
geographies (of prosperity and lack thereof) and revisits some artifices 
of place-making operative in sociological debate from the end of the 
Second World War onwards – addressed through approaches like ‘area 
studies’ and ‘cultural areas’.
Modernity, time and spaces of uneven development
Although the process of place-imagining predates modernity – Plato 
described Atlantis in 360 bc – tales of fantastic lands became a 
common topos during the period. Representations and prophecies 
about prosperous and impoverished lands mesmerised Europeans 
since the Middle Ages, but the fascination with this sort of literature 
and accounts grew significantly in modern times. A considerable 
number of the first European voyages of exploration were inspired by 
myths of fantastic worlds filled with extraordinary treasures. During 
this period, Europeans sailed off to the Americas, Africa and Asia 
in search of promised lands described in a plethora of myths and 
narratives (Johnson 1998; Manguel and Guadalupi 2000). These nar-
ratives included the mythical City of the Caesars (rumoured to exist 
in Patagonia, Argentina), the island of Hy-Brazil spotted by Saint 
Brendon, and the mythological continent of Lemuria (which was 
somewhere between Africa and India, according to nineteenth-century 
Indian theory), brilliantly analysed by Sumathi Ramaswamy (2001) and 
many others.
Modernity did much more than systematically connect parts of 
the globe, as a consequence of colonialism, trade, the expansion of 
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Christian missions and of an enormous apparatus of technologies 
produced to satisfy Western curiosity concerning the other (Stagl 
1995). It also supposed exercises of imagination and of invention of 
geographies as indistinguishable attributes of a topology of power. As 
Edward Said (1978) has argued, modernity has made imagination a 
privilege of power (of colonisers over colonised). This strengthens the 
difference between centre(s), which have the power to imagine, and 
periphery(ies) as the product or subject of the imagination (in politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural terms). In this regard, Said analyses 
Orientalism as a technology and as a Western repertoire of power 
that associates imagination with the production of representations, 
ultimately referring back to a structure of domination in the service of 
colonialism.
It would be interesting to provoke a dialogue between Said and 
Ramaswamy. After all, reflecting on both progress and its absence is 
a condition of modernity; one that evokes the gap between centre – a 
place of prosperity and the crafter of the imagination – and  peripheries 
– loci of the absence of prosperity and an adjective of metropolitan 
poetics and policies of representation. Although Said does not use the 
argument of a moral economy of development that separates ‘us’ from 
the ‘other’, he evokes this tension between contradictory structures 
that characterise modernity. This historical-culturalist interpretation 
of macro-narratives on the invention of otherness has also influenced 
the debate on economic theory.
From the eighteenth century onwards, various theoretical models 
tried to explain diversity (of peoples, languages, lands, and so on) in 
terms of evolutionary hierarchies around concepts of progress. Adam 
Smith’s classic An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations (1776) – most probably one of the first works to discuss 
the political economy of progress – divided the world into ‘prosper-
ous’ and ‘savage’ nations. His essay provides an economic and moral 
explanation of the ‘different progress of opulence in different nations’, 
towards ‘wealth and improvement’.
Smith’s concepts of wealth and progress evoke a semantic constel-
lation of arguments ultimately related to moral concepts of evolution, 
which he associated with categories such as improvement, progress, 
wealth, civilisation, and so on. In this regard, ‘wealthy nations’ (civi-
lised and prosperous) stood in stark contrast to ‘savage and barba-
rous nations’ (wild and poor). For Smith, difference and diversity in 
historical, economic and social terms are inevitably bound to ideas of 
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advancement and progress and to narratives of its absence. Progress 
would become the ultimate goal of humanity but access to its benefits 
would be limited to certain people and territories. This assumption 
nourished binary oppositions – antinomies of modernity – that have 
organised the understanding of otherness since post-Enlightenment 
times. In addition to consolidating a structure of antinomies in eco-
nomic thought, Smith’s essay established a set of categories that would 
persist until the Second World War (Arndt 1981; Rist 2009). The idea of 
‘material progress’ as a synonym for ‘economic development’ became 
central to economic debate between the late nineteenth and mid-
twentieth centuries.
Economists utilised the concept of economic development, espe-
cially when debating economic theories and theories of empire in the 
late nineteenth century. The concept was mainly identified with ideas 
such as industrialisation, modernisation and Westernisation (see, 
among others, Marshall 1890; Schumpeter [1911] 1934). The promo-
tion of economic development was associated with colonialism and its 
mandate became more apparent in the late nineteenth century, under 
the notion of trusteeship. Trusteeship (Arndt 1981: 463) referred to a 
legal and political concept based on the idea that progress should be 
attained under the tutelage of the colonial metropolises. The concept 
would be very popular until the Second World War, after which it 
gained new wind and was reframed in a new vocabulary. During this 
period, it basically reproduced the binary divisions between develop-
ment and lack thereof, reframing the idea of development, which 
became ‘development-promoting policies’, ‘assisted development’ and 
similar terms. Later, in the 1940s to 1950s, concepts like ‘backward 
areas’, ‘poor countries’ and ‘underdeveloped areas’ began to replace the 
‘savage nations’ of Adam Smith.
Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address is a key part in this move-
ment insofar as it has the effect of consolidating not just a new 
vocabulary, but a wholly new ontology of otherness based on economic 
rationality. ‘We must embark on a bold new program for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available 
for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’ (Truman 
1949; my emphasis). That speech immediately made two billion people 
across the world underdeveloped. While the lexicon varied, it still 
remained organised through pairs of binary opposition consolidating 
views of progress and development through a semantics of inequality. 
In turn, the antinomies of modernity based on this semantics (Kaiwar 
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and Mazumdar 2003) lent support to the idea that the international 
geopolitics of development tends to create a global division between 
the countries that accumulate wealth and those unable to develop. This 
lengthy process summarises Ramaswamy’s argument by presenting 
modernity through experiences of development and its absence. The 
post-war period was very fertile in terms of fashioning narratives of 
global development, narratives that presented new mythologies and 
a new lexicon while expressing concern over the fair distribution of 
wealth.
Jim O’Neill’s exercise of imagining the BRICS as the hope for a 
new developmentalism is not the first case of a situation analysis, with 
ambitions of futurological forecasting aspects of global geopolitics, 
eventually becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Others have attempted 
to introduce a new lexicon and new arrangements of international geo-
politics by defining alterity in terms of moral aspects of development 
and progress.
In August 1952, the French magazine L’Observateur published one of 
the most important articles of the twentieth century: Trois mondes, une 
planète. This half-page essay became internationally known for coining 
the concept of the Third World. The author, the French geographer 
and demographer Alfred Sauvy (1898–1990), described a world divided 
into binary poles of opposing powers: ‘East and West’, ‘capitalism and 
communism’. It was also a world inhabited by a residual bloc of under-
developed regions, that is, the former and existing European colonies 
in Africa, Asia and the Americas, leaving other countries little option 
but to choose between one of the other two worlds, that is, the Soviet 
Union or the United States.
The article and the term gained immense popularity and helped 
consolidate the political semantics of the Cold War; it became a man-
datory reference in almost all debates concerning the international 
system at that time. Sauvy became famous and earned a prominent 
place on the global development agenda, joining the Conseil d’Études 
Économiques of the Secrétaire d’État à l’Économie Nationale et aux 
Finances, and becoming chairman of the Commission on Population 
and Development at the United Nations Economic and Social Council. 
He also joined the Collège de France (1962) and held posts at several 
academic institutions.2
That article in L’Observateur set off an avalanche of academic texts, 
development programmes, media debates on global economy, and so 
on. Several of these relied on the idea that the concept of a Third World 
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could encapsulate a global division between states and regions, hierar-
chically organised between those who won and those who lost the race 
for development, with the winners achieving prosperity and wealth, 
and subsequently reaching modernity. As a concept, then, Third World 
was converted into an epistemic reality with an almost ontological 
density, shared by the mainstream media, in academic debates, and by 
the institutions of global governance aimed at promoting development 
and addressing inequality.
Starting in the 1950s, a series of initiatives culminated in new vocab-
ularies intended to describe and rewrite the global political structure 
of the post-war period. The foundation of the Arab League (1945), the 
Bandung Conference (1955), the Cuban Revolution (1959), the meet-
ings of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961 onwards), the Organization 
of African Unity (1963), the oil crisis and participation of Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (1970s), the Brandt 
Commission (1980), the South Commission (1986–7) and many others 
marked a search for new models of development, but also disputes over 
the semantic classifications that characterised global geopolitics. It was 
the beginning of decolonisation in Asia and Africa and the concept 
Third World seemed to identify these new countries emerging from 
the dusk of colonialism. But Sauvy’s idea of a Third World hid striking 
distinctions between contexts of the periphery of capitalism, where the 
countries in Latin America had little in common with regions of Asia 
and Africa whose daily struggle against colonialism continued.
Roughly speaking, at that time Latin America oscillated between 
what was considered as the successful experiences of progress and 
modernisation of the First World and the search for new pathways 
for regional development, as evident in Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) debates on structuralism 
or dependency theory. At the other side of this underdeveloped world, 
African and Asian countries sought out new models that could break 
with the neo-colonial hegemony of the West. Some parts of the Third 
World believed in Sauvy’s prophecies and drifted towards one of the 
dominant poles, while others sought out new inspirations. Divergence 
in terms of beliefs and pathways of development were expressed in a 
vocabulary and semantics of inequality ascribed to the lack of develop-
ment in peripheral contexts.
Correspondingly, the Bandung Conference vocalised demands for 
a new development agenda in order to devise a new international 
architecture of power out of the framework of colonialism (Chatterjee 
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2005). Similar demands for stronger political participation in the global 
arena were presented by the members of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(which held its first meeting in September 1961) or by OPEC (captain-
ing concerns of other commodity-producing countries), following the 
oil crisis of the 1970s.
Third World was not a concept universally adopted; only certain 
intellectuals and politicians in Latin America, Asia and Africa used it 
in reference to the development agenda that would identify countries 
in the region. In some places, the term has consolidated notions of 
otherness and difference based on economic indicators, when material 
progress was viewed as a necessary condition for overcoming poverty. 
In other contexts, the enemy was the phantom of colonialism, ‘neo-
colonialism’, a term coined by Sukarno, President of Indonesia in 1955 
and instilled by Jean-Paul Sartre, Kwame N’Krumah, Frantz Fanon and 
others.
In the late 1960s, new research on inequality helped renew debate 
about the semantics of inequality, proposing another lexicon for 
development. The concept of the South emerged from discussions 
on global inequality, that is, the capitalist system’s failure to secure 
global well-being (Gregory 1994). In this context, the South shared 
the semantics of other binary divisions that had organised nations in 
terms of antinomies of modernity – synonymous with terms like the 
Third World, peripheral, semi-peripheral or underdeveloped coun-
tries. In these discussions, the North–South divide was identified with 
an extension of ‘material inequalities’ that separated ‘affluent nations’ 
(North America, Western Europe and Japan) from the ‘poor countries’ 
(in Asia, Africa and Latin America) struggling for a new international 
economic order that could rework the unsustainable balance. At that 
time, the South was economically and geographically identified with 
‘poor developing nations in the Southern Hemisphere’ (Amuzegar 
1976: 547). This approach made the South almost undistinguishable 
from Sauvy’s idea of the Third World, and initiatives such as the Brandt 
Commission (1977–8) and the South Commission (1987) again set 
global geography in antinomian terms. Common issues surrounding 
both concepts included the fight against poverty, commodity prices on 
the global market, corruption, militarism and especially industrialisa-
tion. However, the South became a much more polyphonic category, 
considering it was used in many different contexts, addressing different 
meanings.
In the early 1970s, the concept of the South became a tool of political 
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articulation, given the success of OPEC initiatives to raise the global 
prices of oil and to change, albeit temporarily, the global balance 
of power. In their successful push to increase prices, oil-producing 
countries tried to inspire a political movement for the recovery of 
international commodity values and to give the peripheral countries 
a more prominent role in global politics. In this context, the concept 
of the South represented a place of political enunciation, rather than a 
mere geography of absence or a lack of material progress. The concept 
has evolved into a far more complex amalgamation of actors, ideas, and 
theories of political and economic connections, distancing itself from 
euphemisms of poverty to highlight a new outline of power structures 
in a multi-polar world.
All these attempts at new lexicons capable of describing the global 
structure of power ended up in one way or another reinforcing the 
same antinomian divisions described by Adam Smith in the eighteenth 
century and views on modernity not far from Ramaswamy’s own. In 
all the discussions, two aspects were made relevant to the sociological 
debate, recapturing the idea of how the BRICS could impact on the 
agenda of social sciences. First, the range of these vocabularies also 
suggests disputes about how to classify these semantics of difference 
as geographies imagined by the centre (the case of terms like Third 
World) versus those imagined on the peripheries (as Non-Aligned 
Countries and the South). This dispute alludes to a discussion over the 
‘place of utterance’ (Bhabha 1994), a question of who defines geogra-
phies of development and of how they are defined. In Edward Said’s 
terms, we must ask how the periphery builds agency based on its own 
definition of itself – a definition, it should be noted, considered an 
attribute of power.
Furthermore, an important aspect in imagining these geographies 
within both economics and the social sciences is that these elements 
allow for comparisons between contexts (countries, territories, and so 
on).
What forged identity among the countries and regions of the Third 
World? They shared non-development and a commitment to promot-
ing material progress in a context where periphery was identified with 
poverty, non-democratic governments and inequality (economic and 
social). Basically, the Third World meant exclusion from the benefits 
of economic development and global politics. What created identity 
among movements like Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement? 
The need to respond to colonialism (and neo-colonialism) in order 
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to reorganise the political and economic agendas that characterise the 
relationship between centre (metropolis) and periphery (colonies). 
And what creates identity among the participants of the Global South? 
A desire to address political utterance in a global context where periph-
eries are associated with specific forms of politic-economic participa-
tion (as in the case of the OPEC countries).
Elements of a bricology?3
But what was so relevant and unique about the emergence of the 
so-called BRICS? Initially, the same condition that animated the 
peripheries of capitalism since the end of the Second World War: an 
expectation of change for the future. There was a belief that the tradi-
tional hierarchical structures of the global economy that had character-
ised the entire twentieth century – the US–USSR bipolarity, addressing 
development; and the Third Word, illustrating underdevelopment 
– could then be overcome.
There was also trust that this bloc of emerging countries could 
vocalise the demands of a periphery that was about much more than 
economic and political exclusion. As the world saw international 
geopolitics become increasingly multi-polar, this became particularly 
relevant. The BRICS recognised that they were what centres imag-
ined as periphery, thus deprived of the epistemic devices for creating 
self-representations.
In spite of these positive expectations, critics continued to insist that 
BRICS was an inadequate term for a coalition or political configuration, 
insisting on the supposed ‘lack of identity’ among these countries. This 
argument gave rise to economic and sociological arguments, both with 
points in common. According to these arguments, the BRICS initiative 
offers a remarkable opportunity to assess how sociological theory can 
explain global capitalism in a dialogue with economic theory by reviv-
ing experiences such as ECLAC, dependency theory or world-systems 
theory, rehabilitating the relevance of social sciences on the agenda of 
development theories.
The idea of BRICS helps to revisit the historical debate on develop-
ment theories (Rist 2009) and the insistence on antinomies as a way 
to understand modernity (Kaiwar and Mazumdar 2003). It has also 
encouraged a review of global geopolitical divisions vis-à-vis the devel-
opment debate. It other words, it establishes the relationship between 
concepts like ‘centre and periphery’ and ‘development and underde-
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velopment’ in a context of changes to financial flows, population and 
the political importance of certain regions. The economic analysis has 
focused on whether the new acronym represents a new grammar of 
developmentalism, with economically peripheral countries capturing 
a much bigger portion of wealth while the old core nations experience 
a severe economic crisis. As the renowned Brazilian economist Maria 
da Conceição Tavares has suggested, the centre–periphery division 
had been overtaken by the idea of ‘intermediate developing coun-
tries’ (Conceição Tavares 2010) – an argument that evokes Giovanni 
Arrighi’s thesis on the reconceptualisation of semi-peripheries of 
 capitalism (Arrighi 1990).
But the BRICS do not precisely fit into the rhetoric that separates 
imagined geographies in terms of progress or lack thereof. Instead, 
BRICS is a way to reflect on the historical belief about geographies of 
prosperity and future utopias. Thus, BRICS evokes another aspect of 
modernity that Ramaswamy did not consider: modernity is not only 
preoccupied with explaining the past and the present (i.e. interested 
in progress and its loss) but also with making predictions, with future 
expectations. O’Neill’s acronym does not refer to the present, but to 
idyllic expectations for the future. Or, to borrow Reinhart Koselleck’s 
([1979] 2006) category Erwartungshorizont, a horizon of expectations, a 
hope for the future. V. Y. Mudimbe (1988: 17–19) has reached a similar 
conclusion, viewing Africa as an intermediate space of ‘marginality’ 
divided between ‘the so-called African tradition and the projected 
modernity of colonialism’ – or, in the terms I employ, squeezed 
between past and future.
Economics, especially political economy, has traditionally been 
taken as the science of predicting or narrating the future (Johnson 
and Kenyon 1993), as can be seen in the term used for predicting 
scenarios of development, ‘economic forecasting’. The BRICS are not 
the only recent example of economic theory imagining the future 
potential of geographies and prosperity to come. A similar projection 
into the future characterised the development models of Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea – the so-called Asian Tigers or 
Dragons – in the 1990s (Vogel 1991).
Situational analyses of the global economy like O’Neill’s (frequently 
presented as ‘economic theories’) help us to understand how this field 
structures its discursive arguments concerning prosperity on two 
different levels. First, such arguments can be seen as teleologies and 
prophecies of development (that is, they provide an organised look at 
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the past and prospects for the future), and a narrative of its absence 
(that is, poverty, underdevelopment, dependence). At another level, 
(imagined) geographies are necessarily embedded in the representa-
tions of an expected prosperity in the future. This consideration allows 
us to examine how current economic theory is related to a long tradi-
tion of mythologies concerning development, progress and prosperity, 
produced by exercises in imagination and place-making.
Imagining future expectations for places suffering from shortcom-
ings in the present could represent a major challenge to sociological 
theory. Accordingly, it seems natural to contrast this view with the 
criticism of theories of modernity as an expression of a European 
experience conceived of as universal4 and the imposition of models 
of Western development5 as the single and inexorable path for world 
progress. In addition, the sociological theory approach to analysing the 
future could prove useful once again, since the rhetoric of emergence 
has characterised much of the analysis of peripheral societies, not only 
in terms of its economic bias, but also in politics or studies on social 
structure, morphology, and so on.
Futurology and forecasting may sound like unusual reflections in 
present-day sociology, but they have been popular in our field and have 
also been a very common demand on social scientists more generally. 
In the 1980s, the American Anthropological Association sponsored 
a ‘commission on futurology’ to consider forecasting scenarios with 
regard to population flows and the impacts of development in local 
contexts (Burman 1982, 1985). On the other hand, sociology itself has 
a long tradition of dealing with methods of forecasting, with a suppos-
edly scientific field – social forecasting – that determined regularities 
and predicted social behaviour (individual, institutional or collective); 
this can be found in some of Robert Merton’s writing (Henschel 1982; 
Horowitz 1974–5).
The relationship between geographical imagination and future expec-
tations helps us to summarise a final point in this chapter: the impor-
tance of spatiality for development debates and their consequences for 
the social sciences.
One recurring critique regards the heuristic value and the presumed 
relevance of the concept of BRICS to the social sciences. Some ana-
lysts suggest a certain ‘artificiality’ of this alliance based on the ‘lack 
of identity’. According to these critiques, Brazil, Russia, China, India 
and South Africa lack commonalities, cultural aspects such as history, 
language, culture and a shared social identity that would be required to 
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create synergy among them. The critics thus argue that it is unfeasible 
for BRICS to form an economic bloc – or even serve as the basis for a 
comparative sociological analysis. This assumption is based on a large 
degree of naivety. First of all, it is clear that the critics ignore the con-
nections between these countries (that is, the commonalities) while 
also assuming that cultural identity translates into economic commit-
ment and solidarity.
In addition to the attempts to define the ‘other’ of Western develop-
ment (the ‘savage’, ‘wild’ and ‘barbarous nations’ of Adam Smith, the 
Third World, the Global South, and so on), reflecting on the lack of 
identity among BRICS leads to another important question in the social 
sciences and economics: how the social sciences are used to pigeonhole 
geographical and cultural contexts in order to justify comparisons.
Soon after the Second World War, the world began to be divided 
into cultural areas, configuring the ‘area studies’ approach. Although 
the intention was to overcome the colonial outline of non-European 
societies, it generally reproduced this same divide. The impetus for 
‘area studies’ came from US and European academia (neither of 
which were considered ‘areas’) and ultimately maintained the same 
imperial borders, such as those conceived after the Berlin Conference 
(van Schendel 2002: 647–8). This definition of area studies led to the 
study of purportedly homogeneous, self-contained units detached 
from social realities. The process of developing ‘area studies’ as a form 
of compartmentalizing knowledge about societies other than North 
Atlantic ones had something in common with the ‘scramble for Africa’ 
a few decades earlier. This had consequences not only for how this 
pigeonholed world was approached but also for who studied and who 
financed the research on this new map of global subdivisions (Parmar 
2012). Area studies helped consolidate specialised and spatialised aca-
demic communities that existed as self-contained dominions. In the 
case of US academia, area studies brought competition for renown and 
research funding, and raised intellectual borders based on a geographi-
cal regionalisation of the world. This process contributed to a lack of 
communication between different specialists in area studies and to the 
creation of borders, rituals and native categories (the researchers) used 
to define these subdivisions, which came to form academic fiefdoms.6
Generally speaking, it was assumed that an area would represent a 
cultural region, a geographical entity identified by cultural and histori-
cal aspects of identification. People (ethnicities, groups, communities, 
and so on) were associated through cultural commonalities (historical 
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and linguistic connections, and so on) in a territory assigned to an area. 
It is true that area studies was not the only framework available for 
defining cultural geographies. Furthermore, area studies was associated 
with other culturalist understandings and scientific priorities for geog-
raphies of development. Area studies emerges as a relevant concept 
for the humanities in the post-war period, where it vied for hegemony 
with concepts such as ‘culture-area’ (Wissler 1927; Newman 1971) or 
‘socio-cultural area’ (Mintz 1971), both very popular in the social sci-
ences and linguistics, and ‘emerging economies’ (van Agtmael 2007), 
as a representation of otherness in the discourse on development in 
economics. It is relatively apparent that the critiques of a lack of shared 
identity between the BRICS countries are also based on expectations 
that ‘culture’ should produce connections. In addition, although area 
studies did not reify political borders, not even the nation state, it 
assumed that an area presupposed territorial contiguity. That is, 
although area studies recognises the nation state as a modern fable and 
although culturalist borders established no connections with political 
boundaries, the culturalist approach created new physical boundaries 
based on shared elements of ‘culture’ and on expectations of territo-
rial and cultural contiguity. The BRICS countries are dispersed across 
the map and, moreover, disconnected from the culturalist perspec-
tive; it would thus be highly unlikely for sociology to consider them a 
sociologically relevant unit and, correspondingly, to adopt them as a 
configuration under the terms of area studies.
The approach of area studies has been revised and criticised in 
recent years (van Schendel 2002; Slocum and Thomas 2003; Miyoshi 
and Harootuniam 2002). Since the turn of the century, the social sci-
ences have reconsidered the importance of spatiality in response to 
studies on globalisation (Appadurai 2000; van Schendel 2002; Slocum 
and Thomas 2003) and sought to rekindle the relationship between 
local–transnational–global spheres. Here social scientists have begun 
focusing on the interconnections, flows and articulations between 
centre and periphery (Appadurai 1996; Clifford 1997; Hannerz 1989), 
in the search for a global system that structures many local processes 
and brings them into being (Friedman 2000, 2001) while considering 
the importance of networks and local meanings within a global domain 
(Ong 1999; Tsing 2000). Appadurai went so far as to suggest the idea 
of processual geographies (2000), investing in analytical models that 
surpass fixed areas. This movement arose from a crisis of explanatory 
models that linked the place-imagining of contexts and geographies 
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with the elements that identified these contexts as units that could be 
compared with one another.
Then again, the question that concerns us here is how to deal with 
the BRICS from the point of view of sociological theory. By seeking 
cultural elements in common, we are also at risk of inventing some sort 
of bricology – ironic contemporary versions of colonial views like those 
of Brazilianists, Sinologists or Indologists – with their jargon, borders 
and idiosyncrasies. Although this search would be legitimate, it would 
create a path towards the type of specialisation that has already been so 
intensely criticised in recent years.
Yet within the supposed fragility and insignificance of the BRICS, 
there is an argument about the relevance of sociology to economic 
theory. The economic concept of ‘emerging’ (markets, economies 
and countries) breaks with expectations within area studies of territo-
rial continuity as an attribute of cultural identity. The analysis of the 
‘economic miracle’ of the 1990s, which pointed to the Asian Tigers as 
a model to be followed to promote global development, was also char-
acterised by disparities, as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South 
Korea existed outside a single area within area studies and were not 
geographically contiguous. The economic and sociological argument 
of that bricolage was based on how those economies fostered a new 
reading of the international capitalist system. In an emulation of the 
Weberian argument, the ‘Tigers’ shared a ‘Confucian ethics of capital-
ism’ (Hayhoe 1992; Lew et al. 2011).
In a sense, we can consider that Third World and Global South have 
arisen from the logics of area studies, given the rhetoric of absence and 
incompleteness (that is, the conditions of otherness of development: 
poverty, lack of development, unfinished modernity) as the element of 
identity between the countries and regions that made up those blocs. 
But in terms of the BRICS, what factors would help us establish a socio-
logical approach towards this geopolitical configuration?
Concluding remarks
From games of bricolage to theories of bricology?
The historical construction of theories of development has been largely 
associated with place-imagining and place-making, two inextricable 
exercises that helped to structure modernity around antinomies. This 
démarche also played a role in the semantics of inequality that  organised 
The Moral Mappings of South and North
66
global geopolitics and conceived of development as perpetual motion. 
Here the world was divided between contexts (countries, territories, 
regions and areas) that had attained modernity and those that had not. 
Analysing the emergence of new models of development also involves 
tackling expectations to reflect on the decline of other forms of devel-
opment and on the disappearance of certain sites of prosperity.
It might prove useful to analyse the BRICS within this framework, as 
this configuration challenges the social sciences to think about which 
elements could be relevant for the purposes of comparison in sociolog-
ical analysis: the importance of spatiality as a variable or expectations 
for the future. Accordingly, we can approach the BRICS as a discursive 
event (real or imaginary, the distinction is irrelevant here) that provides 
access to a debate where modernity is associated with the imagination 
of geographies of development connectedly, in following the methodol-
ogy proposed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam (1997, 2005). This author also 
criticises area studies for impertinently grouping distinct social and 
political experiences, pigeonholed into the culturalist approaches ulti-
mately referred to within the notion of ‘area’. What he proposes, then, 
is that we should connect the contexts to particular analytical elements, 
though this does not necessarily entail shared stories or cultures as a 
condition for sociological analysis.
We could finally highlight two debates surprisingly neglected in dis-
cussions about the BRICS to date: its approximations to the literature 
on empires, and on civilisational analysis. First, all BRICS members 
arose as postcolonial states largely based on the experiences of empires. 
All five of these countries share a history of configuring or integrating 
trans-regional empires faced with the task of classifying diversities 
(of people and territories) and of ruling difference, which ultimately 
transformed into inequality. This type of long-term political experience 
has provided these states with the know-how associated with institu-
tions and political categories for governing difference. Therefore, it 
is important to recognise that these countries constructed knowledge 
traditions for the colonial rule of difference (Souza Lima 2002), which 
interpreted diversity (ethnic, political, religious, gender, and so on) in 
terms of inequality (Therborn 2011: 20). Brazil, Russia, China, India 
and South Africa all have a long history of dealing with native popula-
tions, for example, grouping them under imperial ruling categories and 
later incorporating them into national states (institutions and popula-




These circumstances affected the national traditions of sociological 
thinking (in political science, sociology, anthropology and history – 
since economics is a separate case here). Although these traditions 
drew on the idiosyncratic political experiences of each country and 
determinedly reflected on the historical constitution of categories of 
diversity (again: ethnic, political, religious, gender, and so on), the dia-
logue between sociological agendas of peripheral countries has never 
existed in any systematic way. Thus, although rural studies occupy 
a prominent place in Brazilian sociology and are also a backbone of 
Indian sociology, the dialogue between these two nationally based 
sociological traditions is virtually non-existent.
Similarly, another debate curiously absent from observations on the 
BRICS is civilisational analysis. Civilisational analysis has grown out of 
a well-established sociological debate, particularly relevant to compar-
ative approaches between large structures – where civilisation consti-
tutes ‘the largest comprehensible unit of sociocultural study’ (Kavolis 
1995: 19) – and particularly to the entire discussion on modernity. It 
has not been drawn upon to approach sociological comparisons of 
the BRICS countries, although this literature is not at all incompatible 
with historical approaches to Indian, Russian, Chinese and Brazilian 
social sciences, where historical experience and cultural identity have 
frequently been understood through the framework of civilisation.
Much of the story of the concept of BRICS and its further develop-
ment finds echoes in other emerging peripheries of the Global South. 
During the 1990s, and especially the 2000s, unexpected political con-
figurations began to appear along the peripheries of the Global South 
– like MERCOSUR (the Southern Common Market, from 1994), IBSA 
(the India–Brazil–South Africa Agreement, 2003), ASPA (the Summit 
of South American–Arab Countries, 2005), ASA (the Africa–South 
America Summit, 2006) and others, and that is only considering ini-
tiatives in South America. Those responsible for these initiatives con-
sciously attempted to avoid the bipolarities that characterised global 
geopolitics during the Cold War, investing in alternative multi-polar 
orders and helping to address agency in peripheral countries as part of 
alternative geographies of development.
BRICS might be much more resourceful to social sciences as a meth-
odological approach and viewpoint for dealing with large and complex 
units of analysis where historical experiences of political configuration 
– as empires – and theoretical approaches to the analytical unit – as 
 civilisation – can play a role in guiding the research. It would also help 
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to move the centre of the analysis away from its current association with 
forecasting economics and towards a cultural approach to ‘civilization 
analysis as a sociology of culture’ (Kavolis 1995), where the debate on 
decentring modernity can be readdressed. As such, the BRICS might 
offer an interesting challenge to sociological theory. It could be used to 
produce ‘connections’ between political experiences and the sociologi-
cal agendas of those countries – traditionally confined to arguments 
about the incomparability of their national or regional arenas. This 
may help keep BRICS from being transformed into another area of 
studies, preventing a new field of bricology in the studies of peripheral 
countries. Finally, it could contribute to the development of a different 
approach to comparative studies in economics and the social sciences, 
whereby it would make sense to connect and compare geographic con-
figurations like Latin America and the Arab world.
Notes
1. Place-imagining and place-making refer to a trend in international academia that 
associates social sciences and geography. See Agnew and Duncan (1989); Gregory 
(1994); Miyoshi and Harootuniam (2002).
2. In two recent interviews, the famous French anthropologist Georges Balandier 
has claimed he gave Sauvy the idea for the phrase and Sauvy later used it without 
acknowledging him (Balandier et al. 2010; Balandier et al. forthcoming 2017).
3. I am adapting the French term bricolage as it allows the word-play with the BRICS. 
Thanks to Lena Lavinas for the suggestion of this term in the debates of the 
ANPOCS-BRICS forum.
4. European modernity is presented as the success of a particular epistemic approach 
that ‘should be’ applied globally, as previously criticised by Chatterjee (1997); 
Eisenstadt (2000); Chakrabarty (2000); Randeria (2002).
5. Western development is sometimes taken as a synonym for prosperity and mate-
rial progress (Smith [1776] 1904), and is at other time synonymous with economic 
development (Schumpeter [1911] 1934), economic progress (Clark 1940), or even 
industrialisation (Marshall 1890; Arrighi 1990).
6. ‘The scramble for the area led to an institutional anchoring of academic com-
munities worldwide, which trained separately, became engaged in area-specific 
discourses and debates, formed well-established reference circles, and developed 
similar mechanisms and rituals for patrolling their intellectual borders’ (van 
Schendel 2002: 648).
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Russia between East, West and North: 
Comments on the History of Moral Mapping
Maxim Khomyakov
Introduction
The ideas of Global South and Global North today seem to have substituted the previous geopolitical notion of an East–West 
divide as well as the concepts of the First, Second and Third Worlds. It 
is probably too obvious that this new divide is as biased and as loaded 
with ideological constructs and unavoidable contradictions as both 
previous ones. If we pay closer attention to the details, we find the 
difficulties, which blur the picture. How, for example, did Australia 
turn out to be in the Global North or Russia, the former leader of the 
‘Eastern’ or ‘Second’ World, drift towards the Global South together 
with its polar regions and Arctic ambitions? It is not really clear how 
one can unite culturally, geographically, economically and politi-
cally different countries into a single unit as wide as a Global North 
or Global South. If North is neatly defined as European and North 
American societies (with the possible inclusion of Australia and New 
Zealand), one can only wonder whether we do not face here the good 
old Eurocentric world-outlook in just slightly changed clothes. This 
really becomes obvious when a relatively homogenous ‘North’ is 
opposed to a ‘South’ containing countries as different as India, Brazil, 
China, Russia and South Africa. Political will and overlapping interests 
can probably bring these countries closer within the frameworks of the 
BRICS countries club; but they cannot change the background of very 
different histories, the background from the depths of which they ask 
and answer questions concerning their being in the modern world.
The interesting question, thus, is not why this or that country is 
included in (or excluded from) the putative or real Global South, but 
how a particular culture positions itself in a world understood in terms 
of various geographical, geopolitical and geocultural divides. Essentially 
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the same question is about the ways in which a particular culture maps 
the globe. Of course, this mapping or positioning is a historical phe-
nomenon and does change with the passing of time. Like large tectonic 
plates, cultures can also drift to the West or East, float to the South or 
North and cause violent eruptions when they collide. Thus, countries, 
which several decades ago were defined as Eastern, now seem to belong 
to the West or North. Sometimes this drift, accelerated by politics, can 
be as radical and fast-moving as the widening gap between Russia and 
Ukraine is. Thus, the most interesting question is not so much about 
the current cultural positioning, but rather the history of the mapping.
This mapping, being geographical, is, however, also political, eco-
nomic, cultural, moral, religious, and so on. This means that it is 
based upon the answers to questions about political allies, economic 
collaborators, cultural relatives, moral connections or religious com-
munities. These answers define ‘our’ cultural identity – not only in the 
sense of understanding who ‘we’ really are, but also in the sense of who 
‘we’ were or who ‘we’ want to be. In this process of self-positioning 
the tenses are interconnected, so that not only does past history define 
future actions, but also the changing answers we give to the question 
of who we want to be in the future make us revisit and reinterpret our 
past. This constant process of autonomous reinterpretation of our posi-
tion in the world influences our real world experience. Taken together, 
these experiences and interpretations define the particular form of 
modernity a particular society takes (Wagner 2008).
Here we are going to generally outline the history of Russian 
world-mapping over the last two or three centuries. We start with a 
very brief description of the eighteenth-century understanding and 
pay the closest attention to the nineteenth century, which arguably 
defines in many ways the position of Russian culture until the present. 
After another very short consideration of twentieth-century Russia, 
we will draw some general conclusions. Of course, this account will 
necessarily be very sketchy and incomplete. Detailed discussion of the 
nineteenth-century interpretation of the relations between Russia and 
Europe or the West alone would require thousands of pages, since all 
great Russian writers and intellectuals of that time answered the ques-
tion about these relations in their own ways. Their understanding of 
Russia’s relation to Asia and the East is another equally long story. We 
believe, however, that this account, even if incomplete and imperfect, 
remains very useful, since it helps us to better understand the nature of 
the Russian quest to make its own way in modernity.
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It must be said here from the very beginning that the idea of Russia 
somehow belonging to any kind of Global South has never been 
present in Russian culture. The South, as we will see, has always been 
an alien ‘other’ of Russia, which itself oscillated between North, East 
and West, between Europe and Asia, between the Slavic world and the 
Central Asian nomadic empires. These concepts, along with the idea of 
Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity, form the landscape in which Russia 
keeps defining its place in the modern world.
Russia as the European North
Sixteenth-century Russia, liberating itself from what later became 
known as the Tatar yoke, took national pride in its being the only 
existing Orthodox kingdom. In 1510, in his letters to the Grand Prince 
of Moscow, Vasili III Ivanovich, the monk Philotheus of Pskov (1465–
1542) argued for a theory of Moscow as the Third Rome, which became 
the core of the young Russian state’s political ideology and geopolitical 
mapping for at least two centuries. Since, according to Philotheus, ‘two 
Romes have fallen, and the Third stands, and a fourth shall never be’ 
(see Toumanoff 1954–5: 438; Duncan 2000: 11–12), the fall of Moscow 
would necessarily have eschatological consequences. That is why, when 
in the troubled seventeenth century some people decided that both 
tsar and clergy had fallen into heresy, they saw in it clearly apocalyp-
tic signs of the approaching Doomsday. The result was the complex 
eschatology of the Old Believers, a conservative religious movement 
in many aspects similar to some denominations of Western European 
Protestantism. The idea of the Third Rome, however, made Russia the 
messianic centre, culturally isolated from the rest of the world, and did 
not really promote thinking about its relation to the other parts of the 
globe. At the same time it was the sixteenth century that witnessed a 
great expansion of the Moscow Kingdom, one of the most impressive 
acts of which was the beginning of the colonisation of Siberia.
The contacts with the external world were intensified in the second 
half of the seventeenth century, when Russia started attracting foreign-
ers (especially Germans and Dutch) to live and work in Moscow. The 
crucial breakthrough in this respect was, however, made by Peter the 
Great (1672–1725), who, with the founding of St Petersburg, according 
to the famous saying of Pushkin’s (actually taken from Italian writer 
Francesco Algarotti), ‘cut the window through on Europe’ (Pushkin 
1960: 285). In addition to moving the capital from Moscow to this 
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newly founded northern capital, he established (in 1721) the Russian 
Empire and reformed Russian life according to Western European 
standards, using for this purpose the most cruel means. He defeated the 
Swedish troops of Charles XII, made Russia an important European sea 
power and started to actively interfere in European affairs. Russia as a 
young European power developed really fast and already Catherine the 
Great (1729–96), who was in correspondence with both Diderot and 
Voltaire, came to be widely praised as a European enlightened ruler. 
In her Nakaz (Instructions), a statement of legal principles, she defined 
Russia as a ‘European Power’ of ‘European People’ (Ekaterina II 1849: 
4).
Throughout the eighteenth century, thus, Russia positioned itself 
as an essentially European, or Northern European, country not only 
according to its physical geography, but also in accordance with 
its interests, values, actions, and so on. Thus, the first independent 
modern Russian scientist, the founder of Moscow University, Michael 
Lomonosov, praised the daughter of Peter the Great, Elisabeth I, for 
her giving ‘calm to the whole Europe’ (Lomonosov 1803a: 282) and 
‘subduing military noise in the whole Europe’ (Lomonosov 1803b: 284). 
Welcoming the teenage Peter III, he calls him ‘future possessor of the 
North’ (Lomonosov 1959a: 62), but in his ode to Elisabeth II of the same 
1742 he mentions the ‘cold North’, ‘sultry steppes’, ‘American waves 
from the Eastern countries’ and ‘Baltic shores’, that is, all four cardinal 
points, as loyal to the Russian Empress (Lomonosov 1959b: 284–90). 
In dedication to Peter III, prefacing Lomonosov’s Compendium of 
Eloquence, he again speaks of the Russian Emperor as called to the 
‘adornment and defence of the whole North’ (Lomonosov 1952: 92). It 
is just very natural, then, that Lomonosov paid such close attention to 
the Russian North and Siberia, urging the exploration of the Northern 
Sea Route to the eastern parts of the Russian Empire. And his main 
conclusion is not surprising either: ‘Russian might will grow with 
Siberia and the Northern Ocean and will reach the main European 
 settlements in Asia and America’ (Lomonosov 1950: 630).
The Great French Revolution frightened both enlightened Catherine 
the Great and Russian noble society. One of the results of this shock 
and fear was the idea of an opposition between a stable European 
North and revolutionary South of Europe. Russia was now increasingly 
viewed as a potential rescuer of Europe and a successor of the fallen 
France as far as the Enlightenment was concerned. Talented poet and 
gifted statesman of the first half of the nineteenth century, a close friend 
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of Pushkin and the first head of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, 
Prince Peter Vyazemskiy clearly expresses this idea in his poem 
‘Petersburg’. He specifically insists on the fact that Russia is glorious 
not only with its military victories, but also with the arts and sciences. 
The beginning of this glory was the ‘stately spirit of Peter and intellect 
of Catherine’. Thus, ‘the day was dimming in the South when dawn 
we had’. In the South rebellion and prejudices ‘threatened to reduce 
to ashes the sanctuary of Enlightenment’, but ‘the North became its 
asylum’. So, when in Europe the old world was ignited with revolt and 
sedition, a ‘creative spirit hovered over young Russia and called it to 
its feat . . .’ (Vyazemskiy 1880: 158–9). That is why all arts and sciences, 
which used to inhabit the South, are now Russian natives (Vyazemskiy 
1880: 159). The Messianic idea of Russia as the rescuer of Europe 
became archetypical for Russian culture and in various forms has been 
repeated throughout the nineteenth, twentieth and even twenty-first 
centuries whatever real or perceived dangers threatened Europe. It still 
very much defines the complex relation of Russian society towards its 
European alter ego.
The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed a national rise 
and great Russian success in Europe. Having defeated Napoleon, 
Russia established itself as a mighty European power. Since this time 
Russia has been actively interfering in European affairs and thus has 
become an integral part and (some would also think – a guarantor) 
of the European system of international security. The national rise 
has naturally been accompanied by blooming culture. Defeat of the 
Decembrist revolt in 1825 delayed development and started a long 
period of conservative reaction but did not shatter this understand-
ing of Russia as a fast-developing European country. Thus already in 
1844 one of the early Slavophiles, a brilliant writer and a follower of 
Schelling and Hoffman, Prince Vladimir Odoyevskiy, did not hesitate 
to announce in the midst of the dark times of the reaction of the reign 
of Nicolas I: ‘The nineteenth century belongs to Russia’ (Odoyevskiy 
1913: 423). Interestingly, it was written some eight years before the 
Crimean War, which, together with the revolutions of 1848–9, signifi-
cantly changed Russian feelings towards Western Europe.
Russia as the Christian East: Russia and Slavdom
It was not, however, Prince Odoyevskiy who initiated the discussion 
of so-called Slavophiles and Westernisers on the identity of Russia. 
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Russian visitors to Europe started making comparisons already in 
the eighteenth century. The comparisons were always ambiguous: 
on the one hand, Russia seemed to be a backward country in need of 
urgent modernisation, while on the other hand, Russian noble travel-
lers abhorred what they perceived as the petty bourgeois lifestyle of 
Western Europe. Thus, already Denis Fonvisin, a writer and memoirist 
of the eighteenth century, during his European travel complained: 
‘money is the first God of this land. Moral corruption has reached the 
degree that mean acts are not punished even by contempt . . .’ (Fonvisin 
1959: 461). Nikolay Gogol, with his aesthetic mindset, thought that only 
comparatively backward Italy managed to preserve the creative spirit, 
which long ago used to penetrate Western Europe: ‘All Europe is only 
to look at, and Italy is to live in’ (Zenkovskiy 1926: 50).
One should also remember the fact that the Russian nobility of this 
time often did not read Russian at all and spoke it only as a second 
language. Their first language was French, and English and German 
were also widely spoken. Peter the Great’s reforms created a Russian 
European nobility, who lived in Russia as if in a foreign colony. This 
unfortunate divide persisted throughout the nineteenth century. The 
noble ‘European’ stratum was gradually widening and in the 1860s it 
started to include lower classes, mostly sons of the clergy, to form a 
peculiar social phenomenon: a rationalistic intelligentsia. Although 
they started to talk and to write Russian, their rationalistic mindset 
differed greatly from the Orthodox mysticism of their own fathers and 
of the majority of the peasant population. This ‘intelligentsia–people’ 
divide, so characteristic of Russian culture of the nineteenth century 
was, so to speak, the internal dimension of a growing awareness of the 
difference between Russia and Western Europe. It is at this time that 
Russia started to understand itself as East in contrast to the West of 
European culture.
In different times the basic cleavage of Russian society has been 
conceptualised differently: as the East–West contradiction, as the 
Orthodoxy–rational science divide, and so on, but it is the ‘intel-
ligentsia–people (narod)’ opposition that became the idée fixe for all 
Russian literature. Thus, the famous Russian Husserlian philosopher, 
Gustav Shpet (1879–1937), described this problem of Russia as the main 
problem of Russian philosophy:
the ‘people’, and the ‘intelligentsia’ as the creative spokesman of 
the people, are related to one another both philosophically and 
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 culturally. Russian philosophy approaches its problem of Russia as 
the problem of the relations of the above-mentioned terms, some-
times from the side of ‘the people’, sometimes from the side of the 
‘intelligentsia’, but always solves the only problem, the problem of 
the relation itself. The difference and even opposition of the answers 
– sub specie of the people and sub specie of the intelligentsia – defines 
the peculiar dialectics of Russian philosophy . . . (Shpet 2008: 76)
Internal and external divides reinforced each other: those critical 
of Western Europe also wanted to correct the excesses of Russian 
enlightenment and to find a specific Russian way in modern civilisa-
tion; those who thought of the West as the best implementation of 
modern civilisation naturally wanted to finish what Peter the Great 
had only started and to ‘Westernise’ the whole country. The split itself, 
however, has always been understood as a symptom of a deadly disease 
of Russian culture. Westernisers of the early nineteenth century saw 
the nature of this illness in the ignorance and backwardness of the 
people, while Slavophiles of the time interpreted the divide as a deadly 
split between borrowed enlightenment and original Russian life. One 
of the fathers of Slavophilism, Alexey Khomyakov, in his article of 
1845 called this borrowed science ‘colonial’ (Khomyakov 1900: 24) and 
vehemently condemned its discord with the life that had created great 
Russia ‘before foreign science came to gild its tops’ (Khomyakov 1900: 
22). Being a follower of Schelling and a lover of Britain, Khomyakov, 
however, thought that scholarship (especially in the social sciences and 
humanities) must correspond to the life of the nation, must be of the 
same roots, so to speak. The absence of such correspondence led to a 
situation in which ‘there was knowledge in the upper classes, but this 
knowledge was absolutely remote from life; there was life in the lower 
classes, but this life never rose to consciousness’ (Khomyakov 1900: 22). 
This split was the primary object of analysis for Russian philosophy and 
sociology and arguably also became one of the reasons for the Russian 
Revolution.
The Westernisers were the first to start this discussion. It was a 
brilliant noble officer, a participant in the war against Napoleon, 
mystical philosopher, younger friend of the great Russian historian, 
Karamzin, and older associate of the great Russian poet, Pushkin, Peter 
Chaadayev, who in 1829–31 in his ‘Philosophical Letters’ (written, by 
the way, in French) vehemently criticised Russia as a country that had 
deviated from the ways of humankind:
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One of the saddest features of our peculiar civilisation is that we 
are only discovering the truths that have already become truisms 
in other places and even among the peoples lagging far behind us. 
This is because we were never united with other peoples; we do not 
belong to any great families of humankind; we belong neither to the 
West nor to the East, and we do not have the traditions of either of 
them. As if standing out of time, we were not touched by the world-
wide education of humankind. (Chaadayev 1914b: 110)
Russian spiritual life, according to Chaadayev, is very underdeveloped. 
However:
standing between two main parts of the world, East and West, resting 
with one elbow against China and with the other against Germany, 
we should have linked in us both principles of the spirit, imagination 
and reason, and should have combined in our civilisation the history 
of the whole globe. This, however, was not the destiny designated for 
us by Providence. (Chaadayev 1914b: 116)
Being an ardent preacher of the Catholic unity of Europe and of the 
beneficial influence of Catholicism upon the formation of European 
civilisation, he naturally saw the first cause of this unfortunate deviation 
of Russia in that it had borrowed its Christianity from the ‘miserable 
Byzantine, deeply despised by (European) peoples’ (Chaadayev 1914b: 
118). Separated from the rest of Europe, Russia became a victim of the 
Tatar yoke, and, after liberation from it, a victim of the yoke of its own 
state power, which succeeded the Tatars in its despotism (Chaadayev 
1914b: 111). This characterisation was partly a result of what Chaadayev 
saw in Russia after he came back from his foreign trip. This was a new 
Russia of the conservative reaction of Nicholas I, when all Chaadayev’s 
Decembrist friends were either in prison or in Siberia (see Gershenzon 
1908: 63–4). Philosophical Letters, in spite of all their ‘social mysticism’ 
(Gershenzon 1908: 64), became a manifesto for the later Westernisers.
Chaadayev, of course, was very far from unbelieving in Russia. 
At the beginning of the 1830s he even wrote to Nicolas I and rather 
naively offered his services as a counsellor to the government. After 
the publication of his first ‘Philosophical Letter’, Chaadayev, however, 
was pronounced insane and was subjected to humiliating daily medical 
examinations. In his Apology of the Insane, written in 1837, he made the 
turn, which became so distinctive for almost all Russian Westernisers – 
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from Chaadayev to Herzen and for all Russian socialists – from Herzen 
to Lenin. For Chaadayev, Russia was so weak and backward because 
Providence had saved it for a much greater mission (Gershenzon 1908: 
150–1). This mission resided in ‘solving most of the problems of the 
social order, fulfilling the majority of the ideas generated by the older 
societies, and answering the most important questions that humankind 
faces’ (Chaadayev 1914a: 227). To do this, however, Russia would have 
to reject all old prejudices and truly become European, would have to 
fulfil what had been started by Peter the Great.
‘Peter the Great’, emphasises Chaadayev, ‘found at home only a 
blank sheet of paper and wrote with his own strong hand the words 
Europe and West; and we belong to Europe and the West ever since’ 
(Chaadayev 1914a: 220). East and West for him are two main parts of 
the world, corresponding to two principles, two ideas. The principle 
of the East is deep contemplation of the mind, which leaves the whole 
Earth to the arbitrariness of the social authorities. The idea of the West 
is a notion of action inspired by reason. East was the first to be promi-
nent in the history of humankind, while modernity is rather the time 
of the West. Now:
we live in the East of Europe . . . however we never belonged to the 
East. The East has its own history which has nothing to do with ours. 
. . . We are simply northern people, both in terms of our climate and 
in terms of our ideas . . . It is true that some of our regions border on 
the states of the East, but our centres, our life are elsewhere; our life 
will not be there until . . . a new geological cataclysm throws south-
ern organisms into the polar ices. (Chaadayev 1914a: 224)
This was not, however, a mere repetition of the idea of the Northern 
European Russia of the eighteenth century. For Chaadayev, his great 
Russia is still in the future, and this future depends on the fulfilment of 
the Westernising vision of Peter the Great.
The leader of the first Slavophiles, Alexey Khomyakov, did not really 
disagree with this last conclusion. His idea was also to find Russia’s 
own place in the modern world, but he thought that this should be 
done by addressing history across a longer duration than the history of 
Imperial Russia, which started with Peter the Great. His main disagree-
ment with Chaadayev is exactly about the exaggeration that Peter the 
Great found in Russia only a blank sheet of paper. In 1836, answering 
Chaadayev, he exclaims:
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Do not we ourselves break the unity with impressions of our past? 
Why are our tops being separated from the bottom? Why do they 
live in the motherland as if they were guests; why do they not only 
speak and write, but also think in the foreign ways? (Khomyakov 
1994a: 452)
Khomyakov sees the distinctiveness of Russia in its Slavic character. 
For him the Slavic world, which has not disgraced itself with the crimes 
of other Europeans, ‘safeguards for humankind, if not an embryo, then 
the possibility of renewal’ (Khomyakov 1994b: 493). Khomyakov, being 
one of the most educated people of his time, elaborated a complex and 
detailed philosophy of history, based upon findings of comparative and 
historical linguistics, history of religion, geography and ethnography. 
Elements of this philosophy were incorporated in his Semiramis – an 
impressive historical, linguistic and philosophical treatise (written in 
the 1840s).
According to Khomyakov, geography and history can be organised 
according to tribes, according to faiths and according to states. And it 
was only the history of the third type that had been satisfactorily devel-
oped by modern scholarship. That is why Khomyakov himself focused 
upon the histories of faiths and tribes with a clear purpose in mind – to 
give Slavic peoples the place in world history that they, according to 
him, deserved.
The whole history of humankind in this philosophy is defined by 
the struggle of the Global North and South in the form of Iranian and 
Kushite principles. These principles, being the principles of religion, 
define also the main features of the enlightenment of the particular 
peoples and, thus, penetrate the whole culture of the nations and tribes 
(Khomyakov 1994c: 442).
The Iranian, Northern principle is a principle of the freedom of crea-
tive spirit, and produced spiritual, ethical religions of the Absolute. The 
Kushite, Southern (actually Ethiopian, African) principle is a principle 
of material necessity, and produced religions worshipping natural life 
and its laws (Khomyakov 1994c: 190–1). The symbol of life in Kushism 
is a snake and ophiolatry is a distinctive feature of its religion. Hostility 
to the snake, which can be found in many religions and mythologies 
(from Judaism to the Hercules myths) is, then, a characteristic feature 
of the Iranian beliefs (Khomyakov 1994c: 190). Kushism is naturally 
inclined to pantheism and emanatism, while Iranism is disposed to 
monotheism and creationism (Khomyakov 1994c: 199, 203). Iran’s 
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invention is poetry and philosophy, while the main art of Kush is archi-
tecture: ‘colossi of poetry and thought were rising in the North against 
the stone colossi of the South’ (Khomyakov 1994c: 324).
Khomyakov interprets all cultures as formed by the struggle of the 
two principles. Sometimes they mix, sometimes they form fighting 
religions and denominations, but it is almost always possible to identify 
the primary source. Thus, although ancient Greek religion is a com-
bination of Iranism and Kushism, in Hercules’ fight with the Hydra 
Khomyakov sees the story of the Iranian fight with the Southern snake 
and thus identifies this myth as a Northern one. In the religion of Maya, 
however, he discerns Kushism:
the same mass of the temples and buildings, the same insanity of 
the stonemasons . . . the same frenzy of the debauchery, the same 
worshipping-producing force of the matter, and especially the same 
holiness of the snake, which so sharply separates the Egyptian and 
Phoenician world from the Iranian one. (Khomyakov 1994c: 236)
In India both principles coexist in purely Iranian Brahmanism with 
Northern Vishnuism on the one hand and in almost absolutely Kushite 
Shivaism with its Buddhist alter ego on the other hand (Khomyakov 
1994c: 176).
The struggle of Global North and South is, thus, the main content of 
world history. It is obvious for Khomyakov that even if Kushite mate-
rialism so easily spoils Iranian spirituality, a final victory is on the side 
of the Northern principle:
An inexplicable law, giving everywhere victory to the North over 
the South, has been fulfilled in Greece as it has been fulfilled in the 
struggle of Persia with Egypt, of Rome with Carthage, of the Turk 
with the Arabian, of the Teuton with the Roman. The animal skin, 
club and sword of the Iranian superseded the Kushite’s armour and 
arrow. (Khomyakov 1994c: 210)
The spiritual North always supersedes the material South.
Of all Iranian languages, the Slavic ones along with Sanskrit are, 
according to Khomyakov, the closest to the original proto-language. 
Khomyakov discovered a stunning parallelism between the Russian 
and Sanskrit languages and even published an impressive Comparison 
of Russian and Sanskrit Words (Khomyakov 1904). According to him, 
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both the Slavic tribes and the Brahmans of India originated in eastern 
and north-eastern Iran, while all other Iranian European ethnic groups 
(including Celtic, Hellenic and Teutonic ones) belonged to western 
and south-western Iran (Khomyakov 1994c: 380). Kushism influenced 
the Iranian south so that ancient German or Teutonic tribes moved 
away from the pure and peaceful Iranian spirituality.
Khomyakov thinks that Slavic groups colonised Europe before in their 
turn they were conquered by the Germanic tribes (Khomyakov 1994c: 
363). The conquerors were aristocratic and militant nomads, while the 
Slavic tribes represented peaceful democratic farmers, whose character-
istic features were tolerance and an aspiration for universal values. As 
one piece of evidence of the historical enslavement of the Slavs by the 
Teutons, Khomyakov refers to the etymology of ‘slave’ (Latin Sclavus) 
from Slav (Khomyakov 1994c: 90). Interestingly, he also links the 
spreading of the three branches of Christianity with this opposition of 
the German and Slavic tribes. Catholicism, the product of Rome, spread 
in the western part of the Roman Empire, which had been conquered 
by the Teutonic tribes. This is a branch of Christianity that combines 
Roman logical formalism with the Hellenic worship of beauty. The 
Byzantine Empire, according to Khomyakov, was over-populated by 
Slavs, who influenced its Christianity greatly, bringing to the Orthodoxy 
symbols and images that the Eastern branch of Christianity treated, 
however, freely. The German Reformation was also, for Khomyakov, 
the result of the Slavic influence (through occupied Slavic territories 
in Prussia and such Slavic pre-reformers as Jan Hus), due to which 
Christianity abandoned Roman formalism, but was left shapeless.
In this way three Christian teachings were formed in Europe . . .: 
a German, shapeless one; Eastern or Greek and Slavic, dressed in 
symbols, but free from these symbols; Western or Roman, logical 
in its form like the civic law of Rome and bending its knees before 
the beauty of the symbol like Hellenic antiquity. (Khomyakov 1994c: 
306)
Thus, for Khomyakov and other Slavophiles, Russia as a leader of 
Slavdom is a deeply European country, even if this Europeanness is dif-
ferent (and sometimes really opposite) to the Roman and German civi-
lisation of Western Europe. With the discussion between Slavophiles 
and Westernisers, the old understanding of Russia as a Northern 
country, however, started to transform into the idea of Russia as a 
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European East, Orthodox and Slavic world. The differences between 
the parties in this discussion, however, in reality were not too great, 
which enabled another great political philosopher of the Westernisers’ 
camp, Alexander Herzen, to say in his memoirs some ten to fifteen 
years later: ‘The struggle between us is over long ago and we have 
extended hands to each other’ (Herzen 1946: 284).
Although the Slavophiles’ philosophy seemed to be quite close to the 
official ideology of the reactionary government of Nicolas I, expressed 
in the famous triad Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality, in reality 
sometimes it was almost as critical of the conservative government as 
the ideology of socialist Westernisers was. It is wrong to try to describe 
the parts in its discussion along the traditional political lines of a left–
right or reactionary–progressivist divide. The main question in this 
discussion was about the historical identity of Russia and of its place in 
the modern world.
Let us recall here again that the question was not only (and even 
not so much) about how Russia relates to Europe, but how it should 
be reformed (or rather, how it should be modernised): according to 
Western European patterns or in its own peculiarly Russian way. The 
question also concerned the internal Russian division between the 
people and the intelligentsia, between Orthodoxy and rational think-
ing; in short, between the internal West and East of Russian culture. In 
the final analysis both Slavophiles and Westernisers arrived at the same 
conclusion on the peculiarity of the Russian way of being modern. 
Two disillusionments, however, still had to happen: with the European 
revolutions in 1848–9 and with the Crimean War in 1853–6.
European revolutions (and especially the French Revolution of 
1848) witnessed by Russian socialist Westernisers had a catastrophic 
influence on their perception of Europe as a land of the Great French 
Revolution. Instead of the leader of progress they now found the land 
of petty bourgeois shopkeepers. The Second (this time socialist) Rome 
of Europe had again (and archetypically) fallen, ceding its place to the 
Third Rome of Russia. On an international scale, through its contribu-
tion to the defeat of European revolution, the conservative Russia of 
Nicolas I gained the status of the ‘European gendarme’, which led to a 
strengthening of its power and to its interference in all European and 
Middle Eastern affairs. In its turn, it contributed to the European fear 
of a powerful, aggressive Russia and to the rise of anti-Russian propa-
ganda, which reached its culmination during the Crimean War. The 
events of 1848–56, thus, contributed to the widening of the gap between 
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Russia and Western Europe, and, in its turn, to new attempts at reposi-
tioning Russia as an independent Eastern European civilisation.
Disappointment in Europe during and before the revolutionary 
events of 1848 in France led socialist and Hegelian philosopher Herzen 
to a negation of progress and of the goal of history as such. Already at 
the end of 1847 he wrote: ‘the goal of each generation is the generation 
itself. Nature never makes generations the means for the achievement 
of the future; it does not care about the future . . . it has a heart of the 
bayadere and Bacchante’ (Herzen 1948: 31). ‘In history everything is 
improvisation, everything – will, everything – ex tempore, there are 
no limits and itineraries ahead; there are conditions, holy anxiety, the 
fire of life . . .’ (Herzen 1948: 33). This theoretical rebellion against a 
Hegelian logic of history together with disappointment in European 
societies, penetrated with the spirit of shopkeepers, led Herzen to the 
greatest crisis of his life. ‘I am not dead, but I became old’, wrote Herzen 
in Paris immediately after the events of June 1848 (Herzen 1948: 38).
In the ‘betrayal of shopkeepers’ he saw evidence of the imminent 
death of Europe:
Everything becomes petty and withers on the exhausted soil: there 
are no talents, there is no creativity, there is no power of thought, 
there is no power of will; this world has outlived the times of its fame 
. . . the brilliant epoch of industry is passing away . . . the lifestyle is 
getting less and less elegant and less graceful, everybody is huddling 
up, is afraid, everybody lives like a shopkeeper; the manners of the 
petty bourgeoisie have become common . . . everything is tempo-
rary, is rented, is shaky. (Herzen 1948: 53)
This world is dying and its death is similar to the collapse of Rome, with 
inevitable dark ages to come:
Don’t you see the new Christians going to build, new barbarians 
going to destroy? They are ready; they are like lava stirring heavily 
under the earth, inside the mountains. When their hour comes, 
Herculaneum and Pompeii will disappear, both good and bad, both 
right and wrong die together. This will be no judgment, no punish-
ment, but cataclysm, overturn. (Herzen 1948: 54)
Socialism in modernity corresponds to Christianity of the time of 
the fall of Rome. Like Christianity it is unrealisable. Like any  ideology 
The Moral Mappings of South and North
86
it is not going to build Paradise on Earth. Like any ideology it is 
temporary:
Socialism will develop . . . up to its extreme consequences, up to 
absurdity. Then again the cry of denial will be extorted from the 
titanic chest of the revolutionary minority . . . socialism will take 
the place of the today’s conservatism and will be overcome by the 
coming revolution unknown to us. (Herzen 1948: 103)
Herzen’s advice to intellectuals is Nietzschean (before Nietzsche) and 
stoic – to preach death and to enjoy private life:
Preach the message of death, point to the people each new wound 
in the chest of the old world, each success of destruction; point out 
the sickliness of its intentions, the pettiness of its pursuits . . . preach 
death as a good message of the coming expiation. (Herzen 1948: 71)
Do you remember the Roman philosophers of the first ages of 
Christianity? Their position had many similarities with ours: present 
and future slipped away from them, they were hostile to the past . . . 
One good which remained for these foreigners of their time was a 
clear conscience, a consolatory awareness that they were not afraid 
of the truth . . . they also had another good: personal relations . . . 
some sun, sea or mountains in the distance, noisy greens, a warm 
climate . . . (Herzen 1948: 99)
Herzen could not stop here, and his disappointment with the fallen 
Rome of modern Europe led him to almost religious faith in the Third 
Rome of Russia. ‘Belief in Russia saved me on the edge of moral death’, 
he wrote in 1858 (Herzen 1955: 14). Here we see this almost illogical 
move, which we have already noticed as archetypical for Russian 
thought of the nineteenth century. The future belongs to Russia 
exactly because this country is so weak and backward. In Europe liber-
als betrayed revolution out of fear, while Russia has nothing to fear: 
‘Liberals are afraid to lose their freedom – we do not have freedom . . . 
they are afraid of losing personal rights – we still must obtain them . . . 
Europe is sinking because it cannot abandon its cargo, which contains a 
lot of jewels . . .’ (Herzen 1955: 13). Of course, these all are negative ben-
efits, but Herzen also finds a positive one: the peasant community as a 
genuinely Russian form of ‘spontaneous communism’. In Russia of the 
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nineteenth century land was used and owned by communities of peas-
ants. This backward (traditional Slavic) institution gave to the Russian 
socialists hope that Russia would be able to avoid the extremes of the 
coming catastrophe and to be the first to enter the new world: ‘Do not 
be afraid, be calm, our field has a lightning-rod – communal ownership 
of the land!’ (Herzen 1955: 13).
Thus, in Herzen, and later – in narodniki – Slavophiles meet with 
Westernisers, and Russia is understood as a peculiar civilisation, dif-
ferent from Western Europe. Both camps, however, hoped that it had 
something to say to Western Europe and probably even possessed the 
capacity to save it from the extremes of the coming thunderstorm. 
In Russia they saw the hope of Western Europe – the messianic idea, 
which became so prominent in Soviet times. A very powerful idea 
of the distinctiveness of the Russian way in modernity was present 
in both camps. Neither of them, by the way, was counter-modern or 
counter-European, in spite of being critical both of modernity and 
of Europe. England, for Khomyakov, was ‘a country of holy mira-
cles’ and the philosopher himself contributed to these technological 
miracles through patenting his several inventions in London, one of 
which was a powerful steam engine. Herzen’s Nietzschean rejection 
of Europe was based upon its inability to live up to its own principles. 
For both the Russian way was alternatively European and alternatively 
modern.
The gap between Western Europe and Russia was, however, gradu-
ally widening. Since the mid-1840s anti-Russian propaganda in Western 
Europe had been increasing and it reached its culmination during the 
Crimean War, which had been widely understood both in Russia and 
in Europe as a war of the West against a strengthening Russia. Lord 
Palmerston had famously planned the partition of the Russian Empire 
and presented the Crimean War as a war of civilisation against barba-
rism. In his speech in the House of Commons on 31 March 1854, Lord 
Palmerston declared
But what I want the Government to say is, that by the help of God, 
and relying on the stout hearts and strong arms of England, we 
shall do our utmost to carry this war to such an issue as will prevent 
Russia hereafter from returning to her aggressions, and from threat-
ening the independence, freedom, and civilisation of Europe—that 
we shall take care to reduce her within limits beyond which she will 
not hereafter be able to go. (Palmerston 1854)
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Some political activists in today’s Russia, by the way, do find quick 
and easy comparisons with the anti-Russian propaganda in today’s 
Crimean and Ukrainian crisis. In spite of such similarities, of course, 
the post-Cold War relations between Russia and Western Europe are 
totally different from what they were in the colonial and imperial world 
of the nineteenth century.
In the nineteenth century the anti-Russian sentiments of European 
societies were perceived in Russia as a mean betrayal by the West. While 
in Russia the war was presented as a defence of Orthodox peoples and 
Slavs, oppressed by the Ottoman Empire, in the West it was perceived 
as an aggressive attempt to gain control of the Bosporus and possess 
Constantinople. If in the Napoleonic Wars Russian society did not see 
enmity on behalf of Western Europe as such, but only menace on the 
part of Napoleon, in the Crimean War
Russian society felt with extreme pain that in fact the West ‘took 
up the arms’ against Russia to hit it and to weaken its influence 
among Slavs. For the first time in this war Slavic self-consciousness 
ha[d] been thunderstruck by the West’s deep hatred of Slavdom. 
(Zenkovskiy 1926: 123)
The great Russian poet, diplomat and rather conservative political 
thinker, Fedor Tutchev, wrote during the war: ‘It could be foreseen 
long ago that this rabid hate . . . which was increasingly stirred up 
year by year, would eventually break loose. This moment came’ (see 
Aksakov 1886: 250). ‘[T]he whole West came to demonstrate its denial 
of Russia and to block up its road to the future’ (Tutchev 2005: 175). The 
misunderstanding between the West and Russia was mutual; it has been 
recurrently present since this time and, unfortunately, does dominate 
their interrelations today. Western Europe still (and sometimes fairly) 
sees Russia as a threat to the international domination of modern 
liberal democracy, while Russia charges it (equally not without the 
foundation) with double standards and a strange suspicion towards a 
fellow European nation.
If both the Slavism of early Slavophiles and the peasant communism 
of early socialists and narodniks were not in any sense anti-Western, 
perceiving Russia rather as the other of Europe, a kind of alter ego, after 
the 1850s their successors defended Russia’s radical otherness, which 
was too often directed against Western Europe. Interestingly, this time 
also witnessed the birth of organic and civilisational approaches in 
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Russian sociology, which further underpinned the idea of the peculiar 
young Russian world poised to substitute a dying European civilisa-
tion. Nikolay Danilevskiy and Konstantin Leontiev are probably two 
the most interesting authors in this respect.
Although the main sociological book Russia and Europe by the 
natural scientist Danilevskiy was published in 1869, it starts with a 
detailed description of the injustices that led to the Crimean War 
(Danilevskiy 2016: 13–39). The main starting questions he asks are 
‘Why is Europe hostile to Russia?’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 39–86), ‘Is Russia 
Europe?’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 87–109) and ‘Is European civilisation iden-
tical with universal civilisation?’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 111–37). Danilevskiy 
emphasises the fact that:
Europe does not recognise us as her kin. She sees in Russia and in 
Slavs in general something alien to her, but at the same time some-
thing that cannot be for her the raw material . . . Therefore Europe 
sees in Russia and in Slavdom not only an alien, but also an inimical, 
principle. (Danilevskiy 2016: 76)
Russia is not Europe at all. Danilevskiy describes it almost in 
Chaadayev’s words:
[Russia] was not nourished from any of the roots with which Europe 
absorbed both salutary and harmful juices immediately from the soil 
of the ancient world destroyed by her; was not nourished with those 
roots also, which draw nourishment from the depth of the German 
spirit. (Danilevskiy 2016: 94)
Fighting Eurocentrism and speaking highly of China, Danilevskiy 
rethinks the notion of progress and makes it relative to particular civi-
lisations. Each civilisation has its own principle, its own idea, the devel-
opment of which is the progress of this particular civilisation: ‘Progress 
. . . is not an exclusive Western or European privilege, and stagnation 
is not an exclusive Eastern or Asian stigma; both are only characteristic 
signs of the age of the people . . .’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 117). If this is so, 
there are no universal things in history and ‘progress does not consist 
in going in one direction, but in walking in different directions all over 
the field of human historical activity . . .’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 132).
The main unit of history is not humankind, then, but some ‘cultural-
historical types’. These units are similar to living organisms and go 
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through their own stages of long primary growth (the ‘ethnographic 
period’), short blooming (the ‘civilisation stage’) and senile apathy 
(Danilevskiy 2016: 160). Thus, the idea of ‘infinite development or 
infinite progress’ should be ‘counted among the most extreme absurdi-
ties’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 163). Danilevskiy’s theory of ‘cultural-historical 
types’ is rather elaborate and detailed and cannot be discussed here. 
Let us mention only that he counts ten developed types (Chaldean, 
Hebrew, Arab, Indian, Persian, Greek, Roman or ancient Italian, 
Germanic, Egyptian and Chinese) and looks forward to the blooming 
of the Slavic one (Danilevskiy 2016: 134). One of the main laws is that 
the cultural-historical types can fully develop only when they enjoy 
political independence and form a state or a system of states. Another 
one is that the principles of civilisation cannot be transferred from one 
cultural-historical type to another.
Politically it means that all Slavic peoples must gain independence 
and together form a political system of states. This is a conditio sine qua 
non of their development:
for each Slav: Russian, Czech, Serb, Croatian . . . the idea of Slavdom 
must be the highest idea, higher than science, higher than liberty, 
higher than enlightenment . . . simply because none of them is 
reachable without its implementation, without spiritually, nationally 
and politically distinctive, independent Slavdom . . . (Danilevskiy 
2016: 189)
Danilevskiy’s political pan-Slavism was, thus, a natural result of his 
theory.
Importantly, Europe, according to Danilevskiy, was drooping. The 
blooming epoch of Europe was the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, when ‘Rafael, Michelangelo and Correggio painted, Shakespeare 
wrote his dramas, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon and Descartes laid the foun-
dations of the new thinking . . .’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 249). This blooming 
time was over for Europe; even if it had not yet rotted, it was getting 
old. Slavdom, however, was only advancing onto the stage of history. 
It still had everything ahead, while for Europe the best time was over. 
Western Europe’s hatred of Slavdom was partly explained by this fact. 
Interestingly, Oswald Spengler, thirty-nine years later in his Decline of 
the West, repeated this conclusion (Spengler 1926), although it is not 
clear if he was really acquainted with Danilevskiy’s theory.
According to Danilevskiy, there are four main activities, through 
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participating in which different cultural-historical types fulfil their 
destiny. These activities are: (1) religious activity, through which 
humans relate to God; (2) cultural activity, through which human 
society interacts with the external world: science, art and industry; (3) 
political activity, in which human beings directly relate to each other; 
and (4) social and economic activity, in which humans relate to each 
other, not directly, but through the conditions created by the use of 
external things (Danilevskiy 2016: 677). The first cultural-historical 
types were syncretic and did not focus on any particular activity. The 
Jewish talent, however, was religion; the Hellenic type focused upon the 
arts and aesthetics; Roman civilisation reached perfection in politics.
The European cultural-historical type was much more complex 
and achieved prominence both in politics and in culture. Moreover, 
the cultural activity of the Europeans was great in all three spheres of 
science, art and industry. Only in art Europe ‘should yield the pass to 
the Greeks in the degree of the perfection of the results achieved’. The 
Europeans, however, widened the sphere of art and found their own 
‘new ways’ in it (Danilevskiy 2016: 687).
As far as the young Slavic type is concerned, it is too early to mention 
its achievements, but Danilevskiy finds promising signs in all four 
main human activities, thus hoping that ‘the Slavic type will be the first 
full four-foundational cultural-historical type. The most original of its 
features will be the first satisfactory solution of the social-economic 
problem’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 722). Again as it was for both Westernisers 
and Slavophiles, so too for Danilevskiy communal land-ownership is 
the main evidence of Russia’s ability to produce a ‘just social-economic 
organisation’ (Danilevskiy 2016: 728). This hope later became the main 
driver of the Russian Revolution and of the grandiose communist 
experiment of the twentieth century. The system of communal land-
ownership in some forms existed up to the Soviet collectivisation of 
1928–37, but started to deteriorate already by the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
Politically and intellectually Danilevskiy is really ambiguous. On the 
one hand, his pan-Slavism and Russian nationalism can be seen as an 
underpinning of nascent fascist, or in any case extreme right, political 
sentiments. They have been shared by many great philosophers and 
writers, including, for example, Dostoyevskiy, who called Danilevskiy’s 
book the ‘future handbook of all Russians for a long time’ and praised 
its conclusions as miraculously coinciding with his own ‘conclusions 
and persuasions’ (Dostoyevskiy 1986: 30). On the other hand, both early 
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Slavophiles and Danilevskiy contributed greatly to the establishment of 
civilisational theory in Russia, to a criticism of the excesses of colonial 
Eurocentrism of the time, and in the final analysis, to an understanding 
of Russia as a peculiar, distinct civilisation existing alongside the great 
European world. The Slavophiles were predecessors of the theories of 
multiple modernities on the Russian soil of the nineteenth century.
The idea of Russia as a European, Christian East has also been 
shared by a follower of both Danilevskiy and Herzen, a very origi-
nal Russian conservative thinker and diplomat, Konstantin Leontiev, 
who, however, was in doubt about the putative benefits of communal 
land-ownership and did not aspire to pan-Slavic unity at all. If for 
Danilevskiy a ‘cultural-historical type’ is a linguistic unity, for Leontiev 
neither language nor ‘tribe’ are really important. For him civilisa-
tions are defined by the state power, by culture and by religion. Tribal 
Slavdom is too diverse or weak in these respects and cannot provide a 
stable ground for distinctive development.
Leontiev focused on the Byzantine roots of Russian culture instead. 
For him ‘to love a tribe for its being the tribe is a strain and a falsehood’; 
what matters are religious and state ideas (Leontiev 1996: 108). These 
Byzantine ideas that formed the great Russian culture were, according 
to Leontiev, autocracy (Samoderzhavie) and orthodoxy (Pravoslaviye). 
‘It was Byzantism that gave us all our power in our struggle with 
Poland, Sweden, France and Turkey. Under its banner we will be 
able to withstand the onset of an international Europe as a whole . . .’ 
(Leontiev 1996: 104).
In a short book published in 1875 under the name Byzantism and 
Slavdom Leontiev endeavoured to provide a theoretical underpinning 
for his conservatism, which older Slavophiles had famously charged 
with preaching a ‘lascivious cult of the truncheon’ (Ivan Aksakov, 
quoted in Solovyev 1914a: 507). Any development, according to 
Leontiev, is an ‘ascent from the simplest to the most complex, gradual 
individualisation and separation from the external world on the one 
hand and from . . . all similar and related phenomena’ (Leontiev 1996: 
125). The culmination of development is ‘the highest degree of com-
plexity, united by some internal despotic unity’ (Leontiev 1996: 126). 
This is true for any phenomenon of an organic nature. Everything in 
the developed organism is subjected to the form of this organism, to 
the ‘despotism of the internal idea’ (Leontiev 1996: 129). In decrepit and 
dying organisms, at the same time, forms are dissolving, fading and the 
unity of the organism is gradually destroyed.
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Cultures are similar to organisms in their development; they all go 
through the three stages of ‘(1) primary simplicity, (2) blooming com-
plexity, and (3) secondary mixing simplification’ (Leontiev 1996: 129). 
Blooming cultures are characterised by complex differences, which 
are so characteristic of aristocratism, and by a despotic and autocratic 
unity of the state, which holds together different parts of the whole. 
That is why Leontiev thinks that egalitarianism and liberalism, equal-
ity and liberty, are both phenomena of a dying culture. They both are 
ruinous for the culture: ‘culture is nothing else but distinctiveness; and 
distinctiveness today almost everywhere is dying primarily because of 
political freedom. Individualism is killing the individuality of people, 
regions and nations’ (Leontiev 1996: 108). That is why for him the 
Chinese and the Turk are ‘of course more cultural than the Belgian and 
the Swiss’ (Leontiev 1996: 108).
Egalitarian and liberal progress ‘struggling with every despotism . . . 
is nothing else but the process of decay, the process of . . . secondary 
simplification of the whole and of the mixing of the components . . .’. 
It is similar in character to any destructive process in nature, such as 
burning, the melting of ice or any deadly illness, which transforms 
blooming organisms into equal skeletons and free atoms (Leontiev 
1996: 130). Conservatism is the only responsible political philosophy in 
a time of decay, while every progressivist is right at the very beginning 
of cultural development.
The problem with Europe and Russia was that for both of them 
the blooming period was over. In the history of humankind no state 
had lived for more than twelve centuries, and the majority of them 
had existed for a much shorter period of time (Leontiev 1996: 138). 
Europe was a bit older than Russia, but Russia was not really young 
either. Leontiev was rather ruthless in his verdict on Russia: ‘millennial 
poverty of the creative spirit is still no guarantee of a rich harvest to 
come’ (Leontiev 1996: 154). But the most dangerous thing Russia could 
do at the time would be to follow the European path.
The problem was that, unlike ancient civilisations, Europe con-
sciously destroyed itself and took senile illness for the ideal:
To tear her ancient chest to pieces Europe believed in democratic 
progress not as in . . . a step towards a new inequality, a new 
organisation, a new saving despotism of the form . . . she believed in 
democratisation, in mixing, in equalisation as the ideal of the state 
itself. (Leontiev 1996: 147)
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The majority of European Slavs shared this pernicious belief and there-
fore could not be of help to Russia. Only the strong Byzantine princi-
ples of deep, Orthodox religious faith and despotic Eastern autocracy 
could save Russia from an untimely death caused by egalitarian and 
democratic progress.
Leontiev, however, would not have been Russian if he had not tried 
to outline a peculiar Russian mission for Europe. Russia must be pow-
erful, for if the West fell and anarchy prevailed, she would be able to 
save what was still worth saving. If, however, the West took the oppor-
tunity to return to its former disciplined state, then Russia still should 
be powerful in order to be equal to the Western countries (Leontiev 
1996: 152).
Leontiev is certainly one of the most peculiar Russian philosophers, 
in whom extreme conservatism and a fascist aspiration towards a 
totality of despotic unity are accompanied by a deep melancholy at the 
decay of the times and by an aesthetic horror of the artist confronting 
the future domination of mediocrity. Interestingly one of his most 
respected sources was the left socialist philosophy of Herzen, whose 
aestheticism led him to a similar melancholy and criticism of moder-
nity. In this sense both Herzen and Leontiev are similar to Nietzsche. 
There is, by the way, some evidence that Nietzsche knew Herzen’s 
works through his close friend, writer Malwida von Meysenbug, 
who was also a teacher of Herzen’s children. The striking similarity 
between Herzen’s From Another Shore and Nietzschean philosophy 
can be explained only by a direct influence. Leontiev’s Nietzscheism 
is also explained by the direct influence of Herzen. In any case, his 
political views are on the extreme right end of the political spectrum. 
This extreme conservatism in both Leontiev and Danilevskiy is also 
underpinned by their naturalism: the idea of a similarity of civilisations 
to living organisms inevitably led them to the notion of civilisation 
passing through periods of birth, development, blooming and decay. 
In the second half of the twentieth century a similar naturalism led the 
famous ethnographer Lev Gumilev to similar (although more moder-
ate) political sentiments.
In sum, we can see here that in the majority of the nineteenth-
century debates Russia was discussed as a distinct Eastern European or 
Eastern Christian country. Byzantine, Slavdom as well as the Russian 
peasant community with its communal land-ownership were the main 
reference points of these debates. Importantly, the discussions were not 
simply concerned with the geopolitical issues of where Russia belongs, 
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but also with the ways of modernising Russian internal life and with the 
problem of the internal Russian divide of the European intelligentsia 
and Eastern Christian people. That is why the questions of the East and 
West, of Europe and Slavdom, of Christianity and rational science, are 
still so important for the Russian identity.
Russia as an Asian power
In this quest for identity the fact that the main territory of Russia is 
in the Asian part of the country has been rather overshadowed by 
the discussions of European, Slavic or Byzantine heritage. Feodor 
Dostoyevskiy in his Writer’s Diary complained that ‘all our Russian 
Asia, including Siberia, is for Russia still like an appendage, which 
our European Russia doesn’t want to take an interest in. We are, they 
say, Europe; what should we do in Asia?’ (Dostoyevskiy 1984: 32). He 
himself, however, thought that there should be a new ‘turn to the East’, 
since the vital interests of Russia were there. He followed Danilevskiy, 
who thought that it was in Russia’s interests not to free Europe from 
Napoleon, but to make an agreement with him, which Napoleon 
himself reportedly sought to advance (Danilevskiy 2016: 64–6). If, 
however, for Danilevskiy pursuing Russian interests in coming to an 
agreement with Napoleon would have meant the liberation of the Slavs 
from Austrian and Turkish rule, Dostoyevskiy thought that Russia in 
this case would have been able to advance in the East, leaving Europe 
to Napoleon (Dostoyevskiy 1984: 34).
Russia’s mission was in Asia. Although she should not ‘leave Europe 
for good’ since:
Europe is also mother to us . . . our second mother . . . [her] civi-
lising mission in Asia . . . will elevate our spirit. . . . In Europe we 
were dependents and slaves; we will come to Asia as the masters. In 
Europe we were Tatars; in Asia we are Europeans. Our mission, our 
civilising mission in Asia will attract our spirit . . . Just build two rail-
roads . . . one to Siberia, another to Central Asia . . . (Dostoyevskiy 
1984: 36–7)
Interestingly, this understanding of Russia as a civilising European 
power in Central Asia had been widespread in nineteenth-century 
Europe, even if sometimes the interests of Russia there clashed with 
those of the British. Danilevskiy complained that the European powers 
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sought to limit the potentially global reach of Russia to the narrow task 
of civilising Central Asia, ironically observing that:
to be built during a thousand years, to create a state of eighty million 
people . . . only in order to treat five or six million vagabonds of 
Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva, possibly together with two to three 
million Mongolian nomads, to European civilisation . . . This is the 
great destiny, the world-historical role, which lies ahead of Russia 
as a bearer of the European Enlightenment . . . (Danilevskiy 2016: 
98)
Evidently, Danilevskiy had a right to complain, since this understand-
ing of Russia’s global role seems to have been shared by many in 
Europe. Friedrich Engels, for example, wrote in 1851 to Marx: ‘Russia, 
on the other hand, is truly progressive by comparison with the East. 
Russian rule, for all its infamy, all its Slavic dirtiness, is civilising for the 
Black and Caspian Seas and Central Asia, for the Bashkirs and Tatars’ 
(Engels 2010a: 363). A bit more favourably, he predicted in 1888 that 
after the overthrow of tsarism, ‘the noble nation of Great Russia . . . will 
be free to carry out its true civilising mission in Asia and to develop its 
vast intellectual resources in exchanges with the West’ (Engels 2010b: 
134). This prediction has been realised, since ‘liberation’ of Central Asia 
from ‘the remains of feudalism’ became one of the main directions of 
the eastern politics of the Soviet Union.
Of course, all these discussions of Russian civilising power happened 
in the context of European colonialism. It was not until the beginning 
of the twentieth century that this colonial discourse about Central 
Asia started to shatter. Soviet (contradictorily both colonial and anti-
colonial) power contributed to this process domestically, while so-
called Eurasianism influenced the discussions from abroad. In the late 
nineteenth century, however, Asia had been perceived either as a threat 
or as an object of civilising interference.
One of the greatest Russian philosophers of this time, Vladimir 
Solovyev, in one of his early works, the article ‘Three Forces’ written 
in 1877, spoke of Russia and the Slavs in more or less traditional words. 
Distinguishing the force of totalising unity, which he saw as active in 
the East, from the force of equally totalising individuation active in 
Europe, he praised Russia as a bearer of the third force, which would 
give harmony to an otherwise split humanity. This third force is ‘rev-
elation of the Highest Divine World and . . . the people through whom 
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this force will work must be only a mediator between humankind and 
this world . . .’ (Solovyev 1911: 237). If the first force in religion means 
worshipping a dehumanised God, and the second a godless humanity, 
the task of the third force is to bring God and humankind closer to 
each other, to create, according to the title of one of his later works, the 
condition of God-manhood (Solovyev 1912). The first two forces had 
already brought their peoples to the point of decay, and thus it was high 
time for the third force to become active. Russia and Slavdom were, 
thus, not East or West, but East-and-West, the third force, correcting 
the excesses of the first two forces and fulfilling the historical mission 
of humankind. Naturally and again archetypically:
[the] external image of the slave . . . [and] the miserable position of 
Russia in economics and other respects not only cannot be an objec-
tion against her vocation, but rather confirm it. Since the highest 
force that the Russian people must bring to the humankind is not of 
this world . . . (Solovyev 1911: 239)
Later Solovyev started to doubt, and in one of his poems of 1890 
(Ex oriente lux) he states that ‘the light, which came from the East / 
reconciled East with the West’, and he asks: ‘Oh Russia! . . . / Which is 
the East you desire to be: / the East of Xerxes or of Christ?’ (Solovyev 
1974: 81). During the 1890s Solovyev’s increasingly eschatological 
expectations were accompanied by the premonition of the ‘enemy 
from the East’ (Mochulskiy 1995: 183–4, 202–12). In 1894 he wrote the 
poem Panmongolism, the very title of which obviously positions it in 
contrast to the ideas of pan-Slavism. Here he describes the ‘last times’, 




guarded by the unearthly power
the tribes go to the North.
Oh, Russia! Forget your glory:
The two-headed Eagle is destroyed
and yellow children for amusement
the shreds of your flags are given.
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 . . .
Thus the Third Rome is lying in the dust
and a fourth shall never be. (Solovyev 1974: 104)
The same theme was present in the eschatological ‘Three Conversations’, 
where Solovyev describes the conquest of Europe by Asia, the establish-
ment of the kingdom of the Antichrist and the unification of Christian 
churches as a prelude to the Doomsday and resurrection of the dead 
(Solovyev 1914b).
After the real Doomsday of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the 
symbolist poet and Solovyev’s follower, Alexander Blok, had already 
counted Russians among the Asian tribes:
Millions are you – and hosts, yea hosts, are we
And we shall fight if war you want, take heed
Yes, we are Scythians – leafs of the Asian tree,
Our slanted eyes are bright aglow with greed. (Blok 1961: 24)
He describes the historical role of Russia as raising ‘the shield up . . . / 
to shelter you, the European race / from the Mongolians’ savage raid 
and sieges’ (Blok 1961: 24). European hostility towards Russia (this 
time already Soviet) threatened to destroy the shield. This would lead, 
according to Blok, to the Apocalypses described by Solovyev:
we shall just watch the mortal strife
with our slanting eyes so cold and narrow.
Unmoved shall we remain when Hunnish forces
The corpses’ pockets rake for plunder,
set town afire, to altars tie their horses,
burn our white brothers’ bodies torn asunder. (Blok 1961: 25)
The only chance for Europe to survive is to ally with the semi-Asiatic, 
Scythian Russia: ‘To the old world goes out our last appeal: / to work 
and peace invite our warming fires. / Come to our hearth, join our 
festive meal. / Called by the strings of our Barbarian lyres’ (Blok 1961: 
25).
After the Revolution the communists were looking forward to the 
international world revolution, and the positioning of Russia in terms 
of the cardinal points lost its importance. Internationalism and the 
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global outlook of communism became the official ideology. With this 
orientation to the East in mind, the Soviet civilising mission in Asia 
became prominent in the politics of Soviet Russia. During the Cold War 
the struggle between the Eastern and Western blocs as the Second and 
the First Worlds defined the content of global politics. However, with 
all its internationalism and ambitions to assume the leadership of the 
new world, domestic Soviet politics was a kind of multiculturalism with 
special attention paid to the eastern republics. This attention to the East 
even led to the formation of a peculiar genre in Soviet  cinematography 
– ‘Easterns’ (analogous with American ‘Westerns’). The plot of all 
‘Easterns’ focused upon struggles against militant gangs in Central Asia 
or the Caucasus during the Civil War. The most famous film of this genre, 
White Sun of the Desert (1970), combines it with the theme of the libera-
tion of oriental women. The struggle against the ‘remnants of feudalism’ 
for the liberation of women in the Caucasus was also the focal point of 
another extremely popular film, the comedy Kidnapping, Caucasian 
Style (1967). This discourse of civilisation, applied to the Muslim East of 
the Soviet Union, was really prominent in twentieth-century Russia.
The focus on the East, although in a different form, has also been 
shared by some Russian exiles, who through this common interest 
even developed some sympathy with Soviet Russia. They represented 
the so-called Eurasianism movement (Evraziystvo), the ideology of 
which is still quite popular in some post-Soviet countries, including 
Russia and Kazakhstan. Eurasianism is thought to have been born in 
Sofia in 1921, when the first Eurasianists published their first volume 
of collected papers. However, in 1914 the famous Russian and (later) 
American historian Georgiy Vernadskiy (1887–1973) wrote a paper 
on the Russian colonisation of Siberia, which already expressed some 
of the Eurasianist ideas (Vernadskiy 1914). The group of the first 
Eurasianists included linguist Nikolai Trubetskoy, geographer Petr 
Savitskiy, religious philosopher Gyorgy Florovsky and writer Petr 
Suvchinsky. During the next several years a number of other famous 
intellectuals joined Eurasianism in the main centres of Russian emigra-
tion: Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, Paris, and so on. The movement split in 
1928 due to disagreements about how to interpret Soviet power. If the 
majority of the older Eurasianists had never really been sympathising 
Soviets, the group of younger writers gathered in French Clamart tried 
‘to link Eurasianism’s historical conception of Russia with an awaken-
ing Marxist political conscience’ (Laruelle 2008: 20). We can also add to 
this mixture Nikolay Fedorov’s peculiar teaching on the  transformation 
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of the nature, whose follower Nikolay Ustryalov (1890–1937) combined 
it with both Eurasianism and his own national-Bolshevism.
As for the Eurasianists, ‘in the great mass of the lands of the Old 
World, where past geography discerned two continents – “Europe” and 
“Asia” – they started to discern a third, middle continent – Eurasia . . .’ 
(Savitskiy 1997: 76). This continent represents a more or less ‘natural’ 
field for political, cultural and similar forms of unity. Being the ‘third’, 
it also presupposes a specific ‘third’ developmental trajectory – neither 
capitalism nor communism, neither liberalism nor dictatorship:
In the Eurasionists’ interpretation, the ‘third way’ was no longer the 
solution for a Europe stuck between the expansion of communism 
and the purported failure of the liberal Western model, but rather 
a statement of Russia’s cultural irreducibility to the West. (Laruelle 
2008: 26)
In the very first of their publications the Eurasianists separated 
themselves from the old Slavophiles because ‘the concept of the 
“Slavdom” ha[d] not justified the hopes’ of its exponents: ‘We address 
our nationalism . . . not only to the “Slavs”, but to the whole circle of 
peoples of the “Eurasian” world, between whom the Russian people 
takes a middle position’ (Predchuvstviya 2002: 106). If, however, Russia 
existed in the midst of the Asians, it would of necessity be greatly influ-
enced by them.
Another famous representative of the movement, Nikolai Trubetskoy, 
understood the Eurasian state of Russia as a central part of the former 
Mongolian Empire created by Genghis Khan (Trubetskoy 1995: 213). 
The great khan is understood by Trubetskoy as ‘a bearer of the large 
and positive idea, and in his life the aspiration for creation of the 
organisation prevailed over the aspiration for destruction’ (Trubetskoy 
1995: 222). Being an integral part of the Mongolian Empire, Russia 
adopted an Asian understanding of state power. When the Russian 
people, however, freed themselves from the yoke, they united this idea 
of the state with Byzantine Orthodoxy. In this way the Mongolian idea 
become Russian, and ‘the ideas of Genghis Khan were brought back to 
life, but in an absolutely new, unrecognisable form’ (Trubetskoy 1995: 
227). The reforms of Peter the Great were, for Trubetskoy, anti-Asian 
and, therefore, anti-national (Trubetskoy 1995: 243), thus leading to the 
‘defacement of Russia’ (Trubetskoy 1995: 246). This anti-national char-
acter of the Empire made the Russian Revolution inevitable. Although 
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the USSR partly continued with the anti-national European politics of 
the Empire, it for the first time ‘spoke with Asians as with equals, as 
with fellow-sufferers’ (Trubetskoy 1995: 253). The main historical aim 
of Russia in his day, then, was ‘to realise its true nature and to return 
to the performance of its own historical tasks’ (Trubetskoy 1995: 260). 
The most important feature of this historical task was attention to 
the East without European imperial colonialism which, according to 
Trubetskoy, was very alien to Russia.
Eurasianism is very much alive today. First of all, we should mention 
Lev Gumilev (1912–92), the son of the poets Nikolai Gumilev and Anna 
Akhmatova, one of the most interesting, even if highly controversial, 
ethnologists and ethnographers, who openly called himself ‘the last 
Eurasianist’. In his introduction to the new edition of Trubetskoy’s 
works, he emphasises the absence of any ‘Tatar yoke’ and prefers to 
speak rather of the ‘political and military union’ of Russia with the 
Tatars (Gumilev 1995: 41). Unfortunately, we cannot go here into the 
details of his fascinating theory of ethnogenesis and his interesting, 
rather poetical description of the history of various nomadic people 
around and inside Russia. It was Gumilev who revived Eurasianism in 
the new post-Soviet Russia. This movement, however, is still as ridden 
with contradictions as it used to be in the 1920s. Being conservative in its 
essence, it sometimes degenerates into an ideology of the extreme right 
(especially when it is politicised) and sometimes it is reduced to a gener-
ally elusive framework of loose ideas and principles. In this last vague 
form it is proposed by Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev as a national 
idea of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev 2015). Apart from naming one of the 
main Kazakh higher education schools L. N. Gumilev National Eurasian 
University, this ‘Eurasian’ idea has not provided Kazakhstan with any 
viable political ideology. The extreme right form of Eurasianism in con-
temporary Russia has found its institutional expression in the political 
party ‘Eurasia’ of Alexander Dugin (Dugin 2002).
Eurasianism in various forms seems to dominate contemporary 
Russian geopolitical thinking. Being inclined to geographical natural-
ism and primordialism, it is also prone to Blut und Boden types of 
ideology. On the other hand, since it considers Eurasia as a multicul-
tural habitat, it is free from narrow nationalism and has a distinct anti-
colonial character. Being contradictory in political terms, it can be very 
decent academically (e.g. in Nikolai Trubetskoy, Georgiy Vernadskiy 
or Lev Gumilev), but also sometimes serves very conservative (and 
even neo-imperial) ideologies of the extreme right political parties (in 
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Alexander Dugin). Some versions of Eurasianism still represent a really 
peculiar mixture of naturalism, Marxism, Orthodoxy and Russian 
cosmism. This kind of mixture, however, is called for in contemporary 
Russia, which still cannot fully recover from the shock and stupor of 
the collapse of 1991.
Conclusion
For several centuries moral mapping has provided Russia not only 
with the basis for self-identification, but also with the frameworks for 
redefining its future and for solving pressing problems of the times. 
Russian intellectuals, writers, politicians and activists proposed solu-
tions to policy issues on the basis of this moral mapping. That is why 
interpretations of Europe and Asia, of North, West and East, have 
always been very important in the Russian context. Close attention to 
Asia almost invariably meant political tensions with Europe and vice 
versa. Moreover, it has always been possible to identify the political 
standing of almost any politician or public intellectual judging from his 
or her interpretation of the West and East.
At the same time, Russia has never been linked to the real South: 
only to the South of the Asian Turkic nomads. Not too much has really 
been changed in this respect today. In the current political and intellec-
tual landscape the split between Western and Eastern parties, between 
a European and a distinctive ‘Russian’ orientation, is as huge as it 
has ever really been in the twentieth century. The current Ukrainian 
and Crimean crises, the revival of the concept of a ‘Russian World’ 
(Russkiy Mir), the sudden return to Cold War rhetoric, and the political 
emphasis on the notions of sovereignty and independence in the epoch 
of global capital and transnational corporations all demonstrate the 
importance these categories still have for the Russian experience and 
interpretation of modernity.
In these quests for self-identification it is possible to identify some 
basic archetypical ideas, invariably present in the discourse. The first 
is a peculiar love-and-hate obsession with Europe. The understand-
ing of Russia as ‘the shield’ of Europe against nomadic Asian tribes is 
archetypal. Interestingly, this understanding is mirrored today in the 
attempt by Ukrainian powers to position themselves as ‘the shield’ 
of Europe against an aggressive Russian Empire. Ukraine itself, with 
all its inescapable schisms, represents a tragic implementation of this 
 obsession with Europe as the alter ego of Russia.
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Second and relatedly, Russia is always between West and East, 
the intelligentsia and the people, Orthodoxy and science. It is always 
seeking its middle way in modernity: a really formidable task for any 
society. The split was incorporated in the internal modernisation 
divide of Russian society of the nineteenth century and in the external 
post-Crimean War break-up with Europe. Archetypically this idea 
is being repeated today in the discussions by political parties of the 
choice between a peculiar Russian way in modernity and the transfer of 
Western political institutions onto Russian soil. This vision also domi-
nates discussions of the prospects of European or Asian partnerships.
What is important is that these discussions, this permanent choos-
ing, this oscillation between West and East, between Europe and Asia, 
are absolutely unavoidable since they themselves constitute a peculi-
arity of Russian modernity. I believe that in order to understand the 
complexities of contemporary Russia’s political behaviour, including 
its behaviour in the international arena, it is absolutely necessary to 
bear this peculiarity of Russian self-identification in mind.
It is just too natural, then, that civilisational approaches are as 
popular in Russia today as they were in the 1880s. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the fall of the Marxist ‘formation’ approach, civi-
lisational theories became really widespread. One university manual, 
published in 1994, describes civilisation as ‘the main typological unit 
of history’ (Semennikova 1994: 35) and Russia as a ‘civilisationally 
heterogeneous society’, as a ‘peculiar . . . conglomeration of peoples 
of different development types, united by a powerful, centralised state 
with the Great Russian nation as its nucleus’ (Semennikova 1994: 109).
Both as a distinct civilisation and as a ‘conglomeration of peoples’, 
Russia has its main interests in the East and North, in the Arctic, 
Siberian and Far Eastern regions. The main resources and the main 
potential for the future development of the country are here. Famous 
dissident (and a conservative writer) Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, in his 
letter to the leaders of the Soviet Union, called on them to develop 
Siberia and the Russian North, and to abandon communist ideology to 
China (Solzhenitsyn 1974). From the time of Lomonosov the idea that 
Siberia and the Northern Ocean were integral to the growth of Russian 
might has occupied the minds of the Russian people.
Current developments in international relations, however, do make 
the pursuit of new global allies necessary. The emerging Global South 
seems to be a natural ally for the deeply northern and semi-Asian 
Russia, simply because both are seeking alternatives to the neo-liberal 
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global order established after the fall of the Berlin Wall. One of such 
possible alternatives to neo-liberal world governance structures is seen 
today in the institutions of the BRICS organisation. The viability of 
this alternative will, however, very much depend on the quality of the 
seemingly strange alliance of the Global North with the Global South.
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Digging for Class: Thoughts on the Writing of a 
Global History of Social Distinction
Jacob Dlamini
In February 1930, Leo Frobenius, the German archaeologist and eth-nologist, announced to the world that he had identified the ‘source 
of the civilization which created Zimbabwe and many hundreds of 
ruins’ (‘The Zimbabwe Riddley’, Cape Times, 1 February 1930) scattered 
around southern Africa.1 Zimbabwe, a ruined stone city, is a Late Iron 
Age archaeological site in the south of the country that today also goes 
by the name Zimbabwe. The city was once the capital of a pre-colonial 
kingdom that existed between the tenth century and the fifteenth 
century. The kingdom thrived on a gold and ivory trade that linked it 
to a commercial network that involved the east African coast, parts of 
the Middle East, India and China. The Indian Ocean was the centre of 
this network and the heart of one of the world’s most dominant trade 
systems at least until the fifteenth century. The city had first come to the 
knowledge of Europeans through Portuguese explorers in the sixteenth 
century but controversy over its origins had raged among Europeans 
almost from their first contact with its ruins. Many Europeans believed 
that Zimbabwe, with its sophisticated architecture, including curved 
and five-metre-high walls built without mortar, could not have been 
the work of Africans. The site was believed to be too complex to have 
been produced by Africans. Enter Frobenius to settle the matter.
When he made his announcement, Frobenius was in Cape Town, en 
route back to Germany after a research trip to India. Speaking to the 
Cape Times, a top English-medium newspaper in the Union of South 
Africa, Frobenius said the archaeological sites that dotted southern 
Africa were more than just ruins. Ruined cities such as Zimbabwe, local 
rock paintings and decayed mines were all related to a ‘culture of the 
highest order’. And this culture was not African – Frobenius said. How 
had he arrived at his conclusion? ‘Logically, he had piled one deduction 
upon the other’, the Cape Times reported. Frobenius said:
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The people who made Zimbabwe had knowledge of geology we had 
lost. The extent and distribution of their mines proved it. Nor were 
their paintings primitive. There was also evidence of a highly devel-
oped science of metallurgy. The creators of these ruined cities made 
bronze wire – a craft of the most difficult kind. Nowhere in Africa 
except in Egypt had native people mastered it. This people, their 
culture which produced Zimbabwe, came from somewhere else. 
(‘The Zimbabwe Riddley’, Cape Times, 1 February 1930)
So where did these people and their culture come from? Frobenius said 
that, having examined similar ruins in India during his recent trip: ‘I 
found [in India] not a father or a mother of Zimbabwe, but a brother’ 
(‘The Zimbabwe Riddley’, Cape Times, 1 February 1930).
So who were the parents? They were, he said, Sumerian and came 
from ‘somewhere near the Caspian Sea’. How did they end up in 
southern Africa? Well, in ‘search of gold, frankincense and myrrh, 
the creators of [Zimbabwe] spread through Arabia and Mesopotamia, 
manned their ships and sailed down the west coast of India, the east 
coast of Africa, and spread industry and culture across southern 
Africa’ (‘The Zimbabwe Riddley’, Cape Times, 1 February 1930). This, 
in short, was Frobenius’s announcement. He was wrong. After more 
than a century of digging, researchers have established beyond a doubt 
that the people who built Zimbabwe and associated sites were indeed 
African. However, to be charitable to Frobenius, we should say that 
while his conclusion about the origins of Zimbabwe was wrong, his 
intuition that Zimbabwe was born global and that the site could only 
be understood in a global context was correct. As the research agenda 
proposed in this essay would show, Zimbabwe and the hundreds of 
sites like it, including Mapungubwe (which preceded Great Zimbabwe) 
were indeed born global, the products of Africans who understood 
themselves to be part of a world bigger than their worlds.
Digging for class: a global history of social distinction
This schematic and preliminary essay is about the global history of 
social distinction. It is about the possible terms and outline of a research 
agenda concerned truly with a global history of social distinction. What 
might a truly global and interdisciplinary history of social distinction 
look like? What might Africa offer if used as a conceptual base of opera-
tions for such a research project? This essay seeks to offer suggestions 
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about how scholars might use Africa as a conceptual base from which 
to launch an archaeological, historical and theoretical investigation 
into the emergence of social hierarchies in human society. How did 
social distinction emerge as an animating feature of human life? What 
led to its emergence, and how was it legitimated across space and time? 
These are, in fact, some of the oldest questions in the humanities and 
social sciences. But this essay seeks to suggest ways in which these 
questions can be asked anew, and to gesture towards possible fresh 
answers through an interdisciplinary approach that involves archae-
ology, history and social theory. It argues that scholars can come up 
with fresh answers through a methodology founded on three related 
innovations. The first innovation would involve making Africa the 
main, but by no means exclusive, conceptual base of operations. This 
means, as I will elaborate below, making Africa key to theoretical and 
intellectual debates about the origins not simply of human evolution 
but of social and political complexity in human life. The second inno-
vation would entail a recuperation of Africa’s history as indeed a global 
history, one that cannot be understood unless one understands what is 
going on at the same time in other parts of the globe. The third innova-
tion, arguably the most original aspect of this schematic essay, would be 
the reanimation of some of the oldest intellectual debates about what 
we would today call global history (see, for example, Conrad 2016) 
through a retracing – mainly intellectual but also literal in places – of 
the international journeys undertaken by Frobenius (see Frobenius 
2014). By following his intellectual and physical travels through Africa, 
Asia and Europe, this essay argues, scholars can show how we might 
go about asking and finding both local and global answers to some of 
humanity’s most pressing problems.
The three innovations mentioned above are designed to suggest pos-
sible new ways of approaching African history in particular and global 
history in general. These new ways would help us challenge assump-
tions about the timelessness of Africa and the supposed marginality 
of the continent to the development of complexity in human life. This 
supposed marginality accounts for Africa’s relative absence in ongoing 
attempts by scholars around the world to theorise, for example, the 
advent of the modern world. This essay seeks ultimately to offer sugges-
tions about how scholars might make Africa a part of more than simply 
the history of human evolution. Scholars need to make African history 
an important reference point in intellectual conversations about the 
study of phenomena such as the birth of agriculture, the development 
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of social and political complexity, as well as the emergence of states. 
By looking at what African history has to say about the rise of social 
distinction in human life, scholars can give new life to debates such 
as those, for example, between thinkers like Karl Marx, who believed 
in class struggle as the motor of human history, and Max Weber, 
who offered an arguably more varied and less politically instrumental 
notion of social stratification.
The three innovations outlined above would also, it is hoped, make 
the burgeoning field of global history truly global by making Africa 
more than a marginal reference point. More than that, this essay 
seeks to inaugurate an interdisciplinary conversation about the global 
history of social distinction. The historical scope of the research project 
outlined here is the period from the ninth century to the twentieth 
century. This means that our research starts in the Iron Age and goes 
to the end of the twentieth century. The essay proposes this scope – 
which goes against the standard periodisation found in many History 
 departments – because it offers the best way to bring the histories of 
Africa, Asia and the Americas into a productive interdisciplinary con-
versation with the histories of Europe, and to have that conversation 
start long ‘before European hegemony’, to borrow Janet Abu-Lughod’s 
phrase (Abu-Lughod 1989). By employing Frobenius as their interlocu-
tor in a research endeavour such as the one outlined here, proponents 
of global history can use his work to develop further his intuitions 
about the global nature of African and Asian history. But, going farther 
than Frobenius ever went intellectually, proponents of global history 
would develop these intuitions in ways that raise questions about the 
emergence of social distinction in the world. What, then, is the state of 
the art of research on Africa in global history and how does this essay 
say we can add to it?
Two Germans meet on a hill in Africa . . .
Mapungubwe, the site proposed here as a historical and conceptual 
reference point, is situated to the south of Frobenius’s Great Zimbabwe 
ruins. Located in present-day South Africa, Mapungubwe sits near 
the confluence of the Limpopo and Shashe rivers. Founded sometime 
during the eleventh century, the polity existed until the thirteenth 
century, when it was replaced by the civilisation that gave us Great 
Zimbabwe. Mapungubwe is significant for our purposes because it 
was the first polity in southern Africa to see the development of a 
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spatial expression of social distinction. At the centre of the polity was 
the Mapungubwe hill, atop of which lived the elite. Below them lived 
mid-level elites and, further below the mid-level elites, lived common-
ers. The Mapungubwe hill, essentially a rock outcropping with neither 
the soils for agriculture nor the space for a big settlement, was home to 
elites whose position in the polity depended on the elites’ monopoly of 
trade (mainly gold and ivory), as well as their position as sacred leaders 
of the polity. In fact, Mapungubwe is considered the first archaeologi-
cal site in southern Africa to see the development and spatial expres-
sion of sacred leadership. In addition, the economic and social life of 
Mapungubwe had what archaeologists refer to as a cattle complex, 
meaning cattle were at the centre of the polity’s economic and ritual 
life.
Now let us imagine a global history of social distinction that begins 
thus: two Germans meet on a hill in southern Africa . . . That might 
strike some as the beginning of a tasteless joke. But what if our two 
Germans are Karl Marx and Max Weber, and what if the hill they meet 
on is Mapungubwe? What began as the making of a bad joke might, in 
fact, prove to be the start of a fruitful conversation about the historical 
emergence of social distinction in human society. If class struggle is, as 
Marx would argue, the motor of human history and class distinction 
is, as Weber would say, driven in large part by vocational specialisa-
tion, might Mapungubwe not be one of the best archaeological and 
historical sites for the testing of those claims? Mapungubwe had it all: 
it had sacred leadership, spatial segregation, vocational specialisation, 
as well as a division of labour through which commoners, for example, 
grew food for elites who did not and could not grow food on the hill 
on which they (the elites) lived as an expression of their special status 
in the polity. Let us imagine how different the global history of social 
distinction would sound if told, not simply as the rise of capitalist 
developments in certain corners of Western Europe that were then dif-
fused outwards to other parts of the world, but as a messier process of 
global exchanges and encounters.
I am not suggesting that Mapungubwe is the only archaeologi-
cal site to tell us about the global emergence of social distinction. 
However, I do think it would add immensely to our understanding 
of global processes of change and connection to make a place like 
Mapungubwe part of the story of globalisation before the fact. The 
truth is that Mapungubwe attained its status precisely because of its 
connections to the outside world. Using their monopoly of trade with 
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the outside world and sacred leadership within the polity, the elites of 
Mapungubwe used both their trade monopoly and sacred leadership to 
justify their position. The question to ask is not how this justification 
was made but, more importantly, how and why commoners accepted 
the social distinction that came to define their polity. This is just one of 
the questions that the research agenda proposed here would raise.
The state of the art
The past twenty years have seen a burgeoning in the field of global 
history. Scholars such as Lynn Hunt (2014), Jürgen Osterhammel 
(2014), Enrique Dussel (2011), John Darwin (2008), C. A. Bayly (2004), 
Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) have 
offered us what we might call, after Dussel, a ‘critical world history’. 
They have produced work bent on ‘provincializing Europe’, to borrow 
Chakrabarty’s felicitous term, by challenging assumptions about Europe 
being the birthplace of the modern world. Scholars engaged in this 
work of decentring Europe from the conceptual and empirical heart of 
the modern world have joined voices offering various suggestions for 
how to think about a world without Europe at its centre. Some of these 
voices talk about ‘vernacular modernities’ (Robert Dixon and Veronica 
Kelly 2008); others speak of ‘alternative modernities’ (Dilip Gaonkar 
2001); yet others say ‘multiple modernities’ (Shmuel Eisenstadt 2000). 
These scholars have, each in his or her own way, added much-needed 
complexity to our understanding of the world and its global connec-
tions. Yet, for all these intellectual and scholarly advances in our under-
standing of the world and its interconnectedness, Africa is absent from 
their considerations. The continent remains hidden behind ‘global 
shadows’, to use anthropologist James Ferguson’s apt description of 
Africa’s relationship with the rest of the world (Ferguson 2006). Works 
whose noble ambition is to give us a truly global history of the world 
have little or nothing to say about Africa in global history. That is, they 
make general statements about Africa and its alternative, multiple or 
vernacular modernities without at the same time giving us a real sense 
of the human element that is the heart of history. Even in the best 
work on global history (e.g. Osterhammel’s and Bayly’s books), Africa 
remains at best marginal.
Part of the explanation for the marginality of Africa in global history 
is that the continent is seen by many scholars and non-scholars alike 
as having nothing to offer scholars and researchers interested in the 
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emergence of such complex phenomena as social distinction and state-
formation. Even in cases such as Mapungubwe, where the hard work 
of digging up ancient histories has been done and evidence found that 
points to the complexity of African life forms, this evidence has not 
fed into broader intellectual and theoretical debates about phenomena 
such as class. Africa is generally not considered a place that offers 
lessons about some of life’s most difficult challenges. Why is this so and 
what does it tell us about the state of the art in the field of comparative 
global history?
Let me start with the second of these two questions. Despite recent 
advances in the study of global history, the field remains very much 
uneven. This is in part a function of the backgrounds of the scholars 
writing global history. Osterhammel, for example, is a student of 
Chinese history with an excellent grasp of the archives that define his 
primary area of research. Bayly, to use another example, was a student 
of Indian history, with a firm grasp of Britain’s imperial archive. These 
backgrounds do not, as we know from these two scholars’ exceptional 
books on global history, limit what they can say about the world 
beyond their areas of expertise. But the backgrounds do influence how 
they relate to areas outside of their expertise. We see this most clearly 
in their treatment of Africa. It remains at best cursory. It breaks no new 
ground.
The ghost of Hegel
Now to return to the first question for why this is so, why Africa is 
generally considered by many scholars to be marginal to intellectual 
and theoretical debates about the complexity of human life. There 
is no simple answer to this question. But, for any answer to be com-
prehensive, it would have to take in the Enlightenment and the race 
theories espoused by some of the Enlightenment’s thinkers; the advent 
of capitalism around the world, Western imperialism and its enact-
ment of a particular kind of globalised world, the ‘Scramble for Africa’, 
colonialism, decolonisation and the emergence of the postcolonial 
world. These are by no means definitive and they certainly do not go in 
a straight line, with one following the other. However, one statement 
that can be made with some certainty for why Africa continues to be 
marginal to intellectual and theoretical debates about the complexity 
of human life is that the ghost of Georg Hegel has haunted the writing 
of global history since the nineteenth century. When Hegel said that 
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Africa existed outside of History, still involved in the conditions of 
mere nature, he cast a spell on the study of the continent that has yet 
to be broken, despite the best intentions of many scholars, African and 
non-African alike. It was Hegel who made it possible for people like 
historian Hugh Trevor-Roper to claim, as he did in 1963, that there was 
no such thing as African history, merely the history of Europeans in 
Africa. Speaking against the backdrop of the decolonisation in Asia and 
Africa, Trevor-Roper said there might yet come a time when one could 
teach African history. In the meantime, scholars had to make do with 
European history and the history of Europeans in the world.
Trevor-Roper was an anachronism even as he spoke these words in 
1963. But his words are worth mentioning because they are important 
for understanding the state of the art in contemporary studies of Africa 
in global history. Unless we understand these words, we cannot hope 
to understand why, despite all the major advances in the writing of 
a critical global history, Africa remains marginal to the intellectual 
history of human life. Why is it that Africa’s offering to the world 
of theorising is limited only to stories about human origins? Hegel’s 
prejudice does not help us answer these questions. But remembering 
his claim about Africans living in conditions of mere nature is helpful. 
This should not be taken to mean that Hegel and Trevor-Roper have 
the last word on the study of Africa in global history, or that these two 
men have set a permanent agenda for the study of Africa. As this essay 
shows below, there have been valiant challenges to Hegel (and the 
likes of Trevor-Roper) for at least a century and these challenges have 
helped bring about a qualitative change in how we today approach the 
study of Africa. Scholars working across a range of disciplines have 
helped us develop a much more nuanced understanding of Africa’s 
place in global history. From archaeology to history and zoology, 
scholars have uncovered African pasts that have qualitatively changed 
how we understand the origins of complexity in human life. Some of 
this research, especially in archaeology, has fed into new approaches to 
the study of the human past. But these approaches have been limited, 
by and large, to the discipline of archaeology. Despite lay and profes-
sional archaeologists from various parts of the world spending more 
than a hundred years digging at Mapungubwe so we can gain a better 
understanding of how social distinction emerged, their findings have 
yet to filter into broader debates in the rest of the humanities and social 
sciences about social distinction and stratification.
In 1946, W. E. B. Du Bois published The World and Africa: An 
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Inquiry into the Part which Africa Has Played in World History. This 
was one of the first scholarly monographs to try to write Africa into 
global history. As Du Bois, the first black American to obtain a PhD 
from Harvard University, explained in the foreword:
Since the rise of the sugar empire and the resultant cotton kingdom, 
there has been consistent effort to rationalise Negro slavery by omit-
ting Africa from world history, so that today it is almost universally 
assumed that history can be truly written without reference to 
Negroid peoples. (Du Bois 2003: vii)
Du Bois decried this omission, saying it was ‘scientifically unsound and 
also dangerous for logical social conclusions’ (Du Bois 2003: vii). He 
said:
Therefore I am seeking in this book to remind readers in this crisis 
of civilisation, of how critical a part Africa has played in human 
history, past and present, and how impossible it is to forget this and 
rightly explain the present plight of mankind. (Du Bois 2003: vii)
This was a year after the formal end of the Second World War and the 
‘crisis of civilization’ mentioned by Du Bois referred to the destruction 
wrought by that war. Du Bois, a sociologist trained in the US and in 
Germany, had written about the place of Africa in world history before. 
Although widely read, these earlier writings had not reversed the omis-
sion of Africa from global history:
I still labor under the difficulty of the persistent lack of interest in 
Africa so long characteristic of modern history and sociology. The 
careful, detailed researches into the history of Negroid peoples have 
only begun, and the need for them is not yet clear to the thinking 
world. (Du Bois 2003: viii)
But Du Bois said he was determined to charge forward, ‘even though 
that interpretation has here and there but slender historical proof’ (Du 
Bois 2003: viii).
What followed was a masterful survey of global history that began 
with what Du Bois saw as the collapse of Europe in light of the Second 
World War, the ‘Scramble for Africa’, the origins of humans in Africa, 
the different civilisations that made up Africa, relations between China 
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and Africa, as well as the role of black Americans in the struggles for 
independence in Africa. Du Bois drew on a number of primary sources 
and scholars for his work, including Frobenius. Du Bois relied heavily 
on Frobenius. But he was also critical of Frobenius in places. Du Bois 
sought to assert the genius of Africans and to highlight the achieve-
ments of their civilisations. But as he himself had admitted in the 
foreword to his book, he had not always firm historical proof. Still, Du 
Bois’s book marked a crucial intervention in intellectual debates about 
the place of Africa in global history. Because The World and Africa was 
such a pioneering text, it bore the vindicationist impulses of its author. 
Du Bois wrote the book to vindicate Africa’s place in the world. He 
penned it in order to show that Africa, too, mattered in world history 
and that, as he said, Africa had played a critical part in human history. 
When Du Bois wrote his book, he believed that the ‘persistent lack of 
interest in Africa so long characteristic of modern history and sociol-
ogy’ (Du Bois 2003: viii) was due more to ignorance than it was to 
malice. He believed that he could address this ignorance through his 
book. He believed that, if he could show that Africa mattered to the 
world, then the world would take Africa seriously. Alas, that did not 
come to pass. Africa continued to be haunted by the ghost of Hegel. 
Africa continued to be seen as a place without civilisation and outside 
of history. But the failing was not Du Bois’s. He tried, using whatever 
archival and secondary material he had at his disposal. But his book 
was important for it signalled the possibility of fighting back against 
the ghost of Hegel. His book showed that Africa, too, could be made a 
subject of real historical analysis.
Another major pioneer in the study of Africa in global history was 
Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop. In 1974 he published The 
African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality. The book claimed that 
the Pharaohs of Egypt were of Negroid origin and that the Egyptian 
civilisation was in fact Negroid. The claim was as controversial then 
as it is now. More importantly, Diop argued that Africans could not 
be defined by one phenotype but that they varied greatly. But Diop 
was more convincing when he argued against European scholars who 
either ignored or downplayed the originality of African civilisations. 
An eclectic scholar who had trained in chemistry, history and philoso-
phy, Diop was among the first historians of Africa to draw explicitly 
from the discipline of archaeology to make his arguments. He used 
archaeological sources, for example, to support his claim that the 
Egyptian civilisation was Negroid; he studied Egyptian artefacts and 
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used ancient paintings to draw conclusions that ancient Egyptians were 
in fact Negroid Africans. Diop also drew from the discipline of linguis-
tics to support his claims about ancient Egypt, arguing in fact that there 
were linguistic affinities between his native Wolof and the languages 
spoken by ancient Egyptians (see Diop 1987). This was indeed a bold 
and ambitious research project and it inspired a body of scholarship 
defined as Afrocentrism.
Among the major proponents of Afrocentrism are American scholar 
Molefi Kete Asante. In his most recent book, African Pyramids of 
Knowledge (2015), Asante argues for example that, as he puts it on his 
personal website, ‘Imhotep, the first pyramid builder, and not Homer, 
should be seen as the first human in antiquity to provide the founda-
tions for subsequent science, art, and mathematics.’2 Asante’s claims 
have proven popular and his work defines the canon of Afrocentrism. 
However, the controversial and disputed nature of his claims has 
limited Asante’s appeal outside of Afrocentric circles. Another reason 
for the limited appeal of Asante’s work is that it is driven almost 
entirely by conjecture. There is little or no primary research to support 
Afrocentric claims. What scholars like Asante do, instead, is to offer 
different interpretations of existing evidence and archival material. 
For example, in his 2014 book Facing South to Africa: Toward an 
Afrocentric Critical Orientation, he argues that Africans can never get 
away from hegemonic Western epistemes unless they privilege their 
own stories and histories. But he does not call for a re-engagement with 
or even development of primary sources. His argument is limited to the 
interpretation that one brings to bear on extant sources and knowledge 
systems.
Perhaps the most influential book to come out of the Afrocentric 
canon is Martin Bernal’s Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of 
Classical Civilization (1987). Bernal argues that, in fact, the roots of 
ancient Greek civilisation are African and that Africans, meaning 
ancient Egyptians in this case, colonised ancient Greece. Bernal says 
this colonisation brought civilisation to the Greeks but that this is not 
acknowledged in histories of ancient Greece and Europe. The claim is 
controversial and has been subjected to withering criticism. One of the 
most trenchant criticisms of Bernal’s thesis is by Mary Lefkowitz, whose 
1996 book Not Out of Africa: How ‘Afrocentrism’ Became an Excuse to 
Teach Myth as History challenged Afrocentrism’s claim that ancient 
Greeks stole their ideas from ancient Egyptians. Bernal responded to 
Lefkowitz and other critics with a 2001 book titled Black Athena Writes 
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Back: Martin Bernal Responds to His Critics. But the largely polemical 
debate between Bernal and Lefkowitz did nothing to break new ground 
in the study of Africa and global history.
Despite claims by either side to be fighting for history and the histori-
cal method, Bernal and Lefkowitz ended up offering nothing more than 
polemic. But if the polemics presented by Asante, Bernal and Lefkowitz 
represented one extreme of the historiographical debates about the 
place of Africa in global history, philosopher V. Y. Mudimbe offered 
a dense but more complex counterpoint to the polemics cited above. 
Starting with his 1988 book The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy 
and the Order of Knowledge, Mudimbe raised pressing questions about 
the meaning of Africa and Africans. What was Africa, Mudimbe asked, 
and what did it mean to be African? Drawing on the work of Foucault, 
Mudimbe argued that there could be no straightforward answers to 
these questions. He said Western scholars and missionaries had intro-
duced so many distortions to African systems of knowledge that these 
distortions had become part of the way in which different Africans 
thought about themselves, their worlds and their relationship with 
wider worlds. Mudimbe argued that discourses produced in the colo-
nial encounter between Africans and Europeans had created thought 
systems within which Africans developed their identities. The implica-
tion of this claim was that African identities and the very meaning of the 
word ‘Africa’ could not be conceived independently of Europe and the 
rest of the world. To be African was to be ipso facto global. It was to be 
of the world. To be sure, this was not exclusive to Africa and Africans. 
Mudimbe’s argument could be applied to any part of the world born of 
the encounter with an imperial and colonial Europe.
Mudimbe followed this book up with The Idea of Africa (1994), 
which argued that even the very name Africa, the very concept of 
Africa, came from outside of the continent itself. But Mudimbe’s 
books were not without their weaknesses. He claimed, for example, 
that Europe’s discovery of Africa in the fifteenth century ‘meant and 
still means the primary violence signified by the word. The slave trade 
narrated itself accordingly, and the same movement of reduction pro-
gressively guaranteed the gradual invasion of the continent’ (Mudimbe 
1994: 17). Mudimbe’s claim here amounted to a poor interpretation 
of Africa’s global history. By privileging the Atlantic slave trade, 
Mudimbe ignored the Islamic slave trade centred on the Indian Ocean 
and which was in fact much older than the Atlantic slave trade. He also 
ignored the extensive trade relations between Africa, the Middle East 
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and Asia. It was precisely these trade links that allowed the Kingdom 
of Mapungubwe to flourish. It was through these links that the elites of 
Mapungubwe were able to develop the monopoly that allowed them to 
buttress their monopoly on sacred leadership. Mudimbe ignored these 
crucial connections. Part of the explanation for why he did this was that 
he was so focused on making Africa a product of European epistemes 
that he ignored Africa’s extensive Arab history. The irony, of course, 
is that by making such a historiographical move, Mudimbe ended up 
offering arguments that essentially cut off an important part of Africa’s 
global history. So focused was he on Europe and its philosophers that 
he seemed to forget, despite his best and stated intentions, that the 
continent of Africa had a history that predated its complex links with 
Europe. Mudimbe might have been wrong in his interpretation but 
his work did represent a valiant effort to inject a degree of sophistica-
tion into discussions about Africa and its place in the world. True, 
Mudimbe’s project was not always helped by his resort to jargon and 
obfuscation. But it at least got scholars of Africa talking, even if a lot of 
that talk was critical of Mudimbe and his impenetrable writing.
A more recent, philosophically orientated approach to the study of 
Africa in global history comes from historian and philosopher Achille 
Mbembe, whose book On the Postcolony (2001) examines power 
and subjectivity in Africa. The book is interested in the pathologies 
of power in contemporary Africa, which Mbembe places under the 
concept ‘banality of power’. The debt to Hannah Arendt is explicit. 
Just like Arendt used Europe’s imperial adventures in Africa to under-
stand the violence that consumed Europe in the Second World War, 
Mbembe uses the idea of the ‘banality of power’ to explore the effect of 
power on African subjectivity. What sort of African subject is produced 
by the banal power of the postcolony? Drawing, again from Arendt, 
on the idea of superfluity, Mbembe looks at the ways in which power 
in Africa dispenses death and the manner in which African lives are 
rendered superfluous. While his concern is with political power as it 
is exercised in contemporary Africa, Mbembe is also interested in the 
relationship between Africa and European forms of knowledge. He 
juxtaposes the violence of the postcolony to the violence of European 
race-thinking. On the Postcolony offers little in the way of hope. It chal-
lenges one of the most common binaries in African history: resistance 
versus collaboration. But it is not clear what the book offers as an alter-
native. It is in that sense a distant cousin to Arendt’s 1951 The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (Arendt 1968).
The Moral Mappings of South and North
120
It is a remarkable feature of modern scholarship on the work of 
Arendt, that so few scholars have seen fit to comment on the fact that 
Part Two of The Origins of Totalitarianism, which deals with European 
imperialism, is set in southern Africa. Keen to understand how the 
Nazis could devise a scheme intended to wipe an entire race of people 
from the face of the Earth and to pursue that scheme even when it 
interfered with their war aims, Arendt turned to Africa for answers. 
There she found, especially in the gold mines of South Africa, a seem-
ingly illogical enterprise that sought to make money while also produc-
ing superfluous bodies – thousands of African miners whose lives did 
not seem to interest the mine owners much, beyond the biological. 
Arendt wanted to understand how an economic system that needed 
thousands of Africans to function could show such callous disregard 
for those same Africans. This was a market system without apparent 
logic. So was the industrial machinery of death produced by the Nazis, 
Arendt thought. To be sure, some commentators have taken issue with 
Arendt’s argument about the origins of totalitarianism and some have 
queried her use of secondary sources from the South African case to 
draw conclusions about Europe. But, for our purposes, Arendt is signif-
icant because she is among a few Western thinkers to make the kind of 
global connections that define this project. At a time when many were 
saying the outrages of the Second World War were an aberration, out 
of character with the general thrust of European history, Arendt was 
making precisely the opposite argument, reminding Europeans of their 
role in other parts of the world. More importantly, Arendt showed 
connections between Africa and other parts of the world. However, 
what she did not show was that these connections predated the Second 
World War. They went deep into the past. To be fair to Arendt, she was 
not making an argument about deep history. Hers was an argument 
driven by a pressing and urgent need to understand the catastrophe 
that was the Second World War. Still, she and Mbembe, later, offered 
work that placed Africa in a global context. Their concerns might have 
been of the moment but they were suggestive of the kinds of connec-
tions that help advance global scholarship.
Exorcising the ghost of Hegel
A scholar who has tried to make Africa a part of contemporary intel-
lectual conversations about global history is sociologist Peter Wagner. 
Working mainly in the subfield of historical sociology, Wagner has 
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written pioneering work about global history. He has done this 
most explicitly in work that calls into question standard assumptions 
about the birth of the modern world (see Wagner 2012). Working in 
conversation with some of the leading lights in global history (Bayly, 
Chakrabarty, Dussel, Osterhammel and Pomeranz), and arguing with 
some of the key thinkers in the ‘multiple modernities’ debate (chiefly 
Eisenstadt), Wagner has produced work that calls into question some 
of the foundational myths about the birth of the modern world. In the 
process, Wagner has raised pointed questions about the assumption 
that Europe was sui generis the birth of the modern world. A sophisti-
cated thinker, Wagner is careful not to make it sound like elements of 
the so-called Industrial Revolution as we understand it were born in a 
place other than certain parts of Western Europe. But he insists that we 
be alert to both the contingencies and the global contexts that made said 
revolution possible. Wagner uses these insights to also initiate debate 
about what the key assumptions about modernity and its meanings 
are. He challenges, for example, the idea that the West had long settled 
elementary questions about organising political life in a given polity; 
managing life in common, and developing epistemologies suited to the 
modern world. Wagner draws from Europe’s contemporary economic 
and political crises to show the ways in which what were long thought 
to be answers have proved to be not fit for purpose. He also shows how, 
for example, claims about Western Europe’s supposedly exemplary 
record on the environment are predicated on the export of so-called 
dirty industries to poor parts of the world.
These are important insights with huge implications for how we 
think about the world and knowledge production. The research agenda 
proposed by this essay draws inspiration from Wagner’s work. But 
it also seeks to go beyond the scope of that work. By beginning our 
research in the Iron Age, we can offer a richer and much older account 
of the kinds of global connections Wagner’s work alerts us to. Part of 
the genius of Wagner’s work is that it reminds us of the fundamental 
fact that humans the world over have to respond to certain basic needs 
in order to live. In this way, Wagner’s work serves to slay the ghost of 
Hegel. It debunks the idea that entire swathes of the world can exist 
outside of history. It also makes nonsense of the Hegelian notion that 
Africa is a place without movement. These are all rich insights and we 
hope to enrich them even further with the findings of our research. It 
is clear by now that it will take more than pronouncements that Hegel 
was wrong – or that his philosophy of history was more prejudice than 
The Moral Mappings of South and North
122
actual history – and that means more of the kind of interdisciplinary 
and international research pursued by Wagner, and followed up here. 
To be sure, I am not suggesting that we replicate Wagner’s research 
agenda. Rather, we should build on Wagner’s work but do so in ways 
that allow us to go backwards and forwards in history. As can be seen 
from this relatively brief state of the art of research on Africa in global 
history, the field is uneven. But there have been major advances over 
the past twenty years. The field of global history is much more estab-
lished than when Du Bois, for instance, tried to write Africa into global 
history. As Du Bois himself admitted in his 1946 book, there was little 
known, especially in the West, about Africa’s deep history.
Archaeological debts, or why this project is feasible
We certainly know more than we did when Du Bois, for example, was 
writing in the 1950s about the world and Africa. But we need to know 
more. We also need to integrate what we discover into contemporary 
intellectual conversations about the theory and practice of global 
history. That is why the research agenda proposed here is so necessary. 
The agenda is feasible because of the work that archaeologists have been 
doing over the past twenty years, if not more. Scholars such as Jeffrey 
B. Fleisher, Thomas N. Huffman, Scott MacEachern, Lynn Meskell 
and Stephanie Wynne-Jones have conducted some of the most path-
breaking work in the field of archaeology. As these scholars (minus 
Meskell) show in Theory in Africa, Africa in Theory: Debating Meaning 
in Archaeology (Wynne-Jones and Fleisher 2015), archaeologists, his-
torians and social theorists already have the archival material and 
conceptual tools needed to make Africa a reference point for more than 
simply the story of human evolution. We have the material needed to 
start the kinds of interdisciplinary conversations about global phenom-
ena such as social distinction. As MacEachern argues, Africa, too, has a 
story to tell about the advent of agriculture, socio-political complexity, 
as well as state-formation. This story can enrich our understanding of 
human life. But the story is not being heard. Through no fault of their 
own, archaeologists are not reaching beyond the confines of their dis-
cipline. That must change. I suggest that we do away with this neglect 
by drawing on the pioneering work that archaeologists have done to 
initiate the kind of crosscutting and interdisciplinary conversation 
work envisaged here.
An archaeologist who has done a lot to encourage interdisciplinary 
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scholarship on so-called non-Western regions is Lynn Meskell. She 
pioneered a field called social archaeology. As Meskell and Robert 
W. Preucel explain in their introduction to A Companion to Social 
Archaeology,
Archaeology has been defined as the discipline that uniquely pro-
vides a world history extending humanity back into prerecorded 
time. It gives primary evidence for the three ‘rites of passage’ in 
the human career, namely the emergence of anatomically modern 
humans, the origins of agriculture/first settled villages, and the rise 
of civilizations. (Meskell and Preucel 2004: 3)
But there is also social archaeology, they say, and this ‘refers to the ways 
in which we express ourselves through the things that we make and use, 
collect and discard, value or take for granted, and seek to be remem-
bered by’ (Meskell and Preucel 2004: 3). This observation is particularly 
relevant to this project. The elite of Mapungubwe used a hill to separate 
themselves from the rest of their society. In the process, they gave spatial 
expression to their social distinction. But they also used gold and ivory 
to trade with other parts of the world. They obtained through that trade 
goods such as Chinese porcelain which they also used to give meaning 
to their social distinction. These are important insights that we owe to 
the excellent work archaeologists have done. It is also thanks to them 
that we have heard suggestions about how we might engender debate 
about theory in Africa and Africa in theory. But, as I hope is clear from 
this extended synopsis, the discipline of archaeology on its own has not 
succeeded in fostering the kind of interdisciplinary conversation we 
need to make Africa more than an incidental part of global history. We 
need history and social theory. We need history to help us connect the 
work of archaeology with critical historical interpretations of changes 
over time with regard to the notion of social distinction. We need social 
theory to help us map out the significance of those changes.
Why Frobenius?
I have chosen Frobenius with care. He is not simply a random guide 
intended to help scholars get around. As can be seen from this essay’s 
research objectives and the questions posed, the challenge is to find 
new answers to old questions about the emergence of social distinc-
tion. Frobenius offers us a useful frame of reference for developing 
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the answers we seek. Even though Frobenius represents a hegemonic 
and stubborn strain of Eurocentric thought that presents real obstacles 
to this project, he asked useful questions about the connectedness of 
human phenomena across space and time. Some of his answers (on 
Great Zimbabwe, for example) were wrong but his questions were 
right. We need those questions. That is why we need Frobenius as our 
guide. We need him to help us frame the questions we intend to ask. 
Re-examining his questions would help scholars contribute to the rein-
vigoration of global history. They would help scholars show how and 
to explain why Africa is more than a marginal reference point in global 
history. There is more to Africa than the story of human origins. While 
the story of human origins is indeed important, it is not the only story. 
By sparking an interdisciplinary debate about the place of Africa in 
global history, scholars who take up the research agenda proposed here 
would show that Africa, too, is an important site for the study of agri-
cultural development, the advent of settled societies, and the forma-
tion of states. Mapungubwe and its successor, Great Zimbabwe, were 
proto-states. That is, they represented some of the earliest attempts 
at state-formation in southern Africa. The question should not be 
whether they succeeded or failed. The question should be, rather, about 
the conditions of possibility behind such a phenomenon. For students 
of African history, the immediate impact of the research agenda set out 
here would be to give them the archival and conceptual material that 
would, it is hoped, allow them to tell a more complete history of Africa 
and to do so in an interdisciplinary fashion. If done well, the research 
proposed here would lead to the production of research material that 
would show students and scholars how and why Africa matters to 
global history.
By building on the substantial work of archaeology and using that 
to bring about an intellectual conversation across disciplines, scholars 
would inspire inter-disciplinarity in the study of global history. It is 
often the case that scholars of global history who have little or nothing 
to say about Africa lament the ‘lack’ of archival material such as written 
documents. For far too long the lack of written sources in Africa has 
been taken as a sign of the continent’s lack of civilisation. This is wrong. 
By challenging practitioners of global history to reckon with archives 
other than written sources and to work with primary sources other 
than what they are used to working with, scholars would profit from 
venturing beyond their comfort zones. Global history will not improve 
its fraught relations with Africa so long as the default lament is that 
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Africa has no sources. Africa has sources. We just need to know how 
to look for them, where to look for them and, having found them, how 
to read them. That is why Frobenius is such an important guide. He 
tried to work with archives other than written sources. He worked with 
architectural ruins and rock art. He believed that he could use these 
sources to great profit. He believed that, through them, he could under-
stand how humans and their civilisations circulated around the world. 
He was wrong in his conclusions about Great Zimbabwe. That is not 
what matters. What matters for this project is that he was able to see 
that he could not make sense of these artefacts without placing them 
in a global context. By re-posing the questions he asked and making 
the connections he did, the research project laid out here would have a 
positive impact on contemporary scholarship about the connectedness 
of the world. As the use of Frobenius planned here shows, we do not 
read past thinkers because they are right, necessarily. We read them 
because they help us see the intellectual blind spots of those who came 
before us. By inserting Africa into intellectual conversations about 
human complexity, this study would have a major impact on how we 
think about the globe, its past and its future. It would have a transfor-
mational impact on the study and teaching of global history.
Notes
1. See Dlamini (2010) for my discussion of the Cape Times interview with Leo 
Frobenius.
2. See Asante’s personal website, available at <http://www.asante.net> (last accessed 
13 January 2017).
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North–South and the Question of Recognition: 
A Constellation Saturated with Tensions
À. Lorena Fuster
In recent times we have witnessed what appears to be the return of a certain expectation in terms of the emancipatory and transforma-
tive potential of the South, at an economic level, but also politically and 
socially (Gray and Gills 2016). The awakening of this interest is due to 
the trustworthiness demonstrated by cooperation amongst so-called 
Southern countries, and stems from the new visibility that this has 
attained within representational frameworks. The re-emergence of a 
Southern layout based on the controversial Global South category, the 
SSC acronym (South-South Cooperation) and especially that of BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), have built upon a historic 
promise. This promise was made in the second half of last century, spe-
cifically from the 1960s and 1970s onwards, drawing on novel economic 
and cultural theories. It was aimed at creating innovations that could 
rearrange the world and was formulated for the first time in the African 
and Asian Non-Aligned Countries’ Conference in Bandung in 1955, 
whose principles were the SSC’s foundational motto (equality, mutual 
benefit, respect for sovereignty, non-interference and non-aggression).
In the following decade the history of colonialism that had its 
origin in the distant sixteenth century was about to end: the process 
of anti-colonial struggles had – almost entirely – been accomplished 
in the form of national liberation or by means of the decolonisation 
process that was achieving its final goals in Africa. ‘Recognising that 
the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its 
manifestations’ was stated – at last – in the United Nations’ Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN 
General Assembly 1960).1
Along with the apparent heterogeneity of liberated Southern coun-
tries, the factors that were common amongst them were their past of 
subjugation, an economically dependent present and a future already 
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marked in advance by the challenges of reducing their own develop-
mental differences, as well as those of countries without a colonial 
past and that had experienced significant economic growth during the 
1950s and 1960s. Only thereafter could the geographical contrast start 
to evolve into something patently geopolitical: thus, the debate about 
economic development entered the global political agenda and was laid 
out as the North–South divide (for a complete account of the meaning 
of this binary opposition, see Pinheiro in this volume). At last, the 
South could join this symbolic–geographic dialectic on its own initia-
tive as the precondition for starting a peer-to-peer dialogue, political 
autonomy, had been fulfilled. It could then be the subject of a promise 
with which to stand up for the capability of Southern Hemisphere 
countries to emancipate themselves in the sense of securing their own 
economic, political and cultural autonomy, creating alternatives to the 
liberal policies of the North.
This chapter does not aim to give an account of the history of the 
North–South debate, but rather to provide an outline, from the per-
spective of the South’s emancipatory promise, in order to situate its 
logic in a broader context: that of contemporary struggles aimed at 
recognition. Nevertheless, this is just the first move; the proposal of 
the chapter is to rethink this North–South dialectic not as being a case 
amongst others, but as the paradigmatic instance of the theoretico-
practical frame that underpins contemporary theories of recognition. 
From the moment we consider it as paradigmatic, in the double 
meaning of exemplar and paradigm-founder, we are able to retrieve 
flashes of some historical and conceptual fragments of what could be 
called a forgotten history of the concept of recognition. The fragments 
are: (1) the imaginary evoked by the representation of the Southern 
Cross in the first atlas of stars, done in the seventeenth century, during 
the time in which the encounters between the seafarers guided by this 
constellation with the native Americans were not yet mediated and 
subsumed by categories that would later be shaped in the philosophy of 
history; (2) the moment in which Hegel in the summit of the philoso-
phy of history structured the concept of the struggle for recognition, 
transforming Fichte’s account of recognition and departing from key 
events of his present; (3) the politico-legal uses of the concept of recog-
nition from Hegel onwards, until the fall of the British Empire; (4) the 
re-emergence of the concept of recognition during the last decades of 
the twentieth century in relation to the rise of new social movements.
‘We must leave the North behind’, claimed José Martí in Our 
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America (1891), actually writing it when he was in the North. De Sousa 
Santos recalled him at the beginning of the century, in the heady days 
of social movements in both hemispheres. If we follow his theory of 
translation to understand the ‘new constellation of political and eman-
cipatory cultural meanings in an unequally globalised world’ (de Sousa 
Santos 2014: 234), we could state that the possibility of leaving a certain 
North behind would be a transversal concern valid for all the current 
struggles against domination and for recognition.
The challenge for the countries of the South was in general to make 
their own singularities and projects recognised, and in concrete to 
transform the structures responsible for an unfair global economic 
order (especially those relating to extractive capitalism), which – as 
analysed in the 1970s – had been born as a Eurocentric and colonial 
form of capitalism (Quijano 1972, 2000; Wallerstein 1974–89).
Economically rooted dependency theories – with their post-Marxist 
reprocessing of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Prebisch [1948] 
1998) – contributed to the creation of an alter-hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic imaginary notion that, despite its internal differences, 
coincided in its attempt to build an anti-colonial project that was also 
respectful of national sovereignty, inclusive and (to some extent) anti-
capitalist, as well as being based on mutual solidarity and cooperation. 
The different configurations (New International Economic Order or 
NIEO; the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum or IBSA; SSC; 
BRICS) all pointed towards a horizon of collective self-reliance, trying 
to generate a South-South collective development paradigm, a hori-
zontal transnationalism based on economic cooperation and able to 
establish peer-to-peer relations with the North (OECD 2011: 17; UNDP 
2013: 1–3).
At the same time – and especially since the 1970s – cultural and phil-
osophical theories have been formulated that have influenced the issue 
of dependency from various angles and through different vocabularies 
and categories: liberation theology, cultural studies, subaltern theory 
and anti-colonial, postcolonial and decolonial theory, to name the 
most important ones. Although emphasis was initially placed on the 
need for liberation from these dependencies – at multiple levels (Dussel 
1973) – progress was made during that decade and the next in terms of 
the research and analysis of how the coloniser–colonised dependency 
developed, as well as what kind of subjectivities and social, political, 
symbolic and epistemic institutions and practices had been generated 
as a result in different contexts.
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The legitimacy of the desire for inclusion, as an experience stem-
ming from instituted normativity, was accompanied by discourses of 
denunciation and vindication that brought to light the historic injus-
tices suffered by colonised countries. At the same time, these discourses 
emphasised the value that colonised countries could bring into the 
world, sometimes from their historically constructed experiences and at 
others from a firm identity construction that bordered on essentialism.
This process went in parallel with other contestations. Over the 
previous centuries, various groups had come to the forefront vindicat-
ing their logical access to a legal framework regulated by the Western 
logic of rights – by thus becoming rightholders – through the most 
basic of them, the recognition of the right to have rights (Arendt [1951] 
1973), from which many were (and still are) excluded. Some of those 
struggles had had their first battles decades earlier, but they re-emerged 
precisely in the 1960s and 1970s with different features to those of 
traditional labour movements, and many of them appealed to identity 
issues in order to fight discrimination based on race, gender, origin 
and language. They were thereby called new social movements, and 
included anti-colonial struggles, the struggle against black oppression, 
the struggles of American Indians or the Beurs, the civil rights move-
ments, feminism, pacifism, environmentalism and anti-nuclear envi-
ronmentalism. All these struggles to overcome inequalities and achieve 
the political recognition of oppressed and/or marginalised groups are 
either more or less exhausted or were energised almost half a century 
later in anti-establishment struggles.
Many of them have gradually been incorporated into the agendas 
of traditional political parties. One of the most noticeable dangers is 
that which relates to the homologating and normalising capability 
of power. Despite the distances between them, the basic experiences 
shared by these groups and their members can perhaps be read 
quite easily in light of Mary Wollstonecraft’s dilemma: the feeling 
of the legitimacy of their desire to take part as equals in the game of 
privileges of those who hold political, economic and cultural power, 
and the difficulty of becoming part of this system without being 
assimilated and betraying the cause. The history of recognition as 
the assimilation of the other has also been outlined in recent decades 
as the mechanism used to set the imperialistic constitution of the 
colonial subject. Liberalism has acted differently – although still 
neutralising differences: by assuming the whole ensemble within its 
(pseudo)-universal Man, it made invisible those differences that were 
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in fact being negatively valued and hierarchically organising society. It 
is becoming increasingly clear to these historically minoritised groups 
that asking to be recognised as human beings and, therefore, as legal 
subjects with human rights is not enough, and that their specific dif-
ferences are the ones in need of full recognition (equal value, equal 
dignity). And this is something that has to be carried out in both the 
legal and symbolic spheres.
The tight theoretical net created around this axis has come to be 
called ‘the [epistemological] paradigm of the other’ (Mignolo 2003: 
20). Although focusing more on cultural aspects – sometimes to the 
detriment of economic ones – these theories not only presented argu-
ments but also justified the demands of the Southern countries for a 
fairer geographical rearrangement of economic, political and cultural 
power, as well as for inclusion into governance and global trade spaces 
and mechanisms.
This process of empowerment is recognised, for example, by the 
incorporation of emerging countries into the G20, but also in review-
ing the status of the South as a whole of poor countries, and especially 
in the creation of an effective narrative of horizontality, cooperation, 
solidarity and respect for sovereignty able to garner international good 
repute.
As we mentioned, since the 1990s the take-off has been impressive 
and it has helped these countries to consider themselves as economic 
powers, bringing emancipation at this level to a considerable degree of 
fulfilment. But they have also succeeded in transforming their identity 
and international legitimacy into that of political actors to be taken into 
account. Although economic growth appears to have slowed since 2012 
and the gaps according to indicators of per capita income and indi-
vidual well-being in comparison with the North persist, it is already a 
fact that the SSC has questioned the hierarchical division North–South. 
In particular, it has done so on policy issues of cooperation and devel-
opment by creating its own systems and institutions (with the Bank of 
the South and the New Development Bank undermining the role of 
the North and the OECD in this area and at the same time challeng-
ing the legitimacy and vertical forms of governance that have been 
hegemonic).
However, after all these years, the ‘Southern identity’ – as a promise 
for something other than multilateral power in the face of Western or 
US unilateralism – seems to be compromised. The political and ideo-
logical emphasis on structural change has shifted towards objectives of 
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greater participation in the forums that define development agendas 
and a more equal distribution of power, yet without laying much stress 
upon social and environmental justice issues, at least not more than 
that which the North does in terms of its sustainable development 
agenda. It is not known to what extent these developments signal the 
rise of an alternative normative power. Moreover, the UN’s universal 
Agenda 2030 seeks to innovate on a large scale with a paradigm shift 
regarding the Millennium Development Goals and, in general, the 
paradigm of aid and North–South cooperation as it has been known 
so far. As its self-definition as ‘universal’ indicates, and unlike previ-
ous agendas, it is not a small group of donors from the North that 
decides what the development model implemented by the South must 
be. Rather, universality must be the criterion for both the creation of 
the agenda (made from a transnational participatory process) and the 
concept of development itself that targets all countries through the 
idea of a framework of local governance of development that has a 
global effect. The development concerns the whole of humanity and the 
planet, while the development concept itself is intended to be rearticu-
lated from a global perspective.
In addition, the economic practices of some of the most powerful 
countries of the so-called Global South – such as Brazil and China, 
primus inter pares – seem to be under suspicion due to their recent past 
(Estrella Faria 2005; Woods 2008; Strange et al. 2013; Gray and Murphy 
2013; Gray and Gills 2016). More and more critical voices observe that 
after the anti-hegemonic discourse – still in force when projecting 
their image abroad – their foreign economic policy is reproducing 
neo-liberal policies and strategies of domination over the resources 
and people of some of their partner countries – such as sub-Saharan 
African countries – under the pretext of assistance and cooperation. 
Some voices speak of southern neo-colonialism and sub-imperialism 
(Gray and Gills 2016).
Hence the interpretive crossroads between on the one hand, those 
who suggest that this is in fact creating a new South-South dependency 
system and others who, on the other hand, see an asymmetric interde-
pendence system being created, as part of a project against dependency 
where what is gained by each party in the exchange is necessarily differ-
ent due to the heterogeneity of Southern countries (money earned as a 
result of trade or obtaining more intangible benefits such as experience, 
knowledge and cultural exchange, capability building, diplomatic soli-
darity, the promotion of human rights and the visibility and recogni-
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tion of the South). Hence the calls to revive the spirit of Bandung or the 
old Third World drive (Santos 2000; Echart 2016).
In terms of domestic politics, the state, which seemed to have 
aligned with social movements in previous decades, has ignored them 
in decision-making – instead taking legal action against them and 
infantilising them for their lack of realism. The argument stating ‘you 
cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs’ still prevails (de Sousa 
Santos 2008; Wallerstein 2002).
In summary, we are witnessing a rather thorny dispute concerning 
interpretations. In fact, the question of whether the South is fulfilling or 
will fulfil its promise is closely linked to a broader debate about whether 
the phenomenon of emerging powers is considered indicative of a shift 
in the locus of the economic and political power of Southern countries, 
which would mean they have emancipated from the North; or whether 
it simply signals the co-option of a select number of key states in the 
Western-led neo-liberal world order, meaning there has not been an 
effective emancipation of the most economically developed Southern 
countries; instead, they would only be an instrument for managing the 
agony of American hegemony, supported by the Global North.
In other words: are we already at the end of hegemony as we used to 
know it, with BRICS now the vanguard – supported by the South – that 
will demonstrate its counter-hegemonic strength negotiating at forums 
and serving the interests of all Southern countries? Or rather, are the 
BRICS just the latest form devised by hegemonic power to prevail in its 
position and pursue its logic?
Moreover, what court has to judge and give authority to the fulfil-
ment of the promise of the South remains an open question. Would it 
be the North reiterating its legitimising narratives? If the economic cri-
teria available to quantify and analyse changes in the characteristics of 
poverty are increasingly questioned, a never-solved issue remains: how 
to measure and properly assess the rates of individual and collective 
self-realisation in social, moral and political spheres. What seems clear 
at this time of conflicting narratives, and struggles for interpretation 
and self-interpretation is the danger of interpreting the new, if there is 
any, with the criteria of the old.
We take the present moment as the provisory ending point from 
which to trace back a line that links it to a starting point: the moment 
in which we may find the pre-history of the North–South divide, that 
is, the moment of the encounter of the European seafarers with the 
inhabitants of the New World. To reach that point and then return 
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progressively to our present, let us be guided by the constellation that 
was the most significant for both at that time: the Southern Cross. 
Between this past and our present mediates a progressive construction 
of an imaginary that allows us to read the dynamics between South and 
North as an ongoing struggle for recognition. In the next section its 
history will be re-presented through a print of that time.
Under the Southern Cross: a fragment of an  
early modern imaginary
The significance of the Southern Cross can be grasped in the fact that 
it is not displayed only in astronomical charts, but is the only con-
stellation represented on the flags of a few Southern countries, and 
particularly on the flag of Mercosur, since it was founded in 1991. The 
Southern Cross has actually, and by extension, become the symbol of 
the Southern Hemisphere. Furthermore, if there is a distinctly ‘modern’ 
constellation, it is the Southern Cross: considered the most proper and 
primordial constellation for inhabitants of the Southern Hemisphere, 
Figure 6.1 The Centaurus constellation, in Johann Bayer, Uranometria: omnium 
asterismorum continens schemata, nova methodo delineata, aereis laminis expressa, 
Augsburg: Christoph Mang, 1603.
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between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries it assumed an unpar-
alleled relevance for sailors as a guide in unknown seas and lands. 
Described in diaries and letters by pioneers, poets and thinkers from 
diverse backgrounds, for many of them its disconcerting beauty was 
also related to its figure, the cross which inscribed their faith in the sky. 
So, without possessing a story linked to an ancient imaginary, it was 
originally baptised in a Romance language (cruzero), not in Latin, and 
was finally recognised as an independent constellation – a status that it 
holds until today (Room 1988; Kanas 2007).
In the Figure 6.1 we can observe it being represented as a Latin cross, 
absolutely Christianised and located to the south of Centaurus, but 
still not independent from the imaginary body of this hybrid being. 
The image is part of the Uranometria: omnium asterismorum continens 
schemata, nova methodo delineata, aereis laminis expressa by Johann 
Bayer, published in Augsburg (Germany) in 1603 and considered the 
first global representation of the celestial sphere in the form of an atlas.
Whilst the gaps in terrestrial maps had been completed in line with 
the great navigation experiences – carried out especially by the Dutch 
– celestial charts had not advanced significantly. Before the end of the 
decade, Galileo Galilei would present the diabolical contraption that 
was the telescope, which would make it possible to observe the skies 
and start the revolution of the universe.
Amongst Alexander Mair’s superb fifty-one copperplate engravings 
symbolising the sixty constellations fixed by Bayer, and as it happens in 
the sky itself, the great southern constellation of Centaurus undoubt-
edly stands out. This constellation was already contained in Ptolemy’s 
Almagest, and he circumscribed amongst its stars – particularly those 
in the lower part of the mythological animal’s legs – four brightly 
shining stars which had been known since antiquity and which were 
easily visible at that time from North Africa and especially from 
Alexandria.2 Those stars would be called the Southern Cross. However, 
the Centaurus constellation was not represented in isolation by Bayer, 
but in conjunction with the wolf constellation, Lupus. Furthermore, 
they are not juxtaposed but in interaction. In fact, they appear in a 
fighting position, at a moment when Centaurus has reached the wolf 
with its ornamented spear, which may be camouflaged with ivy.
The main reason why this print will be both the first fragment of our 
story and the constant reference of all the following argumentation 
is because it can be taken as an eloquent symptom of an imaginary 
that was under construction during the period between the fifteenth 
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and eighteenth centuries. Luciferous stars guiding adventures into 
uncharted seas; different disorders that shake up the traditional orders; 
knowledge and techniques contributing to overcome the mistrust in 
human capabilities and in turn to control human freedom; bestial 
men – both masters and slaves – dance in the double imaginary of 
modernity, in its constitutive tension between autonomy and mastery 
(Arnason 1989; Castoriadis 1990; Wagner 2008).
Nevertheless, when European sailors first saw the Southern Cross, 
the dialectics had not taken that form yet, nor that first global dimen-
sion. What would happen was still only one of the possibilities to be 
determined. And when it effectively happened it was just the beginning 
of a great transformation.
It was determined as a fact in the form of an encounter with the new 
– and retrospectively for us as a Faktum. The novelty lay on both sides, 
voyagers and native Americans, and precisely because it was so it can 
be interpreted also as an experience of recognition, in the sense that all 
of them had to catalogue what the others were by placing them in the 
imaginary net of their own world (Pagden 1983: 12).
However, the classification of the others in those encounters was not 
immediate, univocal and symmetrical, as we can see in the documents 
left both by Europeans and native Americans (Guillén 1974; Pagden 
1983, 1993). It became so progressively, through the political and epis-
temic practices that were established in the course of the encounters. 
In order to systematise and legitimate this Faktum, the way in which 
the encounter with the other effectively took place, the Western phi-
losophy of history created an epistemological and normative frame that 
resolved the constitutive tension of modernity with a biased under-
standing of the concept of universality that pretends towards totalisa-
tion (Fuster and Rosich 2015). What is particularly dependent on the 
European experience of modernity is conceptualised either as the 
only possible experience of modernity, or as an instance of a universal 
concept of modernity to which one needs to conform if one wants to 
be modern (Wagner 2008). Those are issues that we have dealt with 
elsewhere (Fuster and Rosich 2015). What this chapter aims to go back 
to is the argumentative thread, in order to take it a little further and 
illuminate – through juxtaposition of some other fragments – other 
aspects of a possible forgotten history of recognition.
In the scene illustrated by Bayer and Mair, the struggle between 
those two beings, the centaur and the wolf, seems to be at the thresh-
old moment between movement and immobility, the moment of 
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suspension, the standstill of ‘a constellation saturated with tensions’ 
(Benjamin 1999: 475), the instant of motionless coexistence Theodor 
Adorno in his correspondence with Walter Benjamin tried to define as 
‘the moment of indifference between death and meaning’ (Benjamin 
1999: 466). This print arrests our gaze precisely due to the lightning 
quality of those dialectical images. By lighting up the now, the print 
contains an index or historical mark which from the past sends us to 
the present. In fact, this is the second reason why this image has been 
chosen, because it illustrates our present in its specificity. It represents 
the present instant as the pure now, in its innermost constitution, that 
of no longer and not yet. But it also represents the gap in which we 
significantly find ourselves nowadays when seen from the perspective 
of a progressive path to higher and better recognitions.
But before moving onto what the image tells us about our now and 
its past, let us pause step by step on the details of our illustration of 
this place in the celestial sphere. The fascinating intimacy between the 
astronomical and philosophical vocabularies we are mulling over will 
be pushed to its limits in order to outline – on the map – the surprising 
and deep meanings represented by our constellation saturated with 
tensions.
In the image, following the position of the sky from a geocentric 
perspective, Lupus is further north and Centaurus is southward. In fact, 
the physical power that propels Centaurus upward is none other than 
the animality of its hind limbs, precisely where we see the four brightly 
shining stars whose name in Roman times was that of Caesar’s Throne, 
and which only after Andrea Corsali’s Christianised baptism would 
come to be called the Cross.3 The stars of the Cross, which at the time 
of Bayer’s publication were already beginning to be treated as a separate 
constellation,4 were the most important celestial guiding lights in the 
days when the South Seas were furrowed, guiding the great navigators 
towards the phantasmic Indies. Their nautical and terrestrial impor-
tance is essential because they allow for easily and accurately tracing the 
south cardinal point: the celestial south pole around which the celestial 
sphere and the geographic south seem to rotate. As soon as the North 
was left behind, the Cross was there to indicate the South. Its symbolic 
role is less clear, but it is quite easy to deduce that the Cross was a com-
forting sight for European sailors, and less easy to conclude that it was a 
symbolic ally and an alibi in terms of the legitimacy of the evangelising 
mission undertaken under the sign of the (Holy) Cross, as aborigines of 
the South already had their own interpretations of the Cross.
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No European unveiled the four stars to the inhabitants of the South, 
who for millennia had used the astronomical knowledge necessary 
for their farming practices and vital activities in general by building 
on the observation of the small constellation that for some was the 
beginning of their sky (their north according to the representation of 
our maps). Despite the scarcity of sources, we know that – through 
fragmentary evidence, mostly oral and sometimes architectural – since 
the days of the great civilisations, those four stars were regarded as the 
most significant ones in the sky; so significant in fact, that in Andean 
cultures – under the Quechua name chakana and already seen as a 
cross – they were deemed to be an ascending or descending bridge 
or stairway, the intermediate reality linking the earthly world to the 
celestial world and the world of the dead. Its representation is the result 
of the condensation of astronomical observations and a cosmovision 
that confines its geometric harmonies within a stairway-shaped square 
cross, with twelve ends, whose oldest representation found so far dates 
back between 4,000 and 5,000 years. The chakana still appears today as 
a symbol of Andean indigenous cultures and a vindicating sign of the 
relationship of current cultures with their aboriginal past (Lajo 2002, 
2006; Tone 2009). Other cultures – such as the Mocoví people – repre-
sented these stars as part of the ñandú – also called súri or choique – a 
sacred animal, stalked by two hounds, one on each side. It is common 
amongst other distant southern cultures (in Australia, Africa, New 
Zealand and the Pacific Islands) to interpret the shape of the stars as 
the image of a sacred animal (emu, possum, lioness), often stalked by 
human hunters, animals or even – repeatedly – the paw- or footprint of 
an animal, such as an ostrich or an eagle (Bhathal 2006; Norris 2008a, 
2008b). In the end, these stars were at the heart of different cosmovi-
sions and self-interpretations of southern societies, and some of them 
already interpreted their shape as a cross.
But these fifteenth- and sixteenth-century explorations – carried 
out under a particular interpretation of the Cross, that of Christianity, 
and science – eventually imposed a global shape and order onto 
celestial and terrestrial maps. These representations were the prelude 
to the modern world-system in which the different interpretations 
of the world tend to become one. In this frame of interpretation, while 
the Copernican revolution changed the understanding of our system, 
the North never stopped being at the top and the South at the bottom 
in cartographic representations.
As an independent constellation, the Cross was not represented 
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until the publication of Jodocus Hondius Junior and Adrian Vaen’s 
celestial globe in 1613, with the caption ‘Cruzero hispanis, at Ptolemy 
Pedes Centauri’. It was supposedly Augustine Royer who first publicly 
named it as Crux Australis.5
If we now examine the Greek mythological component involved in 
these constellations, the Cross itself does not possess its own history, as 
for the Greeks it was merely a part of Centaurus. On the other hand, the 
Lupus constellation is a constellation marked by the history of violence 
of a father, Lycaon – King of Arcadia – who kills his children for fear 
of them snatching power from him, later serving one of them to Zeus 
at a banquet. To punish Lycaon for his cruelty, Zeus transforms him 
into a wolf.
Chiron, the most famous of all centaurs, also had the archetypal 
devourer of children as a father: Cronus. While those of his kind were 
wild and violent creatures, the talents of this hybrid being included 
medical wisdom, knowledge of the stars, the arts and the use of the bow, 
which he learned from Apollo. In fact, it is usual to see him represented 
tightening a bow just before shooting an arrow, and it was precisely the 
wound caused by an arrow accidentally shot by his friend Heracles that 
caused such excruciating pain that in order to end his own suffering he 
decided to exchange his immortality for Prometheus’s mortality. When 
he died – so the legend goes – Zeus placed him in the sky, and there he 
is, in the shape of a constellation (Sagittarius or Centaurus).
In none of Chiron’s stories are we told about a fight with a wolf, so 
the scene represented by Bayer does not have a traditional reference. 
This is why it is interesting to understand the author’s imaginative 
gesture: to link the centaur and the wolf through the dynamics of a 
struggle, replacing the arrow with a spear, covering it with ivy as if it 
were a ploy devised by the centaur to trick and capture the wolf, and 
finally turning the struggle into a fight to the death. The stars’ layout did 
not compel Bayer to outline this profile: the only thing he had inherited 
from tradition was a Lupus and a Centaurus inscribed in the sky.
In the general political view prevalent in early modernity, shaped 
by the fear and violence of sea attacks, the wolf stands out as the most 
popular animal reference of an anthropology that developed at the 
same time as the Southern Cross entered modern history.6 Man had 
already started – from the times of Plautus – being a wolf to man, but 
only through Thomas Hobbes – ‘the twin of fear’ borne by his mother’s 
horror in face of the proximity of Spain’s Invincible Armada – does 
it truly become one. First in De cive ([1642–3] 1983) and later in his 
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Leviathan ([1651] 2012), the representations of rulers are easily identifi-
able with a devouring father who has already swallowed his children. 
One could say this was done in order to protect them, or as the myth 
of Cronus already indicated, for fear of being dismissed by a new order 
they could introduce into the world.
Thus, the scene tells us – unhistorically – of a fight to kill the devour-
ing father/bestial ruler, which is carried out by a hybrid creature, 
half-man half-animal, a joint paradigm of intelligence and power. By 
contrast, in regard to our present, Bayer’s image historically points 
towards the time of suspension itself: the end of the fight is not con-
summated. It stops – significantly – between the ‘no longer’ and ‘not 
yet’: the wolf is not dead, but they have caught up with it. Will it stay 
that way forever? Never? That is perhaps the greatest question of the 
print, which is not immediately or easily noticeable. Is this (near) the 
end of formal domination (Wagner 2015)?
The unknown – as is almost always the case – is hidden in time. In 
the heat of the battle, we have failed to notice – perhaps – the peculiar 
object carried by the centaur on its left arm. It is in fact the only modern 
object in the whole scene: a pocket watch. Invented only a few decades 
earlier, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the watch displays 
the time that before was only shown by the stars, the ticking of no 
longer–not yet.
The struggle with the other as a forma mentis
A mere man or a mere beast, in all probability, would not have reached 
this point. The wolf is on top. In its dialectics, the image suspends – 
perhaps – the moment that is closest to the end of a struggle, a struggle 
to shake off that which rises above the individual from a metaphorical 
‘top’. A fight to avoid the (indeterminate) threat of power? The threat 
of physical integrity? The threat over freedom? Power configured in 
modern times swallows its children, it includes them in its social body 
(even as equally free) in order to ensure the liveability of life (non-
death/freedom) (Butler 2004). Very often, it does so at the price of the 
difference potentially meant by that freedom. Only as a remainder: 
equality does not oppose difference, inequality does; difference finds its 
opposite in sameness or homogeneous identity.
Late modernity has also taught us that power does not swallow, it 
shapes bodies and souls. That which is left outside the scope of what 
swallows/shapes/recognises power is what is monstrous, deformed, 
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unclassifiable, neither one thing nor the other (what is inter-). 
Therefore, the centaur’s hybridity will be key to our reading. The jux-
taposition of its body – which is not bending – is a triple formation 
that opens up to multiplicity: human–animal–cross. And as a cross: 
ladder–bridge–scale.
Machiavelli also, capitalising on the lessons learnt from the centaur 
Chiron for The Prince, advised the sovereign to be hybrid, double, to 
know how to divide or multiply himself – as a fox and a lion. Given 
the increasingly difficult governance of peoples, the Prince does not 
need to have such qualities, but must intend to have them in order to 
become recognisable as a prince and stay in the place which he knows 
is not entirely his (Machiavelli 2010: 69–70).
So who is the sovereign in the image? The wolf or the centaur? For 
there to be a struggle, it must virtually be both.
The self-governance and general governance manual that is The 
Prince is the best and clearest example of an era whose political space 
was organised around the question of how to rule, which was a pre-
dominant political concern in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
whilst the great navigations guided by the Southern Cross were taking 
place. According to Foucault, Western Europe at that moment was 
characterised by focusing both its thinking and practices precisely on 
governmentalisation. Thus, creating multiple governmental skills – 
in all fields – went hand in hand with the reversal of the question of 
how to govern: how not to be governed (in this way). In the eyes of 
Foucault, the experience of criticism institutionalised as an ethos of the 
Enlightenment can be read – therefore – as an experience of resistance 
in face of the authority that undermines the strength of the pillars of 
traditional legitimacy. The self-interpretation of humans as beings able 
to conduct valid interpretations – both in regard to the natural and 
supernatural (the Scriptures) dimensions – establishes an open space 
for the practice of criticism as both interpretation and transformation, 
‘the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability 
[. . .] would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the 
context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth’ (Foucault 
1997: 32, 39).
What Foucault calls historical critique, with its origin in the question 
about governmentalisation, allows us to discern and illuminate the four 
most significant historical points in the chronology that we are using: 
(1) the dawn of modernity, marked by religious wars and the discovery 
of the New World (fifteenth to sixteenth centuries); (2) the Aufklärung 
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(sixteenth to eighteenth centuries); (3) the emergence of social control 
(nineteenth century); and (4) the world of today, emerged from the 
Second World War (from 1950 until the present) with its theories and 
practical critique of the complicity of power and instrumental rational-
ity (a position in which Foucault situates himself, in proximity to the 
Frankfurt School).
If we go over our temporal contextualisation in parallel with the 
exposition of the governmentalisation question, it is important to note 
that it was precisely the European sailors who – in their encounter 
with the inhabitants of that particular South which is now America – 
 experienced and laid the foundation of the modern question of equal-
ity, in terms of whether these beings (in their eyes, quite unclassifiable) 
were like them or not; whether they could be included in humanity or 
not (Pagden 1993; Fuster and Rosich 2015). Can they be included in 
‘us’? In the various determinations of ‘us’? To do so, they must before-
hand be categorised, to decide whether they belong to the category of 
humans or beasts. Or if they are an inter-. And based on that, to rule 
them or subject them. A symptom to keep in mind is that Bayer, in his 
twelve figurations of exotic animals for the twelve new constellations of 
the southern hemisphere, included the Indian (Indus). The successive 
interpretations of the question, the different answers and their practical 
implications, as well as the heated debates amongst the intellectuals of 
the day belong to the history of that Faktum. What is worth underlin-
ing is that the modern civilisational project, with its space–time con-
figuration, initially legitimised both domination and the struggle to end 
it. These were not successive actions, but simultaneous ones.
But only from the perspective of a very advanced Modernity in 
which the different disciplines have systematised the meaning of the 
events into a universal project can Bayer’s image be read as the future of 
the image of the encounter. What mediated between the two moments 
were normativities that were progressively assimilated into the modern 
imagination. They were registered especially through the revolutions 
of the end of the eighteenth century and their related institutions and 
practices, even in the post-revolutionary era (from the drafting of 
national constitutions to the knowledge represented – for instance – by 
modern political and moral philosophy). Equal freedom and the strug-
gle to determine what this meant informed the main institutions of that 
period. Whereas being free had been declared a duty since Kant – and 
this duty was extended to everyone due to the systemised universalist 
matrix within philosophy itself – the possibility of a free future became 
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a right, apart from being the challenge par excellence of all rational 
beings for breaking out of ignorance and passivity.
Thus, from the necessity of the Aufklärung – formulated by Kant as 
the attainment of the age of majority (from the tutelage of the other) – it 
is tempting – and almost natural – to see every confrontation as a strug-
gle for emancipation, autonomy and equality. And we also understand 
every struggle for freedom – almost directly – in terms of a struggle for 
recognition (of being and the ability to be). We find it natural because 
we are still under the effect of the Hegelian figure of the master–slave 
(Herrschaft–Knechtschaft) fight to the death. This figure was his criti-
cal reinterpretation of Fichte’s concept of recognition (Anerkennung) 
in Foundations of Natural Right ([1796/7] 2000). Hegel ([1806] 1977) 
underlines the moral component of the process of recognition that 
Fichte ignored and in a metonymical move abstracted from the reality of 
the Haitian Revolution, transforming it into a dialectic between a master 
and slave (Buck-Morss 2009). This is the climactic and explicit formu-
lation of an implicit understanding that had been brewing since the 
institution of the philosophy of history (Fuster and Rosich 2015). Such 
a conception of the meaning of the struggle and its internal dynamics 
shocked the core of the philosophical and political imagination of the 
nineteenth century – but especially the general imagination of the late 
twentieth century – to such an extent that it has become a forma mentis.
Similarly, the North–South relationship as an oppositional dialectic 
is at this point a forma mentis, and not only for its opposition on the 
map. In fact, it is easily legible in terms of a struggle for recognition 
because these geographical positions are the contemporary names of 
two poles of a history through which is forged the logic of the relation 
with the other that shapes the heart of the theories of recognition. The 
meeting of the North with the geographical and metaphorical South 
constitutes progressively and asymmetrically the master and slave 
poles, transforming the previous experience of this relation forever. 
This is the experiential and conceptual core of the theory of recognition 
that has shaped the contemporary grammar of politics and has become 
our forma mentis.
But let us pause on Hegel. As is known, in the Hegelian theory of 
the constitution of a universal consciousness, consciousness alone 
can emerge through the recognition that is granted to it by another 
–  formally equal – consciousness. The dynamic modality is that of a 
struggle between life and death of two non-self-realised conscious-
nesses, which – in turn – are internally divided between the will to 
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be free and the will to be dependent. This is not the kind of dialectics 
found in Benjamin’s dialectical images, where the relationship takes 
place in a juxtaposition that establishes analogies, but an asymmetri-
cal dialectic whose inner logic leads to improvement. Neither is this 
the logic of the experience of recognition that took place during the 
encounters; instead of an openness to the will to meet an other who is 
as other as possible, there is the rush to subsume its novelty, to control 
it and neutralise it. The struggle for recognition, although not presented 
by Hegel as belonging to the political dimension, when transferred to 
it, dislocates the paradigm – created by Hobbes – that understands 
human action as a struggle for self-preservation. However – from the 
beginning – the confrontational spirit of this conception of politics is 
present: in order to be, we need the other. Not the equal other, but the 
originally equal other that has been historically subjugated (Negroes, 
indigenes, women, the South, and so on).
On the other hand, the struggle for recognition is a fight that does 
not seem imposed on everyone with the same force of obligation, as 
hinted at by Hegel when referring to Napoleon as the ‘world spirit on 
horseback’:
When Napoleon said before the Peace of Campo Formio ‘the French 
Republic is no more in need of recognition than the sun is’, his 
words conveyed no more than that strength of existence which itself 
carries with it a guarantee of recognition, even if this is not expressly 
formulated. (Hegel [1819] 1991: 366–7)
Nor can everyone enter the struggle of their own free will, because 
it is an asymmetric fight between peers. If in the master–slave dialectic 
what established the dynamic situation was always the open possibility 
for the slave to become someone worthy of being a master (through 
education, revolution or a prospective entry into the middle class), 
then for a person who is unable to access their self-recognition, even 
the possibility of fighting is forbidden (the figure of the Negro and the 
uncivilised or barbaric nation).7
Therefore, the attainment of the express statement of that recogni-
tion is, however, what seems to be implicitly guaranteed by mere exist-
ence, which will become a normative horizon in Hegelian philosophy. 
The expression of personal courage is not enough; there is also a need 
for a positive evaluation from others of what one claims as one’s own. 
Its meaning surpasses Kantian ‘respect’ – the basis of society and 
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morality – and also tolerance, ‘refraining from using power against 
strongly disapproved of important deviations’ (for a distinction of the 
three terms, see Khomyakov 2013).
In its discriminatorily inclusive capacity, the concept of recognition 
had an immediate influence in the legal field, especially in interna-
tional law, between the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth 
century (Parfitt 2016). In the absence of a conceptual history of the 
term ‘recognition’ – as there is for other closely related terms like 
‘freedom’ or ‘emancipation’ (Koselleck and Presner 2002) – if we look 
at recent studies in the legal field we can conclude that the use of the 
term ‘recognition’ in this context is precisely that which was referred to 
by Napoleon: validating or denying the statute of nation-states in the 
field of intra-European discussions (they had internal sovereignty, but 
they needed the recognition of other nations to have an international 
legal identity). Yet that was just the beginning. Over time and through 
different stages, recognition went from being a theoretical tool of 
individualisation and inclusion to a powerful instrument of exclusion 
of what was non-European, by means of identification, cataloguing, 
minoritisation and social control of communities and individuals, 
which would legitimise and facilitate colonial imperialism between the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and the fall of the British Empire 
in the 1950s (Clark 2016).8 Hence, symptomatically, after the collapse 
of imperialism, the framework of recognition was discarded, since its 
exclusionary ability was no longer in use.
It is therefore in the new experience of the imperialist encounter – 
when the normative power of Europe has already constituted itself as 
such – that we discover that there is no obligation to behave towards 
the other following the moral and political patterns that govern the 
land we come from. With the aim of eliminating both the internal 
and external obstacles to the expansion of capital, imperialism – and 
the new encounter fostered with the other – has become characterised 
by the term ‘horror’ (Joseph Conrad). The unmitigated horror that 
causes that other-that-is-no-other legitimises the horror that may be 
committed when there are no containment barriers or reciprocal pacts, 
which are so distinctive of nation-states. Under certain conditions, the 
elimination of the other proves to be a respectable policy. With this 
epistemological framework of recognition, imperialism exceeds its 
economic motive to go deeper into the geopolitics of a world divided 
into ‘master–slave races’ (Arendt [1951] 1973).
We say other-that-is-no-other because it does not count towards 
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entering the struggle for recognition, but at the same time it does 
not count not for being radically other, but precisely for not being so 
as much as expected. What is awful is realising that the other – seen 
from Western recognition frameworks as brutal and barbaric – is not 
so different to us, is not inhuman, and shares the colonisers’ human-
ity. Moreover, what is terrifying is realising that the idea of humanity 
(Christianity, civilisation, progress) is a social construction, and it 
wobbles when going beyond borders. Proximity without the protective 
distance offered by a civilising creation is horrific. It is the dissonance 
between identity and difference that marks the emergence of the cat-
egory of race, which will partner with the mechanism of bureaucracy 
in the encounter of the Boers with South Africa (belonging to a cata-
loguing bureaucracy of recognition). Racism is not the expression of 
rejection towards difference, but an effective prophylactic against an 
experienced similitude (Arendt [1951] 1973).
But we insist on the fact that the functional epistemic framework 
for determining the encounter was not created in the encounter of 
the nineteenth century: it had already been created as a result of the 
colonial experience of the fifteenth century. Therefore, every encounter 
with the other – with what remains to be found – will again be chilling, 
but it will quickly be reduced to the same layout: barbarism, uncivilisa-
tion, bestiality.
What has been a progressive novelty is its increasingly ontological 
coherence, more and more rooted in humankind’s own way of being. 
Had another determination been possible – something contingent, 
only one possibility amongst those possible – a theorisation of rec-
ognition would take place as the only constitution of humanity at an 
individual, social and political level. The maximum effectiveness of 
the theory is achieved through ontologisation, the maximum power of 
persuasion. But that was still to come.
In fact, the obsolescence of the term ‘recognition’ seems to have 
lasted only four decades, yet this time with a specular use. Its resur-
gence is a recent event of the end of the 1980s, and especially of the 
1990s, hence the risk assumed by our interpretation. The concept of 
recognition resurfaced vigorously, again with Hegel as a reference, 
although the egalitarian Hegel of Jena Writings is the most preferred 
version (Honneth, Siep), as opposed to that of The Phenomenology of 
Spirit (Butler, Taylor).
Although the Hegelian concept of recognition has been at the heart 
of other authors’ thinking (Taylor 1994; Butler 2004), it did not become 
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a proper recognition theory until it was systematised and developed, 
especially by Axel Honneth ([1992] 1995), who sees the constitutive 
intersubjective dynamics of identity and otherness outlined by Hegel 
under the influence of the object relations psychoanalytic theories of 
Donald Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin’s relational psychoanalysis 
(Benjamin 1988). Configured this way, the contemporary theory of 
recognition has demonstrated its strength for over two decades. This 
strength is due not only to its power as an ethical and political norma-
tive theory, but also to its heuristic capability: it satisfactorily unravels, 
interprets and explains the operational and legitimising psychological, 
ethical, social and political mechanisms of our world today. In addi-
tion, the most recent scientific contributions – such as the discovery 
of mirror neurons – seem to reinforce this strength, to which the old 
psychological and psychoanalytical theories on personality formation 
in children can be added, preferably as a complement.
With no big debates surrounding the meaning of the term, the core of 
the social struggles of the last decades has been structured around this 
concept, also with little resistance. The main task of the current theory 
of recognition – in line with the critical theory methodology to which 
most authors working in this framework adhere (the most significant 
exceptions are again Butler and Taylor) – is to analyse the hurdles to 
freedom and social justice in terms of social domination, as along with 
the social conditions of individual and collective self-realisation. That 
is, recognition is addressed primarily from the perspective of cases 
where there is misrecognition or a lack of recognition altogether. In 
other words, not from the top down, but from the bottom up.
Perhaps part of the success and validity of the term ‘recognition’, 
especially in association with the term ‘struggle’, is due to the fact that 
it proves to be really intuitive, and it reveals as well that individual and 
collective identity are intersubjective phenomena that are formed when 
we relate to others, that is to say, they are dependent on otherness. It 
is therefore not surprising that many of the claims and discursive pro-
ductions of recent decades – also from the South – use the concept of 
recognition to articulate their demands for justice. In the Declaration 
of the Bandung Conference, the term ‘recognition’ appeared – in an 
inclusive sense – in principle 3: ‘Recognition of the equality of all races 
and the equality of all nations large and small’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1955: 168). Even though it does not seem to have any technical 
significance, its field of use follows the lines we mentioned previously: 
the equal sovereignty of nations and groups, based on racial criteria. 
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The frameworks for the management and enunciation of political 
discursive spaces have changed considerably, but now, because this 
principle has become normatively grounded, when talking about other 
globalisation possibilities from the South in terms of recognition – and 
also of redistribution and situated knowledge (de Sousa Santos 2014) – 
principle 3 forms part of the basis.
From the general perspective of the modern emancipatory project, 
recognition is a concept capable of dealing with the issues of inter-
subjectivity, historicity and contingency of the formation of individual 
and collective subjects. Unlike other democratic narratives in political 
theory, it does not do so from a presupposition of conflict – that char-
acterises the relationship of the self with the other (litige and agonism) 
– but from an inclusivist perspective that corrects the most exclusion-
ary and asymmetrical features of the Hegelian concept. It is also, and 
above all, a concept that addresses the question of freedom and equality 
through the phenomena of individualisation and inclusion, which are 
crucial to social change and analysable from a social science perspec-
tive.9 Furthermore, it can be productive for carrying out an analysis of 
social institutions.
The impregnability demonstrated by this theory prompts us to 
consider the hypothesis that the theory of recognition has become a 
true paradigm in the Kuhnean sense. The level of detail of discussions 
is steadily increasing and authors – especially Honneth – keep updat-
ing the theory, yet it has not lost the formal elegance and elasticity that 
characterise it. It is a paradigm because it seems to be sustained by the 
agreement of the social scientists at different levels and with different 
degrees of involvement.10
Beyond the community of social scientists, we find those whose 
lives unfold against the backdrop of the paradigm’s validity. In regard 
to this last point, it could be argued that the theory of recognition 
went beyond the walls of academia a long time ago, to become a kind 
of sensus communis or, as we said at the beginning, a forma mentis. It 
is an interpretive framework through which citizens make their own 
private and public behaviours intelligible, and therefore all our actions 
may be susceptible to (self-)interpretation as part of a determined 
struggle for recognition, which may itself consist of several intersect-
ing recognitional struggles and may entail changing the frameworks of 
recognition.
The main criticisms levelled at the theory of recognition could be 
classified as follows: (1) it ignores the strictly economic dimensions 
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of social injustice, which may work in favour of the injustices caused 
by neo-liberalism (Fraser, de Sousa Santos); (2) it can reify (assimi-
late, homogenise, stigmatise), essentialise and individualise identities 
(Fraser, Benhabib, Butler); (3) it reduces the intersubjective relation-
ship to an appropriative relationship of domination (Levinas, Pagden, 
Fuster and Rosich); or, on the contrary, (4) it ignores the fact that the 
self–other relationship is always a relationship where power dynamics 
are present, constructing identity (Butler, McNay); (5) when objec-
tive inequalities are taken into the body and naturalised as subjective 
dispositions, the capacity for political agency can be subtly eroded 
(McNay); and finally, (6) an amendment to the whole would entail 
recognition theory being called an ideology, following Rousseau’s idea 
of inauthenticity as the outcome of aiming to please others (Althusser, 
Neuhouser).
To offset the limitations and fill in the blind spots highlighted by 
these criticisms, various arguments have been developed, and they 
have contributed to refining, clarifying and incorporating perspec-
tives (at an intra-paradigmatic level, the Honneth–Fraser discussion 
(Fraser and Honneth 2003) is of particular interest, and at an inter-
paradigmatic level the same is true of the Honneth–Rancière discus-
sion (Honneth et al. 2016), although its impact so far has been more 
limited). With regard to the meaning of the term ‘recognition’, we can 
observe a kind of general consensus. In intra-paradigmatic terms, the 
Hegelian notion, understood as the intersubjective dynamics of the 
constitution of the subject, is preserved – a notion that is based on 
mutuality, which, however, is no longer as asymmetric as it was in 
the master–slave struggle and, also, is based on the exchange of positive 
assessments. This agreed definition accounts for the criticism concern-
ing the suitability of potentially synonymous terms like ‘identification’ 
or ‘acknowledgement’. It would seem therefore that this term – unlike 
most political terms – is not open to contestation, and in order for it to 
be deployed this minimal meaning would suffice.
We shall return to the subject of this apparent conceptual profile – 
not open to contestation – in the final section of this chapter. For now, 
it is important to stress that at an intra-pragmatic level the struggle for 
recognition is not considered amongst the possible forms of relation-
ship with the other, but as the foundational dynamics of the individual 
and social psyche. Let us go back to the struggle of the centaur and the 
wolf, to propose a reading linked to the present.
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The centaur’s watch: what is beyond the paradigm of recognition?
We said that the mystery contained in the print in Figure 6.1, which 
is not immediately noticeable, lay in the suspension of time. The cen-
taur’s watch will have stopped between a no longer and a not yet. Or 
maybe it is the only thing in the scene that retains its relentless beat, 
but the watch’s case blocks our view. We also said that Bayer’s image 
challenges us because it illuminates something inherent to our present: 
the ‘no longer, but not yet’, in which many of the struggles of our time 
seem suspended. Amongst them, as noted before, is the struggle for the 
geopolitical organisation of our world-system.
As easily as in a dream, this question turns into another, which could 
become the political question of our time: can we leave the North–
South behind? With its variations: can we leave the North–South 
behind if we come from the South? And the North? Can we leave the 
North–South behind if we come from the North? And the South?
It may be the form of a question articulated from the Souths of 
existence, wherever they may be, close or far away from the North. 
To understand the specificity of our time, we need diagnoses that 
establish differences and also live up to appearances. Even if it is 
counter- intuitively and provocatively. If we look at the present from 
the vindictive background of the years when the North–South dis-
cussion was forged, especially from the 1970s onwards, we can take 
distance from the most absolutising, negative interpretations that can 
lead to immobility or paralysis. Taking into account the indicators and 
criteria available (economic, legal) to measure historical evolution or 
what used to be called progress, we would have to say that the levels of 
recognition at an individual and collective level – and hence of freedom 
and material welfare – have increased globally. After a transformation 
of the orders of recognition, the gap between established principles of 
freedom and justice and their actual realisation is decreasing.
These considerations and the attempt to discriminate between forms 
of domination are the origin of Peter Wagner’s provocative thesis, 
which we had announced as a question and left suspended with Bayer’s 
image: our present is the time of the (near) end of formal domination. 
We understand formal domination as ‘a kind of domination that justi-
fies hierarchy of one group over another and enshrines such hierarchy 
in formal rules that, among other elements, determine who dominates 
and who is dominated’ (Wagner 2015: 19). We have reached its (near) 
end because we have left behind the legitimation and possible legiti-
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macy of the domination of one group over another or the exclusion of 
one group from participating in determining the rules of socio-political 
organisation (Wagner 2015: 19). It is not a question of there being no 
domination (the end of formal domination is not the end of domina-
tion), but rather that old dominations are no longer sustainable at a 
justificatory level and find resistance everywhere. Nonetheless, many of 
these dominations – beyond the legal scope, but here as well – actually 
remain valid on different scales in all corners of the globe.
But does this (near) end signal that we are near the equator? Can we 
see the Southern Cross from here? Have we left the North behind as 
José Martí wanted?
Is the question relevant despite the paradigms of the North–South 
relationship being declared obsolete or – precisely because of being 
declared obsolete – does the question arise due to the possibility of 
truly leaving these logics of power relations behind, to start new ones? 
We realise that declaring the death of a principle of world order does 
not mean that the ghost of the deceased exerts no power or domination 
(capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy are only some examples).
The invocation of the name of the South during the last few 
decades did indeed attempt to contest an order. After the political 
liberation brought by national independence processes, the accu-
sation of injustice made by the South against the North went far 
beyond the notion of human slaughter and economic spoliation. In 
an increasingly coordinated manner – whether under the theory of 
liberation or not – its demand was presented as a demand for the rec-
ognition of a historic injustice perpetrated in the cultural, symbolic 
and epistemic realms.
The anti-capitalist challenges featured in the origins of the debate 
gradually disappeared, and as we said, if during the years after the 
Second World War distribution was the key word of social strug-
gles, after the emergence of the new social movements the key word 
changed to recognition. The policies associated with this framework of 
understanding – and policies of recognition – but also identity policies 
and policies of difference, possessed logics that could be valid locally 
or could be articulated with the existing universal normativity and be 
claimed as global policies. However, overlapping social equality with 
political equality imposes an imperative of normalisation of differ-
ences. Equality is not an innate quality that arises from differences, 
but a relational framework artificially created through politics and law. 
This legal framework originally bore the seed of utmost inclusiveness, 
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and this is what it progressively aims for (Arendt 1958). Precisely for 
this reason, it is worth remembering that not all invocations of dif-
ferences ‘disturb and generate conflict against the vocation of order’ 
(Birulés 2015: 46). The current emphasis on differences is just the other 
side of the homologating universalism formulated in the obsessive 
modern identity language, since these occur – very often – only as 
unyielding identities (Birulés 2015: 46). Faced with a thorny dialectic, 
between denial and the ‘victimisation of victims’, many groups demand 
recognition for the diverse tones of their discourses and undertaken 
initiatives, while simultaneously tending towards a strong internal dif-
ferentiation as various forms of domination are identified between the 
subgroups that compose them.
Perhaps, the teaching of the centaur is not to allow oneself to be 
reduced to identity and to make only a strategic use of it: to give oneself 
the chance to be more than that which is presented to the wolf for the 
sake of presentability – what is given to the hegemon to recognise as 
being recognisable – having a stronghold of unpredictable otherness 
that is the price not to be paid for being included. It is from this strong-
hold that it gets its elan, its hind legs, the stars of the Southern Cross. 
By losing them, it will only be a disabled centaur, mired in pain and 
wanting to exchange its immortality for a lenitive death.
Other voices said, before the framework of interpretation – from 
which the universal Agenda 2030 stems – was established: the North–
South divide must be left behind. ‘On the contrary, the South seeks an 
undivided world [a truly interdependent world] in which there would 
be “no” South and “no” North’, stated The Challenge to the South, the 
document published by the South Center Commission in 1995 under 
the chairmanship of Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania 
(South Commission 1995: 9–10). ‘And because it is the people of the 
South who more urgently need change in the present world order, it is 
they who have to take the initiative to make this vision of the world a 
reality’ (South Commission 1995: 10).
This vision of the South is the overcoming of the dialectic; a vision of 
reconciliation that would be resolved through new geopolitics, which 
would render the North–South geographical categories metaphorically 
useless. Would it even change the orientation of the sky vault?
Milton Santos spoke about this revolution at the beginning of our 
century when, citing Nyerere and stating the convertibility of glo-
balisation into another possible globalisation, he said that history had 
not ended, but that instead it was about to begin: ‘The movement of 
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the world reveals a single pulse, although the conditions are different 
depending on the continents, countries and places, which are valued 
for their form of participation in the production of this new history’ 
(Santos 2000: 74, 83).
The World Social Forum (WSF) framework initiated in Porto 
Alegre, which is trying to capture this spirit, at once conciliatory and 
revolutionary, insists on these transnational alliances at the level of a 
civil society and anti-systemic movement, under an alternative world 
view:
Importantly, the WSF seeks to bring together movements from the 
North and the South within a single framework. The only slogan, 
as yet, is ‘Another World is Possible’. Even more strangely, the 
WSF seeks to do this without creating an overall superstructure. 
(Wallerstein 2002: 37)
But for some years a different voice has been raised: that which 
certainly seems the most unlikely option is that the new geopolitical 
figure resulting from reconciliation will be able to enjoy the forms 
and levels of well-being that characterise the North today. Everyone 
seems to agree that the North cannot be expanded: the production 
and consumption system that is dominant today in the United States, 
the European Union and Japan is not universalisable because there 
are insufficient natural resources and ecological space on the planet to 
allow for a similar expansion elsewhere they affirm.
Perhaps precisely because of this we are facing a situation in which 
the ‘no longer’ and ‘not yet’ do particularly give us cause for thought. 
In theory, much has been done, and what is yet to be done is only a 
matter of time, especially if we think of time as a line that leads us 
on the right track. But perhaps the perplexity of the ‘not yet’ is more 
evident because what is on the horizon – seen through the lens of the 
Anthropocene – is not very rewarding. Finite beings, as ever, in a world 
that is more finite than ever before in their history. It is not only a new 
philosophical conundrum, which in the best of cases can push us into 
taking an incalculable leap, like that which Oedipus took over the old 
Sphinx’s shrewdness. Nor is it the announcement of a setback, but 
rather a clue for us to grasp that there will be a future reorganisation 
(or an unparalleled disorder) in which perhaps the universalist and 
progressively inclusive logics turn out to be a beautiful remnant. Not of 
what we were, but of what we someday expected to be.
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Is history about to begin or is a certain history about to end? Why 
are we about to leave the North behind? The South? The North–South?
We said that in most legal codes the traces of formal discrimination 
have disappeared, although they may continue working at an empirical 
level and new forms of domination may be created. We also mentioned 
the fact that formal or controlled inclusion has been the perfect move 
to continue excluding without any scandals, to sustain the position of 
the master. Nor is it the first time there has been domination under 
conditions of formal political equality.
We also said that there is a possibility that the South is fulfilling its 
promise of another normativity. Then, within the paradigm of recogni-
tion, what seems logical is for the struggles for self-determination, for 
freedom, to be understood as struggles that continue. They continue in 
the name of reshaping the frames of recognition, of making them more 
and more inclusive, making them fuller forms of recognition. They go 
on beyond the achievements in the formal level, reshaping effective 
practices until a fuller justice, a fuller freedom, will be achieved.
But there is a discontent that persists beyond the fact of being legally 
and symbolically recognised. It is a discontent we keep calling the 
urge for freedom, and we do not know if it is due to a social pathology 
derived from historical injustices with present consequences. Here we 
wonder whether it has been caused by the very understanding of the 
social and political aspects of a struggle against historical injustice in 
terms of the struggle for recognition, where the struggle for redistribu-
tion is already included for the purpose of completing the paradigm 
of justice. We cannot rule out the fact that it may be due to the very 
constitution of humanness as the incompleteness from which desire 
emerges. But that desire re-emerges as a desire for freedom or a justice 
that would allow us to live in freedom.
What is apparent from some of the Southern existences is that even 
when we feel recognised and included, we continue experiencing 
underestimations and exclusions that are identifiable at an empirical 
level of life, but others are not even legible. It is not only that there is 
no outside of power, but also that it is already understood as a consti-
tutive dynamics. What is nurtured is a deep-rooted suspicion that by 
participating, and allowing ourselves to be recognised so much and 
so well (also through the identity construction practices favoured by 
new social networks in the context of the identity obsession that was 
already occurring), we are perhaps dancing to the tune of new forms of 
 voluntary servitude or the sophisticated versions of old ones.
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In any case, it is difficult to understand what happens to us when we 
inhabit the gap that is our present. We struggle to understand if it is 
just the desire to be like the other, to be the other, because we under-
stand that that is the only way to really be. We do not believe this is the 
answer. We also find it difficult to grasp in what new ways, different 
from the struggles for recognition within reciprocity, the response 
– the resistance to remaining and emerging dominations – is being 
formulated: in the self-recognitions of different sovereignties?
In fact, we have difficulty understanding how the new normativ-
ity will be articulated, a normativity that will enable the discomforts 
arising from the relentless attempt to collapse some hierarchies – 
almost always the same and which do not cease – to stop once and for 
all. And for others to be created, surely.
What seems indisputable is the fact that – despite the few positive 
expectations evoked by the future – we remain installed in a messianic 
normative conception. We have before us an elusive horizon that 
serves as a criterion for evaluating our actions and their achievements. 
This is the case, as has been said, if we accept that we still have a horizon 
ahead to direct our steps. But at the same time and perhaps precisely 
because of this, emancipatory discourses – from the classical discourse 
of progress to the discourses disputing it, from feminism to postcolo-
nialism in its most anti-liberal versions – seem to have lost their valid-
ity in the eyes of many. They seem to repeat old ideas that have already 
been normalised and institutionalised, when not outgrown. That is 
why it is tempting to think in terms of a renewed experience of critical 
impotence. A renewed experience of the impatience of freedom. The 
question besetting us may not arise from any other experiences; we in 
fact believe it besets us almost without realising it: is there a chance 
to experience and reconceptualise our relationship with others, with 
ourselves, with what is happening and is about to come, from outside 
the idea of a recognition that imposes geographies of one, the other, 
the margins? Are the possibilities of resistance still found in knowing 
how to extract creativity from our desire to be beyond the other, that 
is, the complement of the Same? From exploring within our being the 
otherness of that other? The reluctance to be recognised, catalogued, 
reduced and normalised can be seen in the vindication of the category 
of transition, of a persistent non-identification as a vocation, as a 
condition. But our new histories of migrations, refugees, displaced 
and stateless people show us that in the current political margins these 
imposed nomadic modalities are unliveable. This does not mean that 
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the force of resistance inherent to what attempts to be unrecognisable 
is negligible.
On the contrary. In the experiences of freedom made from desires 
that do not attempt to win recognition for themselves – whether 
voluntary or accidental – there may be an effective lever in terms of 
the questioning of our frames of self-understanding. It is from that 
questioning that we utter the bemused question: can we leave the 
North/South behind from the paradigm of recognition? The retrieved 
fragments of the forgotten history of recognition seem to point out that 
there is a close dangerous liaison between the divide and the paradigm 
to understand it.
But can we leave the paradigm of recognition behind? Taking this 
question seriously would involve stepping into a conceptual darkness 
and passages full of ambiguity. This is the reason why maybe only the 
reflected light of the Southern constellation’s brightness – before the 
creation of the North–South dialectics – would be able to guide us. But 
by not taking this step we may end up curtailing those hind legs made 
of stars from which the centaur gathers momentum.
Notes
 1. Its logo represents the world map as an equidistant projection made from the 
North Pole, surrounded by two olive branches. The representation is thus a 
direct inversion of what we would see if the projection had been taken using the 
Southern Cross as its zenith.
 2. It has been claimed – since Amerigo Vespucci (letter of 1499), not without 
great controversy – that the stars mentioned by Dante in Canto I of the Divine 
Comedy’s ‘Purgatory’ were the only ones seen by the first humans, Adam and Eve, 
since paradise – according to the poet – was located in the opposite hemisphere to 
his, that is, the Southern Hemisphere. It is also speculated that the Southern Cross 
was in fact the star that guided the Three Kings to Bethlehem, for it was visible in 
Jerusalem.
 3. There is controversy surrounding the question of who the first person to give it that 
name was, but in the ‘Lettera di Andrea Corsali allo illustrissimo Principe Duca de 
Medici, venuta dell’Indis del mese di Octobre nel XDXVI’ we have an early testi-
mony (written on 6 January 1615). Interestingly, although the Cross first found its 
rightful place in Bayer’s celestial maps, it is shifted about 45 degrees to the left due 
to the fact that, when positioning it, he continued using the Almagest instead of 
using the information gathered by the Dutch, which is a symptom of the authority 
granted in the West to the opinions of the ancients, especially the Greeks, often 
undermining what had been discovered with new scientific methods.
 4. Bayer seems to ignore that it is thus and does not seem to know the name 
Southern Cross either, calling it ‘moderis crux’. The ratification of Crux as an 
independent constellation was not formalised until the 1930s by the International 
Astronomical Union (IAU).
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 5. Shortly afterwards, Julius Schiller Christianised the constellations in his Coelum 
Stellatum Christanum (1627), replacing the pagan figures with saints and apostles.
 6. Hobbes writes wryly: ‘Fear and I were born twins. My mother hearing of the 
Spanish Armada sailing up the English channel gave premature birth to me’ 
(Hobbes 1839: LXXXVI).
 7. As is known, Hegel denied uncivilised individuals and groups the possibility of 
having personality of any kind due to the fact that they were unable to distinguish 
between themselves as individuals and their essential universality, which meant 
they could not enter the struggle for recognition. In addition, he believed that 
civilised nations could treat as barbarians other nations that were not as advanced 
as they were (Hegel [1819] (1991): §13, 376).
 8. According to Clark, this development proceeded in four steps: (1) (1800–80) 
Generalised accounts of the criteria of recognition that are fixated almost solely 
on intra-European diplomatic disagreements gradually emerge. (2) (1871–85) 
Recognition begins to incorporate ideas of Christianity, civilisation and progress 
to exclude non-European political communities from entry into the international 
community. (3) (1885–1914) This orientation towards progress proceeds further 
into the period of late colonialism and the ‘Scramble for Africa’, shifting the focus 
of recognition to the technicalities of government and territorial control and, 
eventually, to a state-centric account that normalises civilisational inferiority into 
‘difference’. With the emergence of the fourth and final step (1915–50), recogni-
tion becomes a basic concept in international law, reflected in intense debates 
over its meaning and its use to advance or undermine a range of political projects 
within the League of Nations, including the universalisation of international law, 
changing modes of imperialism, and the constraint of state action through law.
 9. Individualisation has also been called autonomy, and this comes to signify ‘that 
human beings can develop their life-projects on their own, without being con-
ditioned or determined by others’, whilst inclusion means that ‘human beings – 
individuals or groups – become members of a society with equal rights in relation 
to all other members’ (Wagner 2015: 58).
 10. Especially interesting for our case are Gregor Sauerwald’s conciliatory attempts to 
make the Honnethian theory of recognition productive in terms of analysing the 
conditions and demands of Latin America. He does so through demonstrating 
the shared purposes – despite the difference in their vocabularies – of liberation 
theories and other vernacular philosophies through which the theory of recogni-
tion has been renamed as ‘contextualist universalism’ (Sauerwald 2008: 20). He 
wants recognition for the theory of recognition and also for theorists to recognise 
the value of Latin American thought. However, it seems to have worked in one 
direction more than in others. Despite the reluctance described by Sauerwald, the 
concept of recognition has also penetrated the discourses of the South.
References
Arendt, H. [1951] (1973), The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harvest
Arendt, H. (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Arnason, J. P. (1989), ‘The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity’, in Giovanni Busino 
(ed.), Autonomie et autotransformation de la société: La philosophie militante de 
Cornelius Castoriadis, Geneva: Droz, pp. 323–37.
The Moral Mappings of South and North
158
Benjamin, J. (1988), The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of 
Domination, New York: Pantheon.
Benjamin, W. (1999), The Arcades Project, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Bhathal, R. (2006), ‘Astronomy in Aboriginal culture’, Astronomy & Geophysics, 47: 
5, 5.27–5.30.
Birulés, F. (2015), Entreactos. En torno a la política, el feminismo y el pensamiento, 
Buenos Aires and Madrid: Katz.
Buck-Morss, S. (2009), Hegel, Haiti and Universal History, Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press.
Butler, J. (2004), Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, London: 
Verso.
Castoriadis, C. (1990), Le Monde morcelé: les carrefours du labyrinthe III, Paris: Seuil.
Clark, M. (2016), ‘British contributions to the concept of recognition during the inter-
war period: Williams, Baty and Lauterpacht’, in R. McCorquodale and J.-P. Gauci 
(eds), British Influences on International Law, 1915–2015, Leiden and Boston: Brill 
Nijhof, pp. 110–44.
de Sousa Santos, B. (2008), A Gramàtica do Tempo: Para uma Nova Cultura Política, 
São Paulo: Cortez Editora.
de Sousa Santos, B. (2014), Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide, 
New York: Routledge.
Dussel, E. (1973), América Latina, dependencia y liberación. Antología de ensayos 
antropológicos y teológicos desde la proposición de un pensar latinoamericano, 
Buenos Aires: Fernando García Cambeiro.
Echart, E. (2016), ‘El Sur Global, más allá del Estado’, Open Democracy, 15 February, 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/enara-echart-mu-oz/el-sur-
global-m-s-all-del-estado> (last accessed 15 January 2017).
Estrella Faria, L. A. (2005), ‘La política exterior de Brasil: ¿Dónde queda el Sur?’, 
Revista del Sur, 161, 3–6.
Fichte J. G. ([1796/7] 2000), Foundations of Natural Right. According to the Principles 
of the Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Foucault, M. (1997), ‘What is critique?’, in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, 
New York: Semiotext(e), pp. 23–82.
Fraser, N. (2000), ‘Rethinking recognition’, New Left Review, 3, 107–20.
Fraser, N. and A. Honneth (2003), Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-
Philosophical Exchange, London: Verso.
Fuster, À. L. and G. Rosich (2015), ‘The limits of recognition: history, otherness and 
autonomy’, in P. Wagner (ed.), African, American and European Trajectories of 
Modernity: Past Oppression, Future Justice?, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, pp. 55–74.
Gray, K. and B. K. Gills (2016), ‘South-South cooperation and the rise of the Global 
South’, Third World Quarterly, 37: 4, 557–74.
Gray, K. and C. Murphy (2013), ‘Introduction: rising powers and the future of global 
governance’, Third World Quarterly, 34: 2, 183–93.
Guillén, E. (1974), Versión inca de la conquista, Lima: Editorial Milla Batres.
Hegel, G. W. F. [1806] (1977), Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
159
North–South and the Question of Recognition
Hegel, G. W. F. [1819] (1991), Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes, T. [1642–3] (1983), De Cive, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hobbes, T. [1651] (2012), Leviathan, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hobbes, T. (1839), ‘Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis Vita Carmine Expressa’, in 
Opera philosophica, vol. 1, ed. Sir William Molesworth, London, pp. LXXXI–XCIX.
Honneth, A. [1992] (1995), The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, Cambridge: Polity.
Honneth, A., J. Rancière, K. Genel and J. P. Deranty (2016), Recognition or Disagreement: 
A Critical Encounter on the Politics of Freedom, Equality and Identity, New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Kanas, N. (2007), Star Maps: History, Artistry, and Cartography, New York: Springer 
Praxis Books.
Khomyakov, M. (2013), ‘Toleration and respect: historical instances and current 
 problems’, European Journal of Political Theory, 12: 3, 223–39.
Koselleck, R. and T. S. Presner (2002), The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing 
History, Spacing Concepts, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Lajo, J. (2002), ‘Principios de la filosofía andina: la dualidad complementaria y la 
oposición proporcional’, in Qhapaq Kuna . . . Más Allá de la Civilización, Cusco: 
Asociación Pachawaray, pp. 58–79.
Lajo, J. (2006), Qhapaq Ñan: La Ruta Inka De Sabiduría, Ibarra: Abya-Yala.
Machiavelli, N. (2010), The Prince, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mignolo, W. (2003), Historias Locales/Diseños Globales: Colonialidad, Conocimientos 
Subalternos y Pensamiento Fronterizo, Barcelona: Akal.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (ed.) (1955), Asia-Africa Speak from 
Bandung, Djakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, pp. 161–9.
Norris, R. P. (2008a), ‘Emu dreaming’, Australasian Science, 29: 4, n.p.
Norris, R. P. (2008b), ‘In search of Aboriginal astronomy’, Australasian Sky & 
Telescope, March/April, 20–4.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011), 
Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World, Paris: 
OECD Publishing.
Pagden, A. (1983), The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of 
Comparative Ethnology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pagden, A. (1993), European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to 
Romanticism, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Parfitt, R. (2016), ‘Theorizing recognition and personality’, in A. Orford and 
F.  Hofmann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 583–99.
Prebisch, R. [1948] (1998), ‘El desarrollo económico de la América Latina y algunos 
de sus principales problemas’, in 50 años de Pensamiento en la CEPAL, Santiago de 
Chile: Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 63–130.
Quijano, A. (1972), ‘Imperialismo y capitalismo de estado’, Sociedad y Política, 1: 1, 
1–5.
Quijano, A. (2000), ‘Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América Latina’, in 
E. Lander (ed.), La Colonialidad del Saber: Eurocentrismo y Ciencias Sociales. 
Perspectivas Latinoamericanas, Buenos Aires: CLACSO, pp. 122–51.
Room, A. (1988), Dictionary of Astronomical Names, Routledge: London.
The Moral Mappings of South and North
160
Santos, M. (2000), Por uma Outra Globalização: Do Pensamento Único à Consciência 
Universal, Rio de Janeiro: Record.
Sauerwald, G. (2008), Reconocimiento y liberación: Axel Honneth y el pensamiento 
latinoamericano. Por un diálogo entre el Sur y el Norte, Münster: LIT Verlag.
South Commission (1995), The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South 
Commission, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strange, A., B. C. Parks, M. J. Tierney, A. Fuchs, A. Dreher and V. Ramachandran 
(2013), ‘China’s development finance to Africa: a media-based approach to data 
collection – Working Paper 323’, Washington DC: Center for Global Development, 
<http://www.cgdev.org/publication/chinas-development-finance-africa-media-
based-approach-data-collection> (last accessed 8 February 2017).
Taylor, C. (1994), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Tone, E. F. M. (2009), ‘Identidad Latinoamericana como chakana en el marco de la 
filosofía intercultural desde Josef Estermann’, Cuadrantephi, 18–19.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2013), The Rise of the South: 
Human Progress in a Diverse World. National Human Development Reports, New 
York: UNDP.
United Nations General Assembly (1960), Resolution A/RES/1514(XV): Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 December, 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f06e2f.html> (last accessed 15 January 2017).
Wagner, P. (2008), Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of 
Modernity, Cambridge: Polity.
Wagner, P. (2015), Progress: A Reconstruction, Cambridge: Polity.
Wallerstein, I. (1974–89), The Modern World-System, 3 vols, New York: Academic 
Press.
Wallerstein, I. (2002), ‘New revolts against the system’, New Left Review, 18, 29–39.
Woods, N. (2008), ‘Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the 
silent revolution in development assistance’, International Affairs, 84: 1205–21.
161
7
On Spaces and Experiences: 




The tendency to spatially displace imaginaries of societies and their specific historical development is not new. The interpreta-
tion of a space based on geographical orientation has indeed seldom 
been based on any natural idea of what the space is (Gregory 1994; 
Garfield 2013). Recently, though, much attention has been devoted to 
the discussion of space as a political and historical entity. It has been 
rediscovered as a privileged object for the analysis of different historical 
processes largely crystallised in different parts of the globe.
As part of this volume, in which the reader will find a variety of issues 
related to how spatial categories can be taken as ‘useful’ concepts for the 
inquiry into problems of the social world, this chapter addresses a rela-
tively unexplored aspect of modern experience with space. This aspect 
concerns the relation between displacements of people in different 
spaces and the production of knowledge/interpretation. It argues that 
the South, understood for now simply as a specific localisation of his-
torical relations, has always been a space where general trans-regional 
theories and concepts have emerged. As with so-called ‘Northern 
theory’, ‘Southern theory’ shares similar pretensions of universality 
and also proceeds by exercising similar gestures of historical erasure. 
Hence, from this point of view, there is not a strong purely intellectual 
distinction that could split Northern and Southern thought.1 However, 
an important aspect constituting what could be regarded as something 
that does split a Northern from a Southern intellectual tradition is that 
the former has departed from the idea of spatial neutrality as a condi-
tion for the production of theories, as Mignolo (2011) has shown; and 
the latter, on the contrary, has interpreted itself and its place in the 
world through what is called here a critical localisation of argument. 
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This critical localisation of discourse is done without any prejudice 
against the production of universal claims. Henceforth, this chapter 
highlights what could be an important difference detected between the 
‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ intellectual traditions, but argues in favour 
of the existence of similar claims of universality despite the location 
of knowledge/interpretation. That is probably due to the difficulty of 
clearly specifying where things happen in the modern world. It is so 
because of the argument, also developed in this chapter, that it is in 
the movement of people crossing spaces/times and the displacement 
of established societal self-understandings that modern thought has 
emerged and has distinguished itself. The aspects of the transformation 
on a larger scale of temporal and spatial orientation have been well 
explored. This chapter will raise some questions related to the problem 
of modern thought and the experience of space.
In this introduction, it is also worth summarising the arguments 
that the discussion below intends to call into question. There are two 
lines of argument. The first line refers to what could be a sort of essen-
tialisation of spaces that involves a radical dualism and sometimes 
antagonism between different parts. In this view, space became histori-
cally crystallised into entities that are used as explanatory categories to 
think about the historical development of the world and the relations 
of its different parts. The representation of the relation between the 
West and the Orient can help us in elucidating the issue. During much 
of the early modern period (roughly from the 1500s to the 1800s), 
Western thought and art portrayed the Orient as an exotic realm to be 
experienced and explored (Said 1985; Behdad 1994). The metaphor of 
a wise but somewhat decadent West as the observer of a very intensive 
and novel but also ancient world suits this relation well. With a change 
of focus but retaining the same analytical perspective, in some con-
temporary approaches the South is seen as the place for the exercise of 
lively alternatives for the future (Santos 2009; Connell 2007). It seems 
like the South has replaced the Orient as the place in which creative 
innovations developed and imagined in whatever this socio-spatial cat-
egory might be are more interesting and effective than modernisation 
perspectives and allied views could have expected. The difference is that 
now Southern actors have a voice and play a central role in such repre-
sentation themselves. In both perspectives, however, the North is still 
portrayed as a sort of wealthy and powerful old man whose success can 
be easily attested, and whose examples could elucidate a lot of current 
problems, but whose uneven trajectory has produced more problems 
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than it has solved. This man is exhausted and not able to represent 
himself as a paradigm for the future. He has become the image of a past 
and remembered more for his mistakes than his glories.
This leads us to the second line of argument against which this 
chapter was developed. Following from the previous representation, 
it has been wisely attested that the main mistake of this man – the 
North in this image of world regions to which outstanding structural 
power has been attributed – was the development of colonial and 
neo-colonial global capitalism. The works that have recently appeared 
under the umbrella category of ‘Global South’ highlight the colonial 
structures of power as that which is responsible for the crystallisation 
of the North as the site of accumulation of capital and the South as 
the site of exploitation (for more about this topic, see Pinheiro in this 
volume). Geopolitical relations of power are taken as the focus of these 
approaches that mainly analyse the historical aspects of political and 
economic mutual and unequal dependency of centres, peripheries and 
semi-peripheries for the development of capitalism (Wallerstein 1974; 
Quijano 2005). The problem with this perspective does not reside in the 
assumption that the history of colonialism is the main causal factor in 
the consolidation of the world system as we find it today. The problem 
concerns the issue of attributing strong structural powers to places that 
act as rational actors.
The first line of argument above highlights more the aspect of the 
representation of a space by agents acting in specific cultural and his-
torical scenarios. The second line could be regarded as based on a more 
empirical conception of global history and of economic development in 
the era of capitalism. In both accounts, however, the idea of antago-
nistic interests of spaces as historical entities predominates. Places, 
above all from the North, are understood as actors that exercise a large 
measure of control over the course of their actions by subjugation and/
or imposition of their desire wherever they want. From an analyti-
cal point of view, those studies could not have been done by taking a 
long distance from what can be regarded as a classical sociological 
approach to talking about the other separated in time and space. In 
classical approaches, the localisation of the space occupied by differ-
ent groups is not an explanatory factor in the analysis – as it appears 
in Durkheim’s work ([1912] 1995) about how the fundamental notions 
of thought found in the ‘simplest’ form of religious life could elucidate 
the way knowledge and theories are produced. Durkheim’s others were 
synchronically separated in time and space. But space in itself does 
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not appear as the main fact that explains the difference in the forms 
of social knowledge and of religious life. It is the different forms of 
organisation of systems of belief that determines their place in history. 
Pursuing a different argument, but retaining some lessons learned from 
such classical approaches, in this chapter we want to be able to show 
that subjects are not determined by their place of origin. As important 
as the determination of the milieu is the understanding of the diverse 
forms of displacement that mark a subject’s life and thought.2
In order to show the limitations of the perspectives criticised above, 
we will develop an argument about the relation between, on the one 
hand, the specific character of modern displacements and, on the other, 
the interpretation and the consolidation of universal claims. For that, 
we will proceed as follows. In the next section, I provide a general over-
view of the discussion of space in modernity. A brief inquiry into the 
forms of representation of space and its relation to different historical 
developments will be also offered in order to understand the relation 
between displacement and knowledge in modernity. After this section, 
the focus will move to the discussion of two authors and intellectuals 
whose displacements share what we regard to be a critical localisation 
of universal discourse: Simón Rodríguez and Isabelle Eberhardt. They 
lived in different times and moved through different spaces. One is a 
man, the other a woman. The man was devoted to the human sciences, 
was involved in tremendous political activities, and made an impact 
on history; the woman had strong literary pretensions but had some 
difficulty in becoming recognised as a writer during her lifetime.3 They 
both help us to elucidate the argument about the difficulty of splitting 
Northern and Southern thought in a very clear way when it comes to 
the absence of a pretension to universality and the absence of ‘unavoid-
able’ historical events. The discussion concludes with some remarks 
that summarise the proposal to look at space in the social sciences as 
conforming to no pre-established cartography in order to overcome 
the problems of essentialisation and of spatial determination.
Space, representation, displacement: reviewing ideas to build 
an alternative approach
Space has been interpreted as a phenomenon related to the formation 
of nation states; it has been seen as a key concept for understanding the 
formation of the new modern urbis and the reproduction of old societal 
problems along with the creation of new ones in its spaces; it has also 
165
Displacements, Interpretations and Universal Claims
been viewed as part of the formation of centres and peripheries in the 
global system (Anderson 1991; Mbembe 2000; Lefebvre 1991; Wallerstein 
1974). The broad theoretical understanding that those approaches offer 
is the relation between space and the formation of capitalist and colo-
nial societies, as it appears very clearly in the work of Harvey (1985). 
From this perspective, the issue of space in modernity has been mainly 
connected with places and territorial transformations, understood as 
the political and economic physical space determined by changeable 
boundaries and its uses. The nationalist reading of this process tended to 
crystallise the image of modern space as self- contained units that could 
be compared and hierarchised (Menon 2010).
Since the end of the twentieth century, space increasingly has been 
viewed as represented and interpreted according to the perspective that 
humans beings give to it and the recent revival of space can be seen as 
a new concern with this older approach (Gregory 1994; Massey 2005). 
As with the definition of societal borders, the nationalist conception 
of territories has been revised by the proposal for more interpreta-
tive cultural-historical categories such as ‘world regions’ (Lewis and 
Wigen 1997) that aims to emphasise the different paths found in larger 
geospatial categories of thought. Those approaches lose sight of at 
least two other different ways through which spaces are formed: the 
movement of people across space that creates new meaningful worlds 
that would not exist without the action (the movement) itself; and 
the analysis of how the imaginary representation of a space is a key 
variable for thinking about different historical trajectories of social, 
economic and political development. Most of the discussion about the 
‘South’ in contemporary critical thought tends to emphasise empirical 
evidence that shows the consequences of unequal economic and social 
development for the constitution of the global order. In this chapter 
the argument is that space has been experienced and transformed by 
the action of human beings, not only by institutions or by the large 
territorial transformation of the modern state and the urbis. There are 
other societal movements that need to be regarded as productive forces 
in themselves.
In terms of spatial representation of societal imaginaries, it was only 
by the seventeenth century that geographical representations started 
to become less concerned about the display of a ‘fantastic’ picture of 
societies and more concerned about what places are in terms of their 
physical structure, form and politically determined spatial bounda-
ries. However, there was still no scientific progress in cartographical 
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representation regarding the neutrality of perspective of the observer 
(Brotton 2013). This transformation was a product of the incorporation 
of so-called ‘Oriental’ knowledge, the development of new techniques 
of navigation and orientation over sea and earth, as well as the achieve-
ments of the polycentric sources that led to the scientific revolution of 
the Renaissance. In light of our argument, it should be said that the 
difference between the pre-seventeenth-century representation of the 
world and those that started to appear in this period was due not only 
to scientific advancement, but also to the increasing impulse for dis-
placement and a desire to know, interpret and represent the unknown. 
It is this spatial and temporal discontinuity that gives form to the 
perspective of human beings moving across spaces and creating new 
epistemic orders of a new era. The development of new exploratory 
expeditions to Africa and America, the development of new routes 
to Asia and Oceania, and the participation of writers and scientists 
in those travels can be seen as the basis of this transformation in the 
early modern period. From the nineteenth century on, through differ-
ent means, the movement of people, knowledge and the creation of a 
new imagined global order come to be even more important despite 
being little understood. That is what allows us to understand the dif-
ference between the increased significance that displacement has in the 
modern era if it is compared with, for instance, medieval travels, the 
Viking sagas and classical odysseys (Labarge 2005; Ross 2000).
Yet in the early modern period there was a major transformation 
in the way that spaces were represented in maps, globes and atlases. 
What remained unchanged from the sixteenth to the beginning of 
the nineteenth century was how narratives based on the movement of 
people across the globe – as ‘travels’ and ‘exploratory missions’ – were 
positively welcomed in the literary and scientific world. In the early 
modern period, travel literature was a widespread and lively activity 
that became important also as a source of ethnographical materials 
(Talbot 2010). The vivacity and importance of travel writings in this 
period becomes even more important if one bears in mind that it 
was first recognised as a specific literary genre only in the eighteenth 
century (Cristóvão 1999). From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, 
travel writings were largely used as reliable material to inform differ-
ent ways of interpreting and knowing the world(s). John Locke, for 
instance, was a prolific reader of travel literature, above all of authors 
who went to the New World – a space that empirically informed his 
political and philosophical approach (Mota 2015).
167
Displacements, Interpretations and Universal Claims
It also was in the early modern period that individual entrepreneurs 
and intellectuals started to travel for personal reasons. This whole 
process is not limited to overseas trips from Europe. The ideas of spatial 
displacement and the production of a representation of the other 
marked by a hierarchical structure of domination have been strongly 
emphasised by studies that associate modernity with the consolida-
tion of the Western/coloniser perspective on the other and colonised 
subjects of the South and of the East/Orient (Said 1985; Behdad 1994; 
Pratt 2008). Those approaches try to understand the issue of the rep-
resentation of the other mainly by analysing travel writings. However, 
the implications of the movement that they analyse should not be seen 
as a one-way process or something that was used only to impose the 
European perspective. Displacements of persons from other parts of 
the ‘dominated’ world to Europe also formed a not-yet-scrutinised 
colonised perspective on the structure of domination and their place in 
it. The claim that the ‘natives did not travel’ (Appadurai 1988) as well as 
the idea that the colonial perspective crystallised only in the perspec-
tive of the coloniser (Pratt 2008) both need to be strongly challenged. 
The same can be said about Euben’s (2006) proposal to see travel as 
a ‘necessary condition’ for the production of theory, which is for her 
the main manifestation of knowledge. Her argument is not ultimately 
convincing because of a narrow conception of what knowledge is and 
a failure to see the spaces where people travel as a source of experience 
and knowledge per se. For us, the experience of foreign spaces and 
the interpretation of them in light of specific historical developments 
express the way that modernity has been understood as a phenomenon 
of universal significance in different times and places.
This spatial experience is possible only through movement (trans-
formation) and imagination and it is one of the main sources of 
modernity in itself. The sociological and historical literature that 
focuses on travel writings and the object/subject represented in it have 
not paid attention to the fact that the movement from fiction to the 
sciences of the discourse on the other and us shows how knowledge 
started to be regarded in the modern world. That is why for us it was 
not by chance that social science stabilised itself at the same moment 
when travel literature began to be disregarded as a reliable source for 
an interpretation of the world(s). The fact that there was a consider-
able decrease in the generation and public relevance of travel writing 
in the nineteenth century can be interpreted as an expression of the 
new epistemic order that was created in modernity: the transition to 
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science as the  legitimate field in which the discourse on the other and 
us should take place.
As modernity started to consolidate into a global imaginary, the 
desire to know and transform the world through displacement has 
changed with regard to the role of spatial displacement as a public 
condition for the production of knowledge and of modern space itself. 
Displacements that gave rise to scientific interpretations became hidden 
(or assumed as a secondary fact) for human knowledge to accomplish 
orders of universality in what has been regarded as Northern thought. 
In this space, this is the basis of the process of divergence between, on 
the one hand, a philosophy of experience, meaning and the subject 
and, on the other hand, a philosophy of knowledge, of reason and of 
concepts (Foucault 1985, 2001). However, as we will see in the following 
section with the discussion of Simón Rodríguez and Isabelle Eberhardt, 
which retain similar pretensions to universality, displacement and 
knowledge/interpretation occupy a very explicit place in what we can 
regard as Southern thought. It is exactly the explicitness in localisa-
tion of the discourse that makes us able to see a difference between 
‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ thought. Displacements, movements, dis-
connections and discontinuities in time and space made by human 
beings are an important force in the transformation of the modern 
world and reveal that its epistemic-spatial form is not easily crystal-
lised in any unchangeable representation of spaces and of intellectual 
traditions. Before moving forward it is worth explicating better what 
modernity means in our approach.
Modernity in philosophical and sociological terms can be under-
stood as the process of the acceleration of ‘historical time’ and by the 
idea of ‘to be in one’s own time’ (Wagner 2008; Bayly 2002; Koselleck 
2004). From this perspective, it is possible to see how difficult it is to 
relate modernity to a single temporal and political understanding. 
However, European authors did not have much problem in agree-
ing on the place of a specific revolutionary process that became an 
important point of reference for understanding the modern ruptures. 
In Koselleck (2004) this place and time is very clear. For him it was 
during the Neuzeit – understood as a ‘new time’ that emerged around 
the time of the French Revolution – that the idea of progress and the 
future became connected in a very specific form. What is important to 
bear in mind is Koselleck’s idea that it was in light of the transforma-
tions of the Neuzeit that three aspects crucial for the understanding 
of modernity emerged: the idea of autonomy is connected with the 
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possibility of a positive transformation, the acceleration of time, and 
its increased separation from the space where life flows. The emphasis 
on the orientation of time – towards the future – is based on the ‘space 
of experience’ (Koselleck 2002). However, this space is not scrutinised 
deeply enough in this approach (Pickering 2010).
In a similar vein, for Giddens (1990), time and space distantiation is 
what distinguishes the rhythm of change in modern societies, making 
them different from traditional ones. Giddens sees the ‘pace of change’ 
of modernity as something that happened because of the separation 
of time and space and their recombination in forms that permit the 
precise ‘time-space zoning’ of social dynamics. For Giddens, what 
he sees as ‘pre-modern societies’, spaces and places tended to be the 
same.4 In modern societies, on the contrary, spaces became detached 
from their locales. What he calls the ‘mechanisms of embedment’ are 
responsible for the reorganisation of social relations in a situation of 
large time-space distances in modern societies. It is due to this large 
separation that one of the consequences of modernity is the formation 
of an ‘empty space’ in which social life happens (Giddens 1990). In 
Giddens, modernity had its beginning in Europe from roughly the sev-
enteenth century and then spread worldwide, a process accomplished 
in spite of the imposition of a European perspective on ways of repre-
senting the world. He very much believes that ‘the progressive charting 
of the globe that led to the creation of universal maps, in which per-
spective played little part in the representation of geographical position 
and form, established space as “independent” of any particular place 
or region’ (Giddens 1990: 19). In our view, this approach is based on a 
conception of the modern representation of the world as able to leave 
behind a privileged perspective of the representation of lived space 
and time. Thus in Giddens’s perspective, despite its European origins, 
modernity acquired the form of a non-local phenomenon because of 
the novelty that it possessed in terms of space and time separation. In 
doing so he is probably the first to unintentionally theorise the idea of 
spatial neutrality as a feature of modern Western thought.
Against the view that modernity and its specific representation of 
shared space as an equal globe have emerged in an insulated space – as 
the West – and spread later on throughout the world, it is sustained 
that the modern experience was made by the synthesis of practices, 
experiences and interpretations that cannot be easily reduced to the 
central areas of the North/Western world (Wagner 2012). The rise of a 
modern imaginary around the idea of the autonomy of human beings 
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as individuals and collective persons and in relation to the possibility 
of making changes in the world in the name of this imaginary is com-
pletely connected to the experiences of displacements of persons and 
thoughts from and to different parts of the globe. This idea challenges 
not only the notion that modernity emerged in an insulated area but 
also the idea of the ‘emptiness’ of the space where life flows.
To be sure, Mignolo (2011) has been theorising the modern/ colonial 
space and offering an alternative approach to the established Northern 
perspective. His approach starts out from Schmitt’s (2006) attempt 
to relate the geopolitics of the organisation of the world and the 
birth of European international law, and from Wallerstein’s (1974) 
world-systems approach as a way to replace the traditional focus on 
nations and societies as almost closed entities. Mignolo (2002) tries 
to understand the modern space departing from, but going beyond, 
both approaches because in his view they do not address the issue of 
‘coloniality the power’ – a phenomenon that was previously analysed 
by Quijano (1998). Mignolo (2011) highlights the fact that ‘we are where 
we think’, but only the European system of knowledge was built on 
the basic premise ‘I think, therefore I am’. However, his thesis places 
too much emphasis on the establishment of a fundamental division 
between Europe and the non-European world. In his view, the new 
decolonial subject should be able to say, ‘I am where I think,’ and by 
doing so show the Europeans that they also are the same. The author 
is right when he says that ‘I think, therefore I am’ is a premise adopted 
by the modern European system of knowledge. However, he is wrong 
in saying that it is a prerogative of the modern European system. As 
in our perspective time and space are not absolute categories, we all 
think, therefore we are and where/when we have been and how we have 
imagined ourselves.
The focus on displacement, the transformation of social imaginaries 
and interpretation all point to another view of modern/colonial history. 
This view challenges proposals that address the issue of the modern 
global configuration based on crystallised geographical images that aim 
to explain how places think (see, for instance, Burawoy 2009; Connell 
2007; Santos 2009). By saying that the spatial dimension of modernity 
is based on the experience of displacement and knowledge, I mean to 
indicate that to experience a different way of seeing the unknown or 
of seeing what it was already known with different eyes is a way that 
human beings can situate themselves in a world(s) that has become 
transformed because of their own action. It also makes it possible to 
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articulate modernity in terms of a meaningfully connected history of 
peoples and the concrete but also imagined routes they created in their 
movement.
Simon Rodríguez and Isabelle Eberhardt: different forms of 
critical localisation of universal claims
This section analyses aspects of the life and work of two authors 
that lived in different spaces and times of the modern world: Simón 
Rodríguez (1769–1854) and Isabelle Eberhardt (1877–1904). By different 
means, they both express what can be understood in our argument as 
the critical localisation of universal claims that are very strongly con-
nected to the displacements they undertook during their lifetimes and 
help us to discuss some aspects of what has here been called a modern 
experience with space. Analysing their life and intellectual contribu-
tions together is a way to challenge the idea both of spatial deter-
mination and of the necessary adoption of spatial neutrality for the 
production of universal ideas in modernity. By doing so, I also hope to 
elucidate the argument about displacement and modern thought and 
how we can understand it in relation to the discussion about Northern 
and Southern intellectual traditions. From the very beginning, it is 
important to notice that both authors adopted different names that 
would be used for them to insert themselves in the new environment 
in which they found themselves: Simón Rodríguez became Samuel 
Robinson and Isabelle Eberhardt became, along with a number of other 
names, Si Mahmoud Saadi. Simón Rodríguez remained a male with an 
English name; Isabelle Eberhardt became a male with an Arabic name. 
The use of pseudonyms and of assuming a different character meant for 
them to open doors that otherwise would have remained closed. The 
change in names was also a way to remind themselves that displace-
ment means something more than only a spatial condition.
Simón Rodríguez is one of the main intellectuals and protagonists 
of the many groups that took part in the struggles for emancipation 
in America. He was closely linked to Simón Bolívar and other eman-
cipators who fought in the struggles against the colonial system in 
Venezuela, Nueva Granada and in the Viceroyalty of Peru. Going into 
exile after he was appointed as one of the leaders of the Conspiración de 
Gual y España (1797–9), he left his home in Venezuela for Jamaica in 
1797. From there he travelled to parts of the United States, Europe and 
Eastern Europe.5 Unlike his brother, Cayetano, who was regarded by 
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everyone close to them as the ‘good one’ and the ‘exemplary Catholic’ 
that had never left his home, Simón Rodríguez showed from an early 
age an interest in learning from experiences with different spaces 
and thoughts (Rumazo Gonzáles 2006: 12).6 He was already versed in 
philosophical and political texts from abroad when he left America. 
But it was when he lived in the Northern part of the world that Simón 
Rodríguez developed most of his ideas.7 The main subject of his thought 
was how America would become free and constitute itself as a new and 
original political order in a world increasingly connected (Rodríguez 
1840, [1830] 1971). To think about America, he based his approach on 
his own experience of getting to know domination in many parts of the 
world – he wrote about slavery in Turkey, Russia and Prussia; exclusion 
of Jews in many parts of Europe; and the marginalisation of manual 
workers, such as craftsmen and farmers, from political life (Rodríguez 
1840: 6–7).
In his opinion, the new nations of America did not share with 
Europe and the East the addictions of being old political traditions 
based on a strong hierarchical conception of life in society. This was 
due to the fact that in America the political challenge was to create 
something anew, not to reform an older order as would be the case in 
the other civilisational forms of life he found in Europe. Despite this 
important historical difference, the formation of enlightened govern-
ments would show what is right for any society. It could be done in 
spite of historical contingencies, cultural orientations and civilisational 
backgrounds. For Rodríguez, in America it should be easier to develop 
an emancipated political life suitable for the new era emerging in the 
nineteenth century. But it would not be done if the vanguard of his 
time were not able to learn from the experiences of diverse parts of the 
world in an attempt of find the best solutions for solving the problems 
of social and political organisation. This is what he calls ‘competition 
of faculties’. For him, curiosity and knowledge would together create 
the conditions for any society to find a way out for problems related 
to the formation of modern republican political life (Rodríguez 1840: 
15; Rumazo Gonzáles 2006: 56). His idea of knowledge is one based 
on the idea that to know better you need to compare what you know 
with what others know about similar problems under different condi-
tions. If this formula is followed, this sort of cosmopolitan imaginary 
developed by Rodríguez could be easily converted into institutional 
arrangements that could be applied everywhere (Mota 2012). For him, 
universal knowledge is possible by the incorporation of experiences of 
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any societal groups otherwise apart in time and space.8
America had a central role not only for the creation but also for the 
maintenance of the new political imaginary emerging in the nineteenth 
century (Rodríguez [1830] 1971). The struggle for emancipation in the 
United States of America, the successful Andean break with colonial 
ties, the revolution of black slaves in Haiti, and the formation of 
the Pan-Americanism movement of the beginning of the nineteenth 
century were events that attested to the political vivacity and desire 
to change the colonial condition in this part of the world. He also 
regarded the French Revolution, and even more importantly the expe-
rience of the Les Enragés for the consolidation of the ‘utopian socialism’ 
in Europe, as evidence of the desire for change everywhere. All of those 
experiences should be followed for the implementation of the ideals of 
rights of property, freedom, republican education9 and knowledge to 
all (Rumazo Gonzáles 2006).
At the time when Rodríguez was actively working, the division of 
the New World into North and South America and the formation of 
an idea of a successful North and the failed South did not exist as fully 
consolidated phenomena. The process of calling the America stopped 
in time by ‘South America’ and ‘Latin America’ is a production of a 
division within the New World that was happing at this moment (Mota 
2015). Simón Rodríguez’s main work, American Societies,10 is a book 
that shows exactly how the continent was seen at that moment, as a 
place with similar problems and dilemmas but with different historical 
trajectories that were not strong enough to be regarded as something 
existing apart in time and space. The ‘American divergence’ of the 
nineteenth century and the formation in the New World of the mean-
ingful idea of the North as the place where important developments 
are observed and the South as a place that did not get away from its 
past problems was understood through a process that might be called 
the paradigmatisation of historical events (Mota 2015). This is a process 
through which many revolutions, reforms and emancipatory move-
ments do not play the same role as other similar events for the analysis 
of the formation and transformation of the modern world and the new 
emerging conception of space and time. Important intellectuals of this 
time, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, had become part of this process of 
divergence in America, of creation of a specific idea of North and South 
and its relation to modern developments. Simón Rodríguez died in 
1854, probably too soon for him to able to reflect on the consequences 
for Latin America of its historical creation.
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Simón Rodríguez was concerned about the state of the political 
developments in Europe and America at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. But he did not try to reflect upon those developments 
and the relation between the New and Old Worlds using spatial ideas 
such as North and South to describe what he was experiencing. It seems 
that for him those categories could not establish anything of substance 
about the meaning of the relation between those parts of the world 
and their development in history. Unlike Simón Rodríguez, Isabelle 
Eberhardt used the reference point of the South as a meaningful cat-
egory to represent her desired desert (the Maghreb), for her the pro-
jected space of liberty and self-realisation. In her Visions du Moghreb,11 
the South appears as another word to express a space ‘without political 
boundaries’ compared with the Western world, which is the place of 
imprisonment and of unescapably forced exile.12 This is for her the 
main characteristic that split Europe, her birthplace, and the South, 
her chosen place of rebirth. From her writings it is quite clear that 
Eberhardt saw from a very early stage of her life that freedom could be 
realised only away from her cultural milieu (Abdel-Jaouad 1993).
The South appears in Eberhardt’s writings as a space in which one 
can have a true experience of autonomous action – to decide to what or 
to whom one wants to be subjected. Going against what anyone would 
expect from a person that was born in a family with strong anarchist 
ties,13 she decided to convert to Islam. It is because of her freedom 
that she felt she could choose to convert to a religion of submission. 
When she moved to Algeria14 she joined a group of Sufist Muslims who 
placed great emphasis on the mystical experience between God and the 
believer. For Sufism, suffering and pain are not seen as negative feel-
ings. They are part of the experience of a full submission of someone to 
God, enabling them to see the other as more important than oneself.
For her, the fact that the Maghreb was so close to Europe without 
Europeans knowing anything about it revealed Europe’s self-imposed 
blindness. The Maghreb was geographically nearby but completely 
faraway when it came to the knowledge that the Western world had of 
it. It was a place that Europeans saw as fit only for exploitation and the 
imposition of an absolutely unfair way of ruling collective life. That is 
why she became obsessed with finding an Algeria that existed before 
colonisation. She wanted to experience a space that had remained 
untouched by the Western powers.15 To think about Isabelle Eberhardt 
as an intellectual that helps us to elucidate the point about the South 
as a space of production of knowledge that shares similar pretensions 
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of universality to ‘Northern’ thought, as we have done with Simón 
Rodríguez, we need to understand her political struggle against the 
colonial structure developed in the North of Africa. For her, contact 
with Europeans meant the destruction of every form of non-Occidental 
life (Eberhardt 2000: x). That is the basis of the strong anti-colonial cri-
tique that appears in Eberhardt’s works. Anticipating later postcolonial 
and decolonial thinkers, Eberhardt sees the development of modernity 
and of coloniality as a process of destruction of forms of non-European 
‘traditional life’ by foreign Western forces.
We can look at Eberhardt’s writings as a contribution to the critique 
of Western colonialism everywhere in the world, not only in the North 
of Africa (Eberhardt 2000, 2008). Abdel-Jaouad (1993: 102) observes 
this when she says that Eberhardt’s work expounded a general sociol-
ogy of ‘colonialism and oppression’ that in the Francophone world 
would only later be highlighted by the works of Frantz Fanon and 
Albert Memmi. She has immersed herself in the colonial world of 
North Africa, and it is from this specific locale in a specific time that she 
builds her universal critique of Western colonialism everywhere else. 
Her strategy of radical critique is built on the use of language(s) as tool 
for subversion of reality and she masters this tool in an outstanding 
way. She uses French as the main language of her writings, but uses her 
polyglotism16 as a form of transgression of the French colonial world. 
The elements of her strategy of criticism can be summarised in the 
 following extract:
By intertwining oral and written literary materials and incorporat-
ing indigenous ethnographical and anthropological elements into 
her fiction, Isabelle deterritorialized [. . .] the content of her writing 
completely and radically. She was the first to experiment and use 
polyglotism as a device to undermine the hegemony of ‘monolan-
guage’, one of the principal pillars of the colonial orders. She was the 
first to present the Maghrebian ethos from the inside, using consist-
ently the Arabic name ‘Maghreb’ when the current and official term 
was North Africa, and first also to introduce indigenous words into 
the French language, beginning thus a long process of disenfran-
chisement of the dominant language. (Abdel-Jaouad 1993: 116)
In her texts one can easily discern that her refusal to translate key 
words that express feelings and experiences is connected to her critique 
of the imposition of monolanguage in the colonial world. Language 
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and gender were not fixed categories of Eberhardt’s thought – they 
were means of displacement through different worlds she wanted to 
inhabit. They were the main means she used to deterritorialise herself 
and make her universal claims about the unfair relations established in 
the neo-colonial world.
According to Connell, the ‘Northernness’ of Northern social thought 
has been produced by the use of four basic textual moves: ‘the claim of 
universality, reading from the center, gestures of exclusion, and grand 
erasure’ (Connell 2006: 258). In this text, Connell analyses the work 
of three late-twentieth century authors, James S. Coleman, Anthony 
Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu, to show how they all proceed by the idea 
of producing theories that do not have a place of origin. They all come 
from the North, but try to present themselves as supporting ‘Northern’ 
intellectuals’ claims to the eyes of the reader. Proceeding by a similar 
path of looking at how intellectuals have produced their ideas and what 
their ideas mean in terms of temporal and spatial orientation, we have 
taken authors that are not widely known that have transited between 
Southern and Northern spaces at specific moments of transition in 
modernity. What unite those different moments and spaces, however, 
is the struggle against colonialism and the creation of imaginaries of 
emancipation. Problematising the argument developed by Connell, 
I wanted to show that Southern thought shares at least two of these 
textual moves that she identifies as key structures of the Northern 
thought: one related to the argument’s pretensions to universality, and 
the other related to the gesture of historical erasure.
Both Simón Rodríguez and Isabelle Eberhardt claim the universal 
relevance of their ideas, struggles and remedies for the problems of 
domination. They both also talk only about the history they know. In 
this way, they also have deleted for critical readers that know other 
histories equally important alternatives that should have figured in 
their proposals. Simón Rodríguez is clear when he creates the basis 
for the formation of a shared programme of universal political and 
social emancipation that could be applied everywhere. The history 
that he knows and talks about is the history of domination in America. 
Although he had long experience of living in Northern countries, 
this space and its histories appear in his analysis only when it comes 
to comparing similar examples of domination developed inside the 
North. He does not talk at all about what was going on in others parts 
of the world at the same time. Using literary means, Isabelle Eberhardt 
also offers us a strong critique of Western colonialism. She did not 
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have any pretensions to be recognised as a social scientist. However, 
even without sharing this idea of producing a general theory that 
should be free from personal impressions and fictional characters, she 
is able to make universal claims about how different forms of social life 
have been destroyed by the imposition of colonial monolingualism, 
religion and power structures. As with Simón Rodríguez, she did not 
incorporate what she knew about other realities into her writing. She 
constrained herself to what she wanted to let us know. Both intellectu-
als have kept everything they regarded as peripheral to their main idea 
away from the centre of their analysis.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter we challenged two mainstream ways of looking at how 
history and imaginaries of spaces merged together in the formation of 
the modern world. On the one hand, we tried to problematise the natu-
ralisation of the idea of Northern – very often treated as a synonym for 
Western – societies and their role in the formation and consolidation 
of the modern world; on the other hand, we tried to understand some 
limitations of the self-proclaimed anti-Western traditions that attempt 
to construct a strong distinctive Southern tradition of thought. Simón 
Rodríguez and Isabelle Eberhardt were taken in this chapter as authors 
whose life and work cannot be easily analysed by the tools of these two 
available conceptions of how to think about the experience with space 
and of displacements, and the structure of knowledge and interpreta-
tion, in modernity.
In the social sciences, the only studies that combine empirical 
investigation with theoretical analysis about the life in displacement 
of intellectuals and the changes in their interpretations are offered by 
Offe (2005) and Scaff (2011). Both authors develop different approaches 
about how ‘America’ has played an important role in the work of some 
European thinkers. The focus of Offe’s (2005) study is how for three 
European authors – Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber and Theodor 
Adorno – who went to the United States in different periods, the 
European path to modernity would become comparable to (or over-
taken by) the one developed along the North American path. However, 
Offe (2005) does not pay attention, first, to the fact that spatial displace-
ment in itself was a source of knowledge for those intellectuals and, 
second, that the meaning of ‘America’ for each one of those authors 
is different because of the transformation historically brought about 
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in the ‘New World’ in its relation to the ‘Old World’ (Mota 2015). It 
is fair to make this criticism because of the prominent role played by 
those three individuals in forming an understanding of the making 
of modernity. It should be mentioned that Scaff (2011) has offered a 
very detailed and descriptive account of Max Weber in the United 
States. Nevertheless, as in Offe’s approach, the author did not consider 
movement as part of the knowledge process, quite apart from almost 
ignoring the importance of Weber’s companion Marianne Weber in 
this process. The cartography that marks the meaning of South and 
North America for that matter was also created by the movement of 
those intellectuals.
The argument that we have developed is built upon the idea of 
looking at the specific kinds of displacements that modern subjects 
have made themselves or displacements that they have been subjected 
to, to think about the constitution of modernity itself. The discussion 
about Isabelle Eberhardt and Simón Rodríguez has hopefully helped us 
to elucidate the space of action in modernity as something that cannot 
be taken as a pre-established cartography. The modern experience with 
space is instead one which links time and space by displacement in 
the following way: to think about where you are, you need to displace 
yourself to the unknown in time – to a future – and in space – out of 
one’s own place. It is a temporal and spatial discontinuity that consti-
tutes the way human beings experience societal transformations. The 
imaginary of emancipation in modernity emerges from this exercise of 
displacement. It does not refer only to spatial displacements but also to 
historical transformation that leaves in suspension our certainty about 
the social world. What remains as an open agenda to critical social sci-
ences is the analysis of the modern ‘need’ to understand foreign spaces 
and to interpret them in light of specific historical experiences. In our 
argument, it is by such means that modernity has been understood as 
a phenomenon of universal significance in different times and places.
Notes
 1. As it appears, for instance, in the work of Santos (2009) and Connell (2006, 
2007).
 2. Displacement in this chapter means not only the concrete movement of someone 
from a point in space to another point. It also means the displacement of a soci-
etal imaginary that affects the way that societies can understand themselves. The 
American divergence of the nineteenth century that led to the creation of the idea 
of South and North America can be taken as an example of a displacement of a 
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societal imaginary (Mota 2015).
 3. Isabelle Eberhardt was an intellectual who started to write very early in her life – 
her first writings were published as Visions du Moghreb when she was eighteen 
years old. Following a strategy that became part of the way she constructed herself 
as a person and intellectual, she used a male pseudonym to publish it. As Abdel-
Jaouad (1993: 106) observes, it is unlikely that Visions du Moghreb would have 
been published if she had not used her male pseudonym of Nicolas Podolinsky. 
This is so because, first, she was talking about a topic that in her time ‘concerned 
only men’ – French colonialism in the Maghreb – and second, because the text 
was very critical of French colonialism and was to be published in a journal quite 
enthusiastic about the ‘French mission’ in North Africa.
 4. For Giddens, spaces should be understood as the abstract sphere of physical 
 relations and space as the area of social life.
 5. The places Simón Rodríguez visited during his exile are: 1797 Kingston, Jamaica 
– where he changed his name to Samuel Robinson; 1798 Baltimore; 1801 Bayonne 
and Paris (France); 1804 Vienna; 1805 Paris, Lyon, Chambery, Milan, Venice, 
Ferrara, Bologna, Florence and Rome – where he made a famous oath with Simón 
Bolívar at the Monte Sacro on 15 August; 1806 Paris; 1807 Prussia, Poland, Russia 
and Paris; 1823 London and Cartagena, where he also readopted his name Simón 
Rodríguez (Rumazo Gonzáles 2006: 1379). After coming back to America he 
kept travelling, fighting and working in different places. He moved around until 
the very end of his life, but he did not leave America again.
 6. Before he went into exile, Simón Rodríguez worked as a mentor for young 
students and he wrote a book about public education and political emancipa-
tion in America. In his first book he started to develop his method of education 
and writing, which would be regarded later as his main working approach: first 
 ‘criticism’ and then ‘creation’ (Grases 1954: 5–27).
 7. Nonetheless, his writings start to appear just after he returned to America, espe-
cially by 1828. As has been argued by his main commentator, his thought cannot 
be located in any specific time or space. It was unsystematically produced, in 
many parts of the world and in different times (Rumazo Gonzáles 2006).
 8. The author exemplifies the change in thought that is created by contact and 
movement with a personal analogy: ‘The fortune of my compatriots brought 
me to patriotism; patriotism brought me to Europe and Napoleon; Napoleon 
brought me to Bolívar [Simón Rodríguez met Simón Bolívar in France]; Bolívar 
brought me to Venezuela [thinking about his homeland again]; from there I 
started to see America, and in America I found the republics that torment me’ 
(Rodríguez 1840: 16).
 9. Republican education means to Simón Rodríguez that which produces a public 
authority and not a personal one. It is based on the principle of popular sover-
eignty and opposed to the idea of personal desire (Rodríguez 1840: 88).
 10. The first edition is from 1828, but the book was published in other important 
 editions in the course of the 1830s.
 11. One of Eberhardt’s first writings – see note 2 for more details.
 12. Isabelle Eberhardt was born in Geneva as a Russian Heimatlose, a stateless 
refugee. This condition marked her earlier life with the impression of being a 
stateless refugee from a country in which Russian emigrants were seen as ‘suspi-
cious’ (Abdel-Jaouad 1993: 95). In one of her first writings, a short story published 
The Moral Mappings of South and North
180
using the male pseudonym of Nicolas Podolinsky in the Nouvelle Revue Moderne, 
she expresses her condition of being Heimatlose in Europe and projected a vision 
of the Maghreb as a place of autonomy and self-realisation.
 13. According to Ortega (2008), Eberhardt’s tutor, who is regarded as being her 
real father, Alexander Trophimvsky, was a personal friend of Bakunin. He was a 
philosopher who had escaped from Russia because of his ideas and lived in exile 
with Eberhardt’s mother and brothers. In their place close to Geneva, a house 
called La Villa Neuve, many people who escaped Russian Czarisms for political 
reasons found shelter. Isabelle Eberhardt was raised in this milieu, which strongly 
marked her view about exile, political boundaries, and the role of displacement 
and thought in the human imaginary.
 14. In 1888 Augustin de Moërder, Isabelle’s brother, joined the French Mission 
in Algeria. By this time Isabelle had become increasingly interested in Arabic 
culture. In 1897 she went to North Africa with her mother Nathalie Moërder – 
she adopted a male name and male clothes to insert herself as she wanted into 
the Maghreb. Her mother died in Algeria. Isabelle came back to Europe when 
her economic situation deteriorated in North Africa. In 1900 she would go back 
to Algeria again but had to leave in 1901 because of her involvement in political 
activities against colonial rule. She returned to Algeria one year later, after marry-
ing Slimane Ehnni, an Algerian man to whom she had been a partner for a long 
time.
 15. One could also take the view that Eberhardt wished to do as Durkheim did in 
his search for a place where religion had been experienced in its most pure form. 
Following this approach, one would be able to look at her displacement to the 
Maghreb and her conversion to Islam as a sort of anthropological strategy of 
immersion to know the other and to be able to make herself part of the object of 
analysis.
 16. She was fluent in French, Russian, German, Italian and Arabic. She could also 
read Latin and Greek.
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The South as Exile
Nathalie Karagiannis
What will we do without exile and the long night that stares at the water?
Mahmoud Darwish, ‘Who am I, without exile?’
Sur, espejismo, reflejο.
Federico García Lorca, ‘Suite del agua. Sur’
Figure 8.1 William Kentridge, drawing from ‘Felix in Exile’, 1994, charcoal and 
pastel on paper, 120 × 150 cm / 47-1/4 × 59-1/16 in. Courtesy of the artist and 
Marian Goodman Gallery. Copyright: William Kentridge.
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In the drawing in Figure 8.1, Felix looks into the mirror and faces Nandi through a double-ended telescope, while the blue water of 
memory is pouring into his room. The striking film, from which this 
still is taken, was made on the eve of the first general elections in South 
Africa and its explicit purpose was to reflect on the past as a necessary 
part of the present and perhaps as something that threatened to be 
obliterated.1 The poignancy and apparent confusion of the events/ 
pictures of the film are the direct expression of the poignancy and 
confusion with which Felix, who is in exile in Paris, apprehends events 
in his homeland. Pausing a little bit longer on this picture compels one 
to see that, contrary to conventional thinking that makes of exile and 
home opposite poles, exile is the dynamic approximation of home.
Indeed, exile is not the opposite of home. Reversing María 
Zambrano’s intuition that the true homeland creates exile, I will 
explore in convoluted ways the idea that exile creates the homeland 
or, in essence, that exile is a homeland. During this exploration, it will 
emerge that between utter alienation and feeling/being at home, there 
is a very vast middle ground occupied by a variety of experiences, 
some more intimate, others more collective,2 which are all likely to be 
described by the notion of exile. The paths we will follow in this explo-
ration lead into various areas: poetry, philosophy, psychoanalysis. Each 
of these accounts presents interesting particularities, and I look out 
for what they have in common. Exploring such paths partly captures 
the complexity of that which is otherwise currently called the refugee 
crisis. Each individual whose survival or death we hear of as pertaining 
to a number is likely to have gone through some of the experiences 
that are subtly but relevantly described by poets, philosophers and 
psychiatrists below. Accordingly, the dark South, which is explored in 
the last section, can be turned on its head: for those coming from Syria, 
it is called Europe.
In the particular light of this chapter, the South indicates the direction 
home, just as in the picture by Kentridge. It goes without saying that 
not all homelands are situated in the South. But the South is of central 
interest here because of very specific features such as juxtaposition, 
sharpness of contrasts and simultaneity, which will be detailed in the 
last section. The point here is one which speaks of an imaginary South: 
this imaginary serves as a direction through which loss and disorienta-
tion are reconfigured into home. It is in this sense that the feature that 
Edward Said ascribes to exile in his famous essay ‘Reflections on Exile’ 
(2002) takes on its full meaning: it is ‘strangely compelling’, because just 
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as strangeness and compulsion are centripetal and centrifugal and nev-
ertheless cohabit spontaneously in this phrase, exile and home cannot 
but exist together, not apart. If the South is the reconfiguration of exilic 
loss (and disorientation) into home, then the South is an equivalent for 
return, which is a topos of any discourse on exile, as we will see later.
Let me then make clear that ‘the South as exile’ is a shorthand for 
the idea that the South means return from exile, that is, the tantalising 
remedy for the irremediable loss that characterises any exile. As such 
(as a shorthand, but also as its explanation) it is an idea that one has to 
undergo – as Jorie Graham would propose for a poem – as a journey. I 
grant the reader that there is nothing self-evident in what I propose; on 
the contrary, it is a deeply personal series of intuitions that stem from 
personal experience. One good example of this is the structure of this 
chapter: even though I claim that the South gives exile its direction, it 
only appears at the end of the exploration of exile. The main reason 
is that I want to show, physically as it were, how disorienting exile is 
before bringing the South to it – as a possible solution? (But the reader 
is warned from the very first line of Mahmoud Darwish in this chapter 
that one might feel lost without exile, whereas Federico García Lorca 
speaks about how the South may prove illusory.) Another example of 
the personal nature of this journey is the homage paid to the writers, 
almost all of them poets, in exile who have expressly struggled with this 
idea (and sometimes with the idea of the South too): each section bears 
one or more names, irrespectively of the significance of their visible 
contribution to this chapter.
One last word of caution: before starting this short but twisted 
journey, I would like to briefly dedicate a few preliminary lines to the 
relation between the exile and the foreigner. Talking of exile is one side 
of the coin; talking of the foreigner is the other. Thinking around exile 
centres on the relation between the movement towards somewhere and 
what (place) has been left behind. Thinking about the foreigner centres 
on the relation between the movement towards somewhere and what 
(place) has been encountered. Thinking about exile means thinking, 
among other thing, about solitude; thinking about the foreigner means 
thinking about, among other things, grouping people. Thinking about 
exile means thinking from rootlessness, thinking about the foreigner 
means thinking from a clear-cut space, that for which the person is 
foreign. Exile: escape. Foreigner: hospitality. These are the differences 
of the two sides: the coin is one and the same.
Let me now indicate that in the first three sections of this chapter, I 
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look at three issues for which I could not easily find answers elsewhere: 
the connection between blindness and exile, the antagonism between 
exiles and those who stay, and the contemporary changes in the topos 
of return from exile. I then dedicate a section to María Zambrano’s 
thought on exile, because this extremely fruitful thought is not known 
by Anglophone readers and because it is María Zambrano who made 
me think of the many borders within exile. The next step the chapter 
takes follows naturally María Zambrano’s thought: in section 5, the 
psyche (lost and found and lost again and found again) is looked at 
from various angles: poetic, psychoanalytic, philosophical. Finally, in 
the last section, the South comes in to offer some direction.
1. Being blind and knowing: Oedipus (and Antigone) and 
Adam (and Eve), and Roberto Bolaño
I don’t believe in ‘exile’, especially when the word sits next to the word 
‘literature’.
Roberto Bolaño, ‘Literature and exile’
True exile is the measure of every true writer.
Roberto Bolaño, ‘Exiles’
The word ‘exile’ was first offered to me by a Spanish-Swiss psychoana-
lyst who had lived formative years in Argentina. It seemed to perfectly 
fit the need of the moment: to make sense of the mismatches between 
everyday life and experience and (cultural) expectations, and whereas it 
began as a satisfactory description, it later turned into a useful tool and 
then into a theme worth exploring as such. I have now come full circle 
and have lost my attachment to the idea of exile, and this might be the 
best position from which to write about it – as its emotional charge 
has lessened and been exorcised in a poetry book entitled Exorismos 
(Karagiannis 2016b), a word that has fallen out of usage in Modern 
Greek but that phonetically brings together the Modern Greek words 
for exile (εξορία) and for definition (ορισμός).
The trajectory of exile through the centuries retains a few unsolved 
ambiguities. It is often thought that death was a lighter punishment 
than exile in ancient Athens. The Socratic option for death in the stead 
of exile has consolidated the intuition that exile must have been taken 
to be the worst fate one could face. Set practically in the context of the 
not always amiable relations between city-states and of an infinitely 
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more reduced world in terms of language and communication, as well 
as against a code of honour which tightly related the person to the com-
munity, we can imagine the gravity of the punishment of exile.
However, mentions of exile in ancient Athens usually focus on 
the moment of punishment itself. Being condemned to exile meant, 
in a second step, being given another opportunity to build a life in a 
 community – even though this community would not be the one into 
which one was born. The practical difficulties of exile cannot be under-
estimated, but what I now want to underline is that exile was not devoid 
of dignity. Taking distance from the place where the wrong was done 
allowed the recovery – for the wrongdoer – of dignity (just as it allowed 
the victims to remain dignifiedly in the same place, without facing the 
outrage of the wrongdoer’s presence). As Richard Sennett points out, 
Oedipus is an exile who retains all his dignity throughout the ordeal: 
indeed, Oedipus introduces a moral dimension into the very act of 
displacement, showing himself to be a stranger of tragic grandeur rather 
than an unwanted foreigner of lesser position (Sennett 2011: 109–10).
In such a context, it is amusing to read Roberto Bolaño’s claim that 
Adam and Eve must be thought of as the first exiles.3 Among the many 
classic depictions of Adam and Eve’s expulsion from the Garden of 
Eden, Masaccio’s is certainly one of the most expressive. Eve hides her 
breast and pubis and mourns desperately, with the mouth open, and an 
upward-cast gaze. As for Adam, he hides his face in his hands, sobbing. 
The desolate, dramatic effect of the fresco has often been commented 
on. I am struck by the discrepancy or non-continuity of the movement 
between the figures of Adam and Eve, which adds to their sense of des-
olation and, mostly, solitude and separateness, as if by being separated 
from God they also become separated from one another. But what is 
centrally at stake here is the similitude of the movement between Adam 
and Oedipus, who also brings his hands to his face, in several early 
Renaissance depictions – in order to blind and then hold his wounded 
eyes. It is no coincidence that both prototypical exiles hide their eyes. 
A great part of the exile that is about to happen features the blind spot 
(of knowledge) – both as origin and as consequence. Until he ate the 
fruit of the tree of knowledge, Adam was ignorant of his ignorance, or 
blind to it. The fruit opened his eyes and made him fall into disgrace. 
Leaving the Garden of Eden condemns him to not seeing it again, ever, 
until . . . he closes his eyes at the time of his death. As for Oedipus, his 
prior knowledge does not prevent him from committing the crimes 
that are his destiny – his knowledge has a blind spot. Horrified by his 
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understanding when the time comes, he blinds himself and becomes an 
exile, who is never again to see his native land. There is a strong sense 
that exile goes hand-in-hand with some form of blindness.
The exilic fate of Oedipus and Adam is a fate we (can) share as 
humans, with respect to our lack of control over the hybristic moment 
or the moment of the sin, the fall, and so on. Thus, the emotions that 
their exile stirs up in us are empathy, pity, perhaps some kind of relief 
that is related to catharsis. We do not view these archetypical men as 
contemptible or indeed shameful wrongdoers but as beings whose 
dignity persists throughout the divinely sanctioned or simply hazard-
ous ordeal.
2. Going and staying: Ovid
What would have happened if Eve hadn’t been involved in the story 
of the tree of knowledge? What would the relation between the 
exiled Adam and the non-exiled Eve have been? This is not a feminist 
counterfactual. Neither do I want to think about the marital relations 
across borders, even though this is a very interesting theme – from, for 
instance, the way Ovid’s relation to his wife while he is in exile passes 
through the highs and lows of trust and jealousy4 to, closer to us, that of 
the parents of Greek poet Michalis Ganas (2007), whose father stays in 
Greece while the mother moves to Hungary with the children.
Rather, I would like to point out the ambiguous relation between 
the exiles and those who stay. Talk of brain-drain and massive exodus 
of the young and talented – a mild form of exile – is an everyday issue 
in journalistic and public discourse in current Greece under crisis. 
Indeed, a lot of younger people have left the country in recent years 
– even though surviving chronic corruption and tax evasion has been 
a problem long before the so-called crisis hit the country. The public 
discourse associated with this phenomenon mostly takes the form of a 
lament, regretting the situation, and so on. However, there are cases – 
in music and texts5 – where exile is seen as a weak stance, one that does 
not offer resistance to the dangers and threats of the crisis. By opposi-
tion, staying in the country means truly and courageously resisting, 
and is the highest form of action. The same antagonism is palpable in 
accounts of political resistance to the 1967 coup d’état in Greece. Those 
who stayed often covertly accuse those who did not stay of cowardice, 
lack of political dynamism, lack of vision, and so on.
This antagonistic relation between those who leave and those who 
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stay hinges on the ambiguity of the obligation of exile. Is it clear that 
a politically active member of the resistance to a putsch, for instance, 
cannot stay in the country? Is she obliged to leave the country – 
 assuming that if her activities or herself were found, she would be 
arrested, tortured, killed? Or is she rather obliged to stay, in order to be 
closer to the ‘battlefield’ and by her example encourage others to fight? 
If most reasonable respondents would now allow our fictive resistance 
to become an honourable exile, such a response may not always have 
been evident, in particular not under communist discipline. Economic 
exile involves the same problems: after what threshold is one honour-
able in choosing exile? After almost starving to death? After remain-
ing unemployed over six months, a year, two years without other 
resources? Or after simply coming to the realisation that the obstacles 
that everyday corruption brings to one’s path are unacceptable or 
cannot be reconciled with an ethical life?
3. Impossible return (not any more?): Ossip and Nadezhda 
Mandelstam, Julio Cortázar, Edward Said, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, 
Melpo Axioti, Michalis Ganas
Perhaps the main problem in the relation between those who stay and 
those who go is the intimate conviction that they share and seldom 
speak out: that return from exile is impossible. The rupture that exile 
produces is such, both within the individual and between the indi-
vidual and that which he has left behind, that even if there is a physical 
return, there cannot be a return to the social reality which was there 
before exile. Social relations are by definition mutable, but few things 
have the destructive power of exile, as Raymond Williams has pointed 
out (Williams 1961).6
Oedipus and Adam archetypically act out this irreversibility.
Said’s ‘Reflections on Exile’ (2002) refers eloquently to this as a con-
dition of terminal loss. Terminality signifies an end, a threshold that 
cannot be crossed the other way around. And indeed, it is this sensa-
tion of terminal loss which differentiates exile as it has been lived for 
two millennia and the current understanding of exile.
For the condition of exile is nowadays much more ambiguous 
than it used to be with regard to the impossibility of return. Means of 
 technology – mobile phones and the internet and, within the internet, 
emailing, Skype and social networks – have entirely changed the condi-
tions under which exile is lived. The constant stream of communica-
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tion by writing, the possibility of relating across borders instantly, the 
possibility of seeing each other on a screen while being miles apart have 
transformed earlier exile’s feature of severe rupture into an apparently 
much greater back and forth movement between the ‘home’ and the 
new place.
There is a host of studies about cyberspace and virtual reality and 
their consequences for the people who spend a lot of their time in those 
spaces and realities. For exiles, that space is as vital as it is illusory. 
They owe to that space that exile is not the irreversible rupture it used 
to be. Not only is it not irreversible any more, but also one could say 
that exile does not/cannot happen any more like it used to: the exile is 
in constant relation to those she has left, she can see and hear the land 
(cannot smell it, though, which as the first phrases of Proust’s magnum 
opus have come to symbolise, must mean a certain loss of memory), 
she can see and hear – and some would say: know – all that which the 
exile before globalisation could not.
Technology has changed exile, but so have numbers. The amount 
of exiles, refugees, émigrés, displaced and uprooted people (let us not 
make any distinction between them for the moment) has increased 
exponentially in the last decades. Be it because of war, climate change 
which changes the job markets at ‘home’, or simply because transport 
has become so much cheaper, settling into a different country than the 
one where one was born is hardly an exceptional phenomenon any 
more.
The increased number of displaced people and the technological 
means available to them have a profound influence on two fundamen-
tal and interconnected aspects of exile: language and isolation. In the 
essay mentioned above, Said recounts a meeting where Faiz Ahmad 
Faiz, a Pakistani poet, meets another Pakistani in Lebanon. Only when 
the poet is able to speak his language at last does he ‘seem to overcome 
his sense of constant estrangement’, that ‘solitude’ which the exile 
‘experience[s] outside of the group’ (Said 2002: 138, 140). Not being able 
to speak one’s language (normally, on an everyday basis, publicly) used 
to be one of the hardest ordeals of the exile: technology has changed 
this to a great extent. Almost anybody can now be connected to the 
internet and through it to local television and radio stations; almost 
anybody can speak on the phone or on Skype with their people for free. 
The possibility of constantly using the home language has changed the 
perception of extreme isolation or desperate solitude that was earlier 
associated with the condition of exile. Think, by contrast, that the only 
191
The South as Exile
companion of Adam was Eve, and the only companion of Oedipus was 
Antigone; think of Nadezhda Mandelstam who memorised Ossip’s 
work in order to keep it alive until publication became possible.
So perhaps it is not so much that return has become more possible 
(many times it remains impossible because it is too dangerous), but 
that it is not as dearly desired as it used to be. The creation of the inter-
mediate, technological state along with coexistence with a multitude 
in the condition of exile has perhaps rendered the return less urgent. 
Reading black British poet Kwame Dawes’s (2011) interesting reflec-
tions on ‘The Pleasures of Exile’ confirms that if younger people, and 
especially writers, are concerned with their exilic condition, they have 
dynamic means of dealing with it – and feel that many are in the same 
situation.
In a 1983 TV interview, Julio Cortázar talks about the massive exile 
of Latin American writers and finishes by saying that ‘in the end, we 
will all come back’.7 Apart from the poignant irony that grips today’s 
spectator who knows that Cortázar died a year later without, of course, 
returning to Argentina, what strikes one is the need to reassert (the 
desire for) the possibility of a highly improbable return.
The improbability of return in this striking example invites us to 
think in the direction of a trope of the return in exile, which is consti-
tutive of the latter. I mean that, no matter how improbable the return 
might be, and no matter how irreversible the condition is supposed to 
be and often actually is, the discourse of/on the return is part of what 
makes the condition itself. One could push this even further and say 
that if it is because of its very irreversibility that exile is such a desperate 
human condition, then that despair is always and constantly under-
mined by the idea of the return to the ‘homeland’ – at the same time the 
despair is cultivated and enhanced by the same, never accomplished, 
always postponed return.
There is a softer condition than the one just sketched, which raises 
other kinds of questions: that of the effective return. In Mitria Patrida, 
Michalis Ganas (2007), an established Greek poet, talks about the 
forced move of his family (his mother and sibling, grandparents and 
aunts but, importantly, not his father), partly due to a political misun-
derstanding, from northern Greece to Hungary, where a special refugee 
status is created for Greek refugees. Even though the conditions there 
are difficult, the return is depicted as even stranger, precisely because 
of a supposed familiarity and cultural and social continuity. When they 
come out of the boat which transported them back to Igoumenitsa, the 
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narrator (the boy Ganas) says that everybody comments on how well 
dressed he and his brother were, as if they had not seen the photos sent 
to them during exile. The rift between exile and the return, between 
the reception of those who stayed through the virtual reality of the 
photos and the ‘real’ perception cannot be bridged. Where there was a 
‘patrida’, a fatherland, there is now a ‘mitria’, a stepmother.
Melpo Axioti’s (2015) Kadmo is another very interesting example of 
a description of an effective return. Contrary to Ganas’s family, whose 
head (the grandfather) had sided with the right wing and travelled to 
Hungary only due to a misunderstanding, Melpo Axioti was a political 
refugee, belonging to the Communist Party since her youth. Kadmo, 
the author’s barely hidden autobiographical character, keeps a tight 
balance between past memories (of the origins, of exile) and the grim 
present of return. Flashbacks and fragmented versions of the present 
succeed each other, while the text is delivered by Kadmo as a narrator 
or spoken to Kadmo in the second person of the singular, in the har-
rowing realisation that exile is death (Kadmo 2015: 84) and that this 
death will accompany every effort for a new life.8
Just as in the case of the never-achieved return, the effective return 
is part and parcel of the exilic condition. Because even after one has 
returned, one remains an exile.
4. The implacable promise of exile: the liminal thought of 
María Zambrano
One hypothesis about why this is so can be derived from the radically 
transgressive thought of María Zambrano, for whom exile creates 
home.9
Even though her work is little known outside Spain, María Zambrano 
is one of Spain’s foremost twentieth-century philosophers. She lived 
between 1904 and 1991; she spent forty-five years in exile, which began in 
1939 because of the end of the Spanish Republic and the Second World 
War. One of the most important characteristics of María Zambrano’s 
work is the style of her thought, which is poetico- philosophical: she 
called it ‘razón poetica’,10 as it is understood to enrich reason by intui-
tion and revelation.
Zambrano never wrote systematically on exile, even though it is 
very clear to all that her life and thought were indelibly marked by the 
condition of exile. She did, however, think of a book that would be 
called Desde el exilio (From Exile), and to this end she took down notes 
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and wrote a couple of longer texts on exile. This project never saw the 
light in a finalised form, but this is where I have looked for her think-
ing (these texts were fortunately brought together in a book called El 
exilio como patria11 [Exile as Homeland], published in 2014), along with 
her book on Antigone and a couple of pieces of secondary literature. 
Because her work, and especially the excerpts I look at here, is not 
easily available in English, and the phrasing of her thought is extremely 
open to interpretation, I have loaded this section with quotations in the 
original and in English translation. That may prove cumbersome, but I 
think it is both useful and unavoidable.
‘There are some journeys of which one starts knowing something 
only upon return’ (Zambrano 2014: 58).12 In trying to capture the 
development of a thought that scrutinised exile in an elusive way, if 
this can be said, let us start from what she says about exile after her 
return to Spain and slowly work our way towards what she says further 
into the past. After having come back to Spain, she writes: ‘Exile has 
been like my homeland or like a dimension of an unknown homeland, 
which once it is known, cannot be renounced’ (Zambrano 2014: 58).13 
There are two important points to be immediately made here: first 
and foremost, the assimilation or embracement of exile as home; and 
second, that the exile, that unknown – or imaginary – home cannot be 
renounced – by opposition to the real homeland one has renounced. 
And she goes on by admitting that in the end she had to renounce this 
non-renounceable home and that left her more than naked, without a 
skin: ‘I admit . . . that renouncing my forty years of exile has demanded 
a lot of work . . . from time to time it hurts, no, it’s not that it hurts, it is 
a sensation of having been flayed, like Saint Bartholomew, an unintel-
ligible sensation, but which is there’ (Zambrano 2014: 58).14
In what terms does she describe this homeland that exile is? One 
can discern three categories along which María Zambrano’s thinking 
develops. In terms of space, exile is a desert, a home without frontiers 
and without a kingdom,15 but also elsewhere ‘that kingdom, that field, 
that source of tears’.16 The hesitation between the idea that exile may 
be a kingdom and that it may not be indicates her ambivalence about 
the role of the person in exile: is she a king of this desert or can the 
desert not have a king? Is the exile standing at the centre of something 
powerful, just as a king would be, or is she, as it is traditionally seen, 
wandering in something which, having no limits, is undefinable . . . 
and therefore lacks substance? The strictest contradistinction to the 
‘normal’ homeland is indeed made through the absence of borders.
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The idea of the border touches, in María Zambrano, upon another 
theme, which was mentioned earlier: blindness. Indeed, here, exile is 
a place which allows one to see and prevents one from doing so at the 
same time,17 ‘because the exile has only horizon. But paradoxically the 
horizon is at the same time the condition of visibility, of the confine of 
the visible and the invisible orders’ (Zambrano 2014: 51).18 In the quasi-
mystic understanding of María Zambrano’s exile, the invisible – that 
to which we are blind, and which is accessed through exile – is on the 
other side of an unending emptiness or line that is the horizon. One 
could imagine that she beheld a ligne de fuite as that horizon which 
both set free and kept the invisible at a distance, until the revelation.
Another spatial inversion she operates regards the countries that 
have welcomed her and that share Spanish as a language: there, she 
writes, the strangers like herself feel outsiders (extraños), and insid-
ers (entraños, a neologism derived from entrañas – the entrails of 
an animal) because they feel within themselves a lost inside.19 The 
coincidence of the Spanish language in Spain and in its former colo-
nies allows the deployment of the thought that exile actually becomes 
the inner part, the core, but one that is lost. Bringing it close to the 
metaphor of desert that she also uses, it is possible to say that María 
Zambrano’s effort is directed towards imploding the significance of 
the border in the creation of exile, either by blowing it up as much as 
in a desert where there are no visible borders or by shrinking it to the 
inner core of the exiled self, so that exile becomes a part of oneself. This 
two-directional strategy allows her to bring out the home-generating 
capacities of exile, rather than its destructive effects.20
Finally, the metaphor of the islands of exile is used by Zambrano 
(2014: 39, 41) to significant effect. The autopoietic capacity of exile is 
most manifest here, since these islands appear by virtue of the pres-
ence of the exile, where they did not exist. This is a metaphor that I 
find particularly interesting because of its explicit use of water (which 
surrounds the islands) and a much greater concreteness or body given 
to the exile.21
Time is a second category according to which this thinker’s under-
standing of exile can be described. The ‘interrupted dawn’ (‘la alba inter-
rumpida’) (Zambrano 2014: 31) is a recurrent trope of her work. As one 
commentator says: ‘All Zambrano’s thought wants, in fact, to be dawn-
like, that is, born into light from within the obscure insides of existence’ 
(Trueba-Mira 2012: 152, n.17). Especially on exile, the philosopher 
writes: ‘When it [the homeland] dawns in history, when one can mini-
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mally see it – actually it is enough for it to be announced – it creates the 
exile of those who, having seen it and served it even minimally, have to 
go away from it’ (Zambrano 2014: 48)22 – the liminal moment of dawn 
corresponds to, on the one hand, the moment when the announcement 
touches the coming-into-being and, on the other hand, the springing 
of light from within obscurity. It is a liminal moment (but perhaps all 
moments are, by definition, liminal) that separates two very different, 
clearly perceptible, states – and we perceive how close this idea is to the 
one of the horizon, mentioned above, which separates the visible from 
the invisible. Zambrano’s reiterated idea of Cronos being the only god 
without a shape and without a mask is related to the significance she 
gives to the (Faustian) suspension of the moment. But this is also what 
she thinks of the exile: she does not have a shape, a face or a mask and 
that may turn her into an omen (like the dawn).23
Dawn is an indestructible moment, for Zambrano, and there lies its 
utility in terms of thinking exile. The fact that it is interrupted suspends 
it in time, having the effect of crystallising a past that is never gone, of 
keeping the past in the present (Zambrano 2014: 31). I see this as the 
other side of the theme of the impossible return – the radical destruc-
tive power of exile, in the sense that nothing will ever be the same upon 
return. Here, the moment of entering into exile is magnified and glori-
fied, so that the homeland can be ultimately saved.
Zambrano’s deployment of spatio-temporal metaphors regarding 
exile takes another form, which brings together one moment and 
its various components. On the one hand, she has a sense that one 
finds oneself in exile suddenly, without prior announcement, without 
possibility of choice: one wakes up in exile.24 On the other hand, she 
establishes a clear distinction between two stages in exile: (1) aban-
donment (and expulsion), which is followed by the desert and (2) 
achievement. However, from the chronological-experiential point of 
view that Zambrano adopts, I do not find clear indications of a distinc-
tion between expulsion and abandonment. On the contrary, they both 
importantly point out the border-like existence of exile: it starts before 
it has even started, it already starts when one stands at the edge of it.25
Indeed, the role expulsion plays at the beginning of exile is straight-
forward. By contrast, the role abandonment plays is a little bit less 
so. On María Zambrano’s double register of the Greek and Judaeo-
Christian traditions, abandonment is the disappearance or the silence 
of the gods. Take the cue from what she says about Antigone: 
‘Antigone’s passion happens in the absence and the silence of gods’26 
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and Sophocles’ tragedy (the gods do not intervene), which is general-
ised as a feature of all tragedy.27 Likewise Oedipus, whose destiny was 
announced to him and whom no divine power descended to help.28 The 
nature of abandonment renders the gaze and judgement of the gods 
absent, and the only thing that comes to the fore is dispossession.29 
Referring to ‘the Father’ too – which is the mediation, at the same time 
as the family, the native city, and so on – she comes to the same conclu-
sion.30 A loss of the gods that is attached to a loss of their gaze brings us 
indirectly back to the theme of blindness,31 and vice versa, but also to 
the lack of voice, and the need to raise the human voice, which are both 
crucially relevant for poetry, as we shall see in the next section.
When the acute sense of abandonment subsides, the desert opens up 
not as expulsion but as exile. Exile’s desertic features are the absence of 
borders, the immensity, the fragmented encounters with other home-
lands. The loss takes on the form of the infinite. So, ‘in order not to get 
lost [in it] one has to lock the desert within oneself, [. . .] interiorise it, 
in the soul, in the mind, in the senses, sharpening the ear rather than 
the eye so as to avoid illusions and hear voices’ (Zambrano 2014: 40).32 
The exile dispossesses herself of all demands.
This internalised desert produces several consequences, which 
express an achieved exile.
The most dramatic of those is the fact that the exile will never settle 
down into any other homeland. No place or circumstances will ever be 
able to fully tempt her into putting down roots – and of that, Zambrano 
says, the exile will be accused (Borgna 1996: 55).33 Conversely, achiev-
ing exile means the discovery of the real homeland. In a deeply 
ascetic understanding, the thinker expresses her certainty that entirely 
renouncing the homeland is that which allows its authentic appari-
tion.34 (The same kind of movement – renunciation of love of God, in 
order to attain that God – is what characterises the common question 
posed by the mystic thinkers whose work is explored by Anne Carson, 
discussed in section 5 below.) Then and only then does the homeland 
become unavoidable. And coming full circle, she reverses the adventure 
of the exile towards her always-elusive homeland: the true, unavoidable 
homeland, she writes, creates exile.35
There is an unresolved ambiguity in the direction of the relation 
between exile and homeland but I ultimately think it is of little impor-
tance. Rather, it is worth keeping in mind the aspect of creation, or of 
generation in the sense that one is generating the other, and that they 
are intrinsically tied together. Another aspect which we should recall is 
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that of interruption of dawn, because it suggests something very strong 
about the state of suspension (of parenthesis) that is caused in the 
condition of exile. Finally, the recurrent mention of the lack of borders 
in exile, which is the same as the infinite horizon and the non-seeing, 
should be brought together with a theme with which we started and 
that we will find soon again: blindness.
5. The exiled soul: Federico García Lorca, Odysseas Elytis, 
Anne Carson, Pascal Quignard, Derek Walcott, Etel Adnan, 
Vladimir Nabokov
approbation had turned me into an exile
Derek Walcott, The Prodigal
Just as Zambrano thematised her experience of exile into poetic reason, 
others in other fields have treated exile both as a field of human expe-
rience and as artistic practice. Indeed, the theme of exile haunts the 
arts of the twentieth century to such an extent that one could call that 
period the century of exile. The great critic George Steiner has pro-
posed that ‘extra-territoriality’ is the defining condition of modernism 
(Steiner 1971).
Rather than thinking of how exile has been represented in poetry 
and psychoanalysis, I would like to propose that the poetic fact and the 
psychoanalytic space are constituted by elements that can be discov-
ered in the constitutive conditions of exile, in other words, that these 
are ontologically similar.
El hecho poético: jump and mystic
In a 1928 conference on ‘Imagination, inspiration, evasión’, Federico 
García Lorca writes:
Imagination supports and creates a poetic ambiance and inspira-
tion invents the poetic fact. The poetic fact cannot be controlled by 
anything. It must be accepted as the rain of stars is accepted. But let 
us be happy that poetry can run away, escape from the cold claws of 
reasoning.36
Like every other human being, the poet lives in a social and politi-
cal space, a space where relations are constantly at play and where she 
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herself is constantly at the centre of these relations, as partner, daughter, 
mother, friend. However, the poet does not write while cooking, while 
attending the children, while paying the bills, while reading an academic 
text. The poet can write about all of these, but in a space which is differ-
ent from all of these, and which is not coextensive with them. The non-
coextensivity of the everyday (called ‘the real’ below) and the other space, 
this jump between them, is constitutive of the poetic. For the moment, 
let us say that there is a jump between the poetic space and what it is not.
In that poetic space, the poet writes against or simply despite the 
(social, political, everyday) laws, she continually transgresses the laws, 
the laws of the fatherland and the laws of the language, and is thus, 
de facto, an outlaw. In the poetic space, the poet listens to and sings 
a language, which is not the everyday language, even though it uses 
everyday words. Thus the mysterious, liminal result: the poem is not 
an everyday object even though the material from which it is made is 
everyday, recognisable material.
Two apparently contradictory examples can be used to describe the 
poetic space as exile; they are both indebted to the gnostic tradition. 
The first example is that of the Greek poet Odysseas Elytis, whose refer-
ences to exile as an ontological condition of the poet are to be found 
repeatedly in his opus magnum Axion Esti (1989).37 As his French 
translator and commentator says,38 the retrieval of the essential instinct 
of Eros and its articulation, its turning into Logos, infringes the laws of 
the city and makes of the poet an exile. But where does the decision to 
do so come from? There are a few beautiful pages in the introduction to 
the French translation of this work where Xavier Bordes (1996) devel-
ops Elytis’s gnostic influences.
Gnosticism was the cultural matrix of the Mediterranean in the third 
and fourth centuries ce. Its most relevant element here is that of the 
foreign soul, a soul which has forgotten whence it comes, that it is a lost 
fragment of God, one of many lost fragments. These fragments of soul 
forget their name, forget what or who they are and cannot be called 
back (by the angel messenger), even when God wishes so, and thus are 
condemned to perpetual suffering. The foreign soul has distanced itself 
so much from its origin that it has lost its identity (Galimberti 1996). So 
subjectivity passes from God to the humans and history is created; the 
event acquires meaning.
According to this narrative, the poetic space is located in the verti-
cal space between the soul and God or the gods: it is a recuperable 
ascension.39
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Unexpectedly, Anne Carson’s concern with Decreation (Carson 
2006) can be likened to this ascension, but the other way around, as 
the neologism ‘decreation’ (coined by Simone Weil) signifies. Indeed, 
in one of the essays included in the book, ‘Decreation: How Women 
Like Sappho, Marguerite Porete, and Simone Weil Tell God’, the poet 
and classic scholar explores the ways these three writers attempt to 
draw out the coincidence between ‘telling’, which must always start 
from the self, and God, who is silent40 and whose love can only truly be 
known and experienced when the self is annihilated. All three authors, 
Carson argues, understand the essential contradiction between being 
an authorial self and having access to God and in order to resolve it, 
invent a ‘dream of distance’, which attempts to both retain at a distance 
and bring close that which is most desired. As James Pollock points 
out in an excellent review of Decreation, ‘God’ is another word for the 
sublime (Pollock 2008), and it is the sublime Elytis is also after in Axion 
Esti.
Even though Carson does not thematise exile as such, in this book, 
a title like: ‘Every Exit is an Entrance’ or the piece on Antonioni 
express a direct concern with similar themes. Most relevantly, I think 
her thought around the FarNear, that she translates from Marguerite 
Perote, is akin to Elytis’s recuperation of the sublime in the homeland 
through the assertion of exile, and to María Zambrano’s intuition about 
the intrinsic tie between homeland – the God, the sublime – and exile.
In the silence, the forgetting and abandonment of the humans by 
the gods or God, which implies the forgetting of one’s own identity 
as derived from the god/s, as godly, the poet speaks, she raises her 
voice . . . Does the poet remember? Is she the messenger (Hermes, 
άγγελος) or the foreign soul? And is this remembrance, the prophecy, 
the reconstitution of the past that indicates the way forward, to come? 
For indeed prophet means she who speaks in the stead of/in place of 
(God). But, as Michaux says, the poet is not master at home (Michaux 
1969). And speaking of poetry as a new beginning, he compares it to 
the first human beings who invented fire. The link we can create to the 
myth of Prometheus points directly to the substitution of the gods, that 
for which the humans are punished: attempting to annihilate the self 
would then be a plausible solution.
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Mother-tongue, fatherland
Odysseas Elytis, in a section of Axion Esti, repeats the verse: ‘My only 
concern was my language.’41 In a Heideggerian echo, Jacques Derrida 
writes in Of Hospitality:
‘Displaced persons’, exiles, those who are deported, expelled, root-
less, nomads, all share two sources of sighs: two nostalgias: their 
dead ones and their language . . . [they] often continue to recognize 
the language, what is called the mother tongue, as their ultimate 
homeland, and even their resting place . . .. That was Hannah 
Arendt’s response on one occasion: she no longer felt German 
except in language. (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 87–9)
The reason for this is that ‘speech, the mother-tongue isn’t only the 
home that resists, the ipseity of the self set up as a force of resistance, as 
a counter-force against these dis-locations. Language resists all mobili-
ties because it moves about with me’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 
2000: 91). There are exceptions. In Kadmo, Melpo Axioti mentions 
the story of an isolated man, an exile, whom nobody spoke to out 
of  negligence – so that he had neither the occasion to remember his 
tongue nor the opportunity to learn a new one. So, she says, this was a 
man – from the very few existing – who had no linguistic instrument 
(Axioti 2015: 45). However, the more frequent view is that language is 
that which can never be taken away from the exile. Even when she is in 
exile, the exile finds herself in her tongue, in her language. But if that 
language is the mother-tongue, why does it come from the fatherland? 
There is feminist literature on why the fatherland should really be the 
motherland, but for our purposes, I would rather ask whether exile is 
mother or father. What are the archetypes on which the different civili-
sations feed themselves with regard to exile? On the one hand, it seems 
clear that the land is female in many languages, so that the movement 
away from the land would be under the guise of the father. In general, 
the travel – as initiation, as search for resources, as hunting – belongs to 
the masculine. However, la patria, η πατρίδα are feminine nouns that 
originate in the collapse of an adjective and a noun into one. The word 
terra, γαία is obliterated in favour of the signifier ‘of the father’, the land 
where the father is born and is buried.
These questions lose significance in the numerous cases where 
people decide to live, and authors to write, in another language than 
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their ‘own’, like, to take two famous examples, Vladimir Nabokov or 
Etel Adnan.
The psyche in exile
Felix Post’s . . . recent studies of creativity and psychopathology found that 
among writers the highest rates of severe affective disorder occurred in poets.
Rosin Kemp and Josephine Loftus, ‘Beckett: portraits of the artist in exile’
Twenty years ago a group of Italian psychoanalysts wrote on the very 
particular theme of therapies where the analysand and the analyst did 
not share the same mother-tongue. I found the reference in an article 
by a psychoanalyst who described his own exile as a passage from 
mother-tongue to father-tongue, that is from oneself to the Other. 
But is the mother-tongue not the tongue of the other already for every 
newborn?
The idea of the ‘internal exile’ does not only address psychiatric 
patients or psychoanalytic clients. It is more and more widely accepted 
that there are forms of exile that are intangible, that are connected in 
a linear or immediate way to the actual experience of displacement 
(Galitzine-Loumpet 2011). Thus:
Exile does not appear only in the form of a concrete, external expe-
rience of a lost homeland, but also as the experience of an internal 
homeland that we have lost and for which we go back and look 
desperately. In the psychotic Lebenswelt, [. . .] the acute and elusive 
experience of this being-in-exile, being-foreigner, without a home-
land emerges anew [. . .]. (Borgna 1996: 54)
Eugenio Borgna, who wrote these lines, is a psychiatrist who has dedi-
cated his life to the phenomenological approach to treating patients 
and who in the article quoted uses María Zambrano’s thought around 
the features of exile – abandonment, border, etc. – in order to under-
line the profound mutation of the perception of space and time that 
takes place in exile. The non-recognisability of the ‘old’ space or the 
‘old’ people (who turn strange, threatening) but also of the new space;42 
the very strong sense of a break of time with no possibility of project-
ing oneself into the future; finally, the difficulty of defining the border 
between the medical condition and the ‘normal’ condition, which goes 
hand-in-hand with a very difficult return to the old configurations 
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of time and space, all speak of a great similarity of the experiences of 
the internal exile caused by psychic illness and of the physical exile as 
described by María Zambrano.
Additionally, it has been noted that in the work of Zambrano herself, 
the mad, along with the poor, children and women, can be subsumed 
under the category of the exile, given the fact that they have been buried 
or ignored.43
Exiting the extreme suffering of such illnesses, and entering the 
more usual realm of a psychoanalytic exploration without psychotic 
expressions, it is worth observing the particularities of the time and 
space of the psychoanalytic session. Henry Bauchau, a novelist and 
psychoanalyst of renown, wrote: ‘The time of the sessions appears to 
be an island, that is surrounded by the beyond and beneath of the 
time of the session that form around it one, unique ocean’ (Bauchau 
2000: 107). One cannot but be struck by the use of the same metaphor 
that María Zambrano used. It is certain that similar accounts can be 
found easily, and such is also my personal experience. The absence of 
an experiential relation to ‘the real’ – the suspension of time – renders 
clear the closeness of the supposedly pathological and the supposedly 
less pathological.
However, this suspension of time in the guise of the island is, in 
another interesting account, the account of Julia Kristeva, ‘scandalous’. 
Based on Freud’s qualification of the unconscious as zeitlos, this is ‘a 
fault, a breach, a frustration’ (Kristeva 1997: 48)44 in the linear time of 
consciousness, which at the one end expresses the pleasure principle 
and, at the other end, the death drive. In that view, the impossibility 
of integrating this a-temporality within the linearity – in its several 
forms – may be a feature of psychopathological states. Kristeva herself 
likens this scandalous Zeitlosigkeit of the unconscious to the nunc stans 
of medieval mystics, which must, in turn, be compared with the women 
thinkers Carson writes about, to Carson herself, to Elytis and Lorca.
Apart from the language that obviously stands between them – 
unites them – a final note on the correspondence between the poetic 
and the psychical underlines the dynamic movement of the ‘soul’: 
ascent – effacement – in the case of the mystical and the gnostic tradi-
tions; descent in the case of the discovery of the unconscious. Both 
could be pointing to the South.
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6. The dark light of the South: Frédéric Pajak, A. Vigoleis 
Thelen, Evgenios Aranitsis, Johan van der Keuken, Isaki 
Lacuesta, Víctor Erice, Carlo Levi
Everyone receives his inner sense of North and South at birth.
Whether an external polarity comes with it is not terribly important.
Jean Paul, epigraph to A. Vigoleis Thelen, The Island of Second Sight
At this point, we dispose of several spatial metaphors with regard to 
exile: desert, island, limit or border. Why introduce the idea of the 
South (and the concomitant ideas of the North – the loss of the North 
– and disorientation)?
As was hinted at in the introduction, the South is the direction 
home, an answer to the question that exile poses, a remedy to a loss 
which is considered irremediable. Even though it appears at the end 
of this chapter, one could consider it as foregrounding the main body 
of it (‘Sur, espejismo, reflejo’), just as the idea of return foregrounds 
the experience of exile. During the preparation of a collective poetry 
book on The Quest of the South (Karagiannis 2016a), invited poets were 
told that the expression ‘the quest of the South’ refers to the quest of 
the imaginary South. It refers to a South that is the object of a pursuit, 
a South that is perhaps never reached, and is thus not a determined, 
physical or geographical place or space. It is an imaginary horizon, in 
the sense that it defines a limit, an end: of the world, the journey, the 
imagination. The quest refers to a journey, which can be circular – the 
starting point is the same as the end point, like in the Odyssey – or 
linear – where the two points are different, like in Rimbaud’s flight 
to Abyssinia. The quest can be thus either nostalgic or romantic – or 
other things. The South is thus malleable, emancipative and resistant to 
imposed interpretations.
Looking for the South necessarily poses the question of the North. 
Drawing on Tacita Dean’s astounding work,45 Tania Kovats says:
To lose your North Star implies confusion, or madness [. . .] The 
North Star is one of the brightest in Ursa Minor, and is one of the 
few starts in the night sky that most people can point to. [. . .] As 
you advance towards the idea of the north, the true north seems 
to move further away. Disorientation, losing your way, a space of 
‘unbelonging’, a place of uncharted possibilities, no man’s land and 
the ultimate test. (Kovats 2014: 57)
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But one can turn the expression ‘perdre le Nord’ (which also means 
‘we have become mad’) around and assert it positively. It is possible 
to refuse to see the North as the point whose loss leads to loss of mind 
or, slightly differently, that the loss – by extension, loss of orientation, 
void, gap – contained in the imaginary South is a loss that is worth 
referring to and out of which we can make a reference.
Thus, there is a rather straightforward line, I think, between loss of 
orientation and the quest of the South. In the book The Quest of the 
South, I proposed a scheme of disorientation going backwards in time, 
as it were: from destinations(/destinies), to transitions, to losses, to 
origins. The uncertainty of destinies, the concreteness of transitions 
succeeding the necessary and unavoidable sense of loss and, lastly, the 
always-reconstructed origins seem to fit both the quest of the South 
and exile, matching almost perfectly.
One could object that there are some formally differentiating fea-
tures between exile and the South as categories.46 Indeed, exile is a 
liminal category: it concentrates on the border, on the limits, on the 
horizon. It can only be thought as something which allows a position 
astride situations. On the other hand, the South is an indeterminate 
category: if it is clear that it is defined by its opposition to the North, 
it is also clear that it does not have any consistence, neither materially/
factually, nor schematically in the sense of a shape. Furthermore, exile 
contains the blindness which is necessary to knowledge (of the origins: 
the homeland); whereas the South always shines with (dark) light. Exile 
refers to distance, whereas the clichés of the South underline closeness, 
warmth, etc. Additionally, in terms of direction, the South is about 
disorientation; exile is simply about loss. And finally, being in the 
South is a matter of phantasy, with all the nuances that can be found 
in the phantasy between the intentional and the non-intentional: the 
imaginary is the strongest element at play and it modulates experience. 
Being in exile is due to a jump, a sudden finding oneself at a loss.
Nevertheless, I would propose that to see in the South the irreduc-
ible element of return makes up for all other difficulties. All of exile’s 
features, such as blindness, distance and liminality, tend dynamically 
towards home. However, exile’s core element of loss is reconfigured 
into home through the topos of return; and this, we proposed, is the 
South: the South as the tantalising or tempting or promised remedy to 
the irremediable.
Before describing in more detail how this is so, I would like to 
mention, though not underline, that there is a factual, historical 
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premise to the South as site of exile (and thus, survival), which starts 
first of all in the Europe of the troubled 1930s. The southern areas of 
Europe, islands like Mallorca and Ibiza, but also Latin American or 
African countries, all became destinations for those fleeing the rising 
threat of Nazism and the war. The creation of Israel itself can perhaps 
also enter this picture as an extreme case – where destination espouses 
destiny, indeed, and exile is turned upon its head by creating an entirely 
new homeland.
Innumerable amounts of intellectuals and artists fled the north of 
Europe towards its south or northern Africa: if one of the reasons was 
certainly the impression that one was not entirely leaving the conti-
nent, that one could easily come back (by opposition to going to the 
US, for instance), another one has to do with the South. The way the 
South is imagined varies, of course, according to the different sensibili-
ties and interests of the exiles.
Film and literature provide us with many examples. The filmography 
around the South is so extensive that it cannot be mentioned here in a 
satisfactory way. One must nevertheless at least mention films as differ-
ent as Casablanca or The Snows of Kilimanjaro because, in them, in dif-
ferent ways, the South takes the guise of exile and plays a fully dramatic 
(active) role in the post-war period. I will take a few more lines for four 
films where both South and exile are negotiated.
The opening scene of Cristo si è fermato a Eboli, the 1979 filmic adap-
tation of Carlo Levi’s autobiographical account of his political exile in 
southern Italy, shows us an aging Levi (Gian Maria Volonté) seated in 
a couch and thinking about ‘his’ peasants of the South. The first phrase 
– off – is strikingly poignant and pertinent to our purposes, as it men-
tions the promise of return Levi has made to i contadini and which he 
now knows he will never be able to keep. The film takes off from there, 
as a flash back, a long journey of memory and imagination, in con-
tradistinction to the Levi sitting there, old, immobile and surrounded 
by his own paintings of the South and its people. The element of the 
promise which ties the future (see Arendt 1958) is an essential element 
of exile, as we saw in Zambrano. Without the promise (either of return 
or of freedom), it is impossible to think of exile, we might as well 
renounce hope. It is, however, interesting that in Cristo the promise 
was made to the place of exile and it is now, from the vantage point of 
the present, surely broken. If this chapter were about literary theory, 
we would point out the different layers of the broken promise (are not 
the book which is being written, and before it, the paintings depicted 
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in the surrounding of old Levi, the realisations of a promise that is 
deemed broken?); however, what interests me more here is the promise 
to return to (instead of: from) exile, which turns exile into home. And 
indeed, the film is a journey in the experience of the exile, discovering 
home in exile, or dynamically appropriating home in the South.
By contrast, the South is the unambiguous place of origin of the pro-
tagonist of Víctor Erice’s beautiful 1982 film El Sur. However, contrary 
to Cristo, we never see the South in this film, which takes place entirely 
in a fictional North, a dark and cloudy North. In El Sur, the narrator is 
the young daughter of a man that has the gift of making magic tricks 
and that is, otherwise, quite absent. One day, the girl discovers that 
her father is connected to the South by the ties of romantic (not only 
family) love: the South is the other woman. Here again, the tenses of 
time are merged: the South belongs to the past, but a cinema theatre 
(called Arcadia!) brings it to life in the present, since the father’s lover 
was a film actress and her films are shown in the North.
The Way South by Johan van der Keuken (1981) and El Cuaderno 
de Barro, by Isaki Lacuesta (2011), two documentaries, both take the 
South as their aim and object of reflection. In the first movie, the direc-
tor films his descent from Amsterdam to Cairo, passing through Paris, 
Rome and Calabria. Johan van der Keuken was a Dutch documentary 
film-maker whose reputation in the essayistic documentary milieu and 
fame among a large audience are inversely related. He belongs to a 
tradition of politically committed documentarists, who matured with 
the idea of an exploited South or Third World. This film is extremely 
interesting, not only filmically, but also in its depiction of a troubled, 
poor South (Cairo, where people whom he tries to interview elude him 
or lie to him) or also of a South in the North (the long interview with 
the Maghreb worker who cannot find a job after an accident in Paris), 
and certainly a frustrating and disorienting South, which resists the 
Northerner’s eye and ear. If one decides to watch another movie by van 
der Keuken, The Film-maker’s Holiday (1974), one gets a rounder idea 
of what the South might mean for such a figure: in this second movie, 
the South is a sweet, family summer in the sun of France. If the first 
film exudes trouble, fight and frustration, the second shows rest and a 
meditative contemplation of beauty – and whereas in both films there 
is an acute sense of transience, as brings the condition of exile, its par-
ticipants also represent resilience, another of exile’s features (Kristeva 
1994).
Van der Keuken’s work is one of the strong influences on Isaki 
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Lacuesta, a contemporary Spanish film-maker who works between 
fiction and documentary. El Cuaderno de Barro documents the work 
of Miquel Barceló, the famous Mallorcan painter, in Mali. The film was 
made on the occasion of the performance Paso Doble, by Barceló and 
the dancer Josef Nadj, which involved entering parts of their bodies 
or their whole bodies into a huge wall made of clay. The Cuaderno de 
Barro follows the ways that Barceló has found of working around the 
obstacles and difficulties the natural environment imposes on him 
in the twenty-five years he has worked in Mali. The South is here, 
certainly, a return to the origins, to the earth, to uncontrolled nature, 
to a time that corrodes everything at a quicker pace than elsewhere 
but which seems eternal, at the same time. The consequences for this 
encyclopaedic painter’s work are of great use: the natural destruction 
brought upon the work (for example, the eating of drawings and paint-
ings by termites) is recuperated as part of the work, the importance of 
technical means diminishes (use of bleach, nails), and so on. In other 
words, destruction and poverty are reconfigured into art. Among the 
most striking scenes of the movie are the sittings for portraits of albino 
people that Barceló makes. The impoverishment of technique that 
Barceló may be seeking meets the poorest, in the sense of most under-
valued, diminished individuals. Painting portraits of them restores 
dignity – but to whose eyes? When the painter suggests in front of the 
camera that one albino should have his eyesight corrected, the figure 
of the rich, well-meaning, patronising muzungu forcefully, and unwit-
tingly, appears.
Straying away from movies, I would now like to keep the white and 
black of Barceló’s albino portraits, in order to take a look at Manifeste 
incertain 2, the extraordinary book by Frédéric Pajak (Pajak 2013), 
which follows Walter Benjamin’s journeys from the North to the South 
of Europe, and his stays on the island of Ibiza. Apart from its evident 
closeness to the theme of the South as exile, and to the underlying 
constant reference to exile in general, through the figures of James 
Joyce and Samuel Beckett, this absolutely singular book unveils, as 
it performs them, two major characteristics of the imaginary South: 
juxtaposition and sharp contrasts. First, juxtaposition is the making of 
the book as it brings together large drawings, underneath which come 
a usually short text. Image and text are not always related in a strictly 
logical, explicative or illustrative way. Most often, they are juxtaposed 
in a way which creates poetic resonances throughout the book. Usually, 
be it in a cabinet de curiosités or in poetry,47 juxtaposition is the 
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 companion of fragmentation. And indeed, matching Benjamin’s own 
preferred mode of thinking and writing, Pajak’s book functions as an 
irreverently assembled collection of fragments, which are all the more 
poignant for being just that.
The second feature of the South which is clearly ‘embodied’ in this 
book is the sharpness of the contrasts. Like other graphic books, this 
book is in black and white, but most of its parts play up the contrast 
between full light and darkness, intense sun and very deep shade. The 
black-clad women in Sicily (which are referred to with nostalgia in the 
text), the blinding white of the houses, the immobility of the paths in 
contrast to the presence of the sea, which is immutable, all contrive and 
manage to give a sense of past and future merging into the present, an 
inescapable, as it were, present (which, all along, is a present one has 
arrived at) and of the porous limits between the external surroundings 
and the internal musings of the writer and his characters as well as of 
the conjoined threat of death and Eros. Thus, under the drawing of an 
ancient temple and the arid landscape that surrounds it, a text says: 
‘The atrocious marvels of creations are marvellously atrocious precisely 
because they do not originate in creation. They are’ (Pajak 2013: 91). 
And inscribed on the sun clock of the beautiful cathedral on Ibiza, the 
phrase: ‘Ultima multis’.
An echo of that same immobility in time, of that hanging threat of 
death at midday, of the admission of the lack of control, can be found 
in a poetic text called [South] ([Νότος]) by Evgenios Aranitsis (2016), 
a Greek poet and essayist, whose work combines an extraordinary 
capacity of reflexion with deeply moving language. In [South], he 
deploys the contrasting rhetoric between North and South in a poetic 
key, playing with the topoi of the North and the South, and indeed 
giving an account of what the South is, by contrast to the North, on 
the occasion of an invitation to write on this but also in the context of 
the generalised, political demands for accountability: ‘the north is vast 
and iron, mercury and nitre belong to it / the south is limited, deep 
and secret, and gold and brass belong to it’ (Aranitsis 2016: 70). Or, 
‘because it holds that you PAY for your errors in the north, whereas 
you owe them and one owes them to you in the south’ (Aranitsis 
2016: 72); ‘in the north, summer is the object of desire, whereas in the 
south it constitutes both an object and a cause’ (Aranitsis 2016: 72); 
‘the north is chronic / the south is eternal’ (Aranitsis 2016: 78), which 
reminds us of Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic Zeitlosigkeit. This explo-
ration yields fascinating results regarding the features of the South: the 
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unapologetic tendency towards fusion with the other (human being, 
elements of nature) – another way of admitting the lack of ultimate 
control over things – the darkness of light where death presides over 
any construction of meaning, South and mourning as synonyms, and 
the persistence of Eros/love. Adding to sharpness of contrasts and to 
juxtaposition, which he also performs, as it were, Aranitsis draws our 
attention on one last, determining feature of the South: simultaneity. In 
the imaginary of the South, he seems to be saying, things are like this 
and like that at the same time and without this being specified, given 
that this is what the South is. No attempt at rationalisation is made. 
Sometimes, the artistic form naturally merges contradictions into one 
entity, such as in his dark light of the summer.
In all these singular works of art, the motor of the imaginary is the 
South. One could also turn this around and say: the South is a potent 
motor for the imaginary, and this is due to the fact that while eternity, 
immobility, immutability seem to be pervasive in the substance of the 
(imaginary) South, on the other hand, everything that is contradictory, 
fragmentary, simultaneous or juxtaposed in its form gives phantasy a 
push, which sets it off in another direction. Is this why Federico García 
Lorca calls the South an illusion (created by the mirror, etymologi-
cally: espejismo), a reflection, in the poem cited as an epigraph to this 
chapter? Is or can the South be anything that reflects upon it?
A mirror is a reflecting surface, but as art and psychoanalysis well 
know, it actually has unfathomable depths. The South is deep, as deep 
as the mirror in the drawing by Kentridge, from which Nandi looks 
back at Felix and from which is poured the water of memory and the 
past. However, what inhabits the mirror changes according to Felix’s 
gaze, the exile’s gaze, just as his own imagination is pervaded by the 
South. The limits between the two are porous and set the imaginary 
alive. Nevertheless, at some point later in the film, Nandi dies and there 
is nothing Felix can do about it, apart from drawing. When he comes 
back to his homeland, Felix holds a bag full of drawings. These draw-
ings are precious, just as the paintings of i contadini are precious to 
Carlo Levi from the vantage point of home. The representation of the 
South makes the exile hold out while in exile. Thus, the South (whether 
it is home or an exile-turned-into-home) offers itself as a remedy to 
exile and, while doing so, embraces all states of the latter: the poetic, the 
psychical, the philosophical.
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Notes
 1. ‘“Felix in Exile” was created in 1994, amidst ongoing public debates on the 
relationship between the country’s division of ownership and the formation of 
identity which accompanied the first open elections in South Africa. The film tells 
the stories of Felix, a man living in exile in Paris, and of Nandi, a woman working 
as a land surveyor. The woman is Felix’s alter ego. She stands for the longing for 
one’s homeland, and how for his sake someone bears witness to the incidents in 
the new, democratic South Africa. . . . Nandi too, finds death. Felix, on the other 
hand, finds himself once again in the deserted landscape of his homeland, but 
now with a suitcase full of drawings’ (Media Art Net n.d.).
 2. As the focus of these thoughts is not political- or social-theoretical, I will not 
establish differences between refugees, displaced persons, exiles, and so on. See 
Edward Said’s (2002) ‘Reflections on Exile’ for an attempt to do so. See also Alexis 
Nouss’s (2015) work on ‘exiliance’ for an accent on the psychic experience of exile, 
which is common to the individual (often chosen) or collective (most often not 
chosen) situations of exile. Nouss’s work is particularly interesting insofar as it 
insists on exile as a combination of material conditions and a conscience or a state 
of mind.
 3. But see also Zambrano (2014: 51).
 4. Ovid wrote the Tristia (sorrows) while in exile from Rome.
 5. See, for example, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/863565/gallery/epikairothta/
ellada/apo-to-vrain-drain-sto-brain-gain> (last accessed 16 January 2017).
 6. An expanded version of this article will contain a chapter on the unavoidable 
transformation of the body (Kristeva 1994) which makes return impossible as 
well as a section on regret, the regret of exile, as it is, for example, expressed here 
by Zambrano (2014: 56): ‘¿Por qué no me quedé, Señor, por qué no me quedé y 
aquí corrí la suerte de los que quedaron por amor?’ (‘Why did I not stay, Lord, 
why did I not stay and live here the fate of those who stayed out of love?’) Here 
and below, all translations from Spanish, French and Greek into English are 
mine.
 7. ‘Julio Cortázar sobre los beneficios del exilio (1983)’, available at <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=diXQ1aCypxA> (last accessed 6 February 2017).
 8. I am extremely grateful to Yiorgos Axiotis, Melpo Axiotis’s nephew, whom I met 
on a plane to Athens in 2016, and who gave me one of his own copies of the book. 
Our common attachment to Greece and literature and our realisation that we 
have both lived longer out of Greece than in it made us start a dialogue between 
strangers. Let him be thanked as a friend. For a wider view on the literature of 
political refugees, see Apostolidou (2013).
 9. In opposition to Said’s or Sennet’s dialectic relation between nationalism and 
exile.
 10. See, for example, Zambrano (2012: 154).
 11. While feminists in Latin-language countries have criticised the paternalistic 
roots of the Spanish word ‘la patria’ (like the Greek ‘η πατρίδα’), which means 
‘fatherland’ in English or ‘Vaterland’ in German, they have not pointed out that it 
presents the particularity of being a female noun (‘la’, also like in Greek: ‘η’) while 
having centrally to do with a male entity (pater, πατήρ). This interesting feature 
complicates the critical viewpoint. A similar point will arise in the later discussion 
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of ‘mother-tongue’. In any case, here I will use the word ‘homeland’ for ‘patria’, 
trying to avoid these ambiguities. See Zambrano (2012: 61) on Mother Fatherland: 
‘la madre patria’.
 12. ‘Hay ciertos viajes de los que solo a la vuelta se comienza a saber.’
 13. ‘El exilio ha sido como mi patria o como una dimensión de una patria descono-
cida, pero que una vez que se conoce, es irrenunciable.’
 14. ‘Confieso . . . que me ha costado mucho trabajo renunciar a mis cuarenta años 
de exilio . . . de vez en tanto me duele, no, no es que me duela, es una sensación 
como quien ha sido despellejado [flayed], como San Bartolomé, una sensación 
ininteligible, pero que lo es.’
 15. ‘desierto, patria sin frontera y sin reino’ (Zambrano 2014: 55).
 16. ‘ese reino, ese campo, esa fuente de lagrimas’ (Zambrano 2014: 51).
 17. ‘sin ver’ (Zambrano 2014: 55).
 18. ‘El exiliado solo tiene, pues, horizonte. Mas el horizonte paradojicamente es al 
par la condición de la visibilidad, del ordén visible que confine con el invisible’, 
the world after the expulsion from Paradise.
 19. ‘paises de habla española, sufridores del Imperio español y beneficiarios al par 
de algunos de sus innegables dones’ (‘Spanish-speaking countries, that suffered 
the Spanish Empire at the same time they benefited from some of its undeniable 
gifts’) make the strangers not ‘extraños’ (‘foreigners’), but ‘entraños, el sentir en 
ellos como une entraña perdida’ (‘insiders, as they felt in themselves something 
like a lost inside’) (Zambrano 2014: 49).
 20. See also ‘Julio Cortázar sobre los beneficios del exilio (1983)’, available at <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=diXQ1aCypxA> (last accessed 6 February 2017): 
however, ‘Patria, casa, tierra no son exactamente lo mismo’ (‘Fatherland, home, 
land are not exactly the same’) (Zambrano 2014: 36), which is why ‘desterrado’ 
(unearthed: literally, landless), ‘refugiado’ (refugee) or ‘exiliado’ (exile) are not 
the same (Zambrano 2014: 35). ‘La Patria es una categoria histórica, no así la 
tierra ni el lugar’ (‘Fatherland is a historical category; not so the land or the place’) 
(Zambrano 2014: 47). And we should principally see in this differentiation a 
varying degree of intensity in the taking leave of the homeland. See Nouss (2015) 
on the different combinations between the experience and condition of exile.
 21. Let it, however, be noted that elsewhere she likens exile to an ocean ‘sin isla 
alguna a la vista, sin norte real’ (‘without any island or any real North to be seen’) 
(Zambrano 2014: 45). The absence of North points to our earlier mention of 
disorientation.
 22. ‘En cuanto auroréa en la historia, en cuanto se da a ver minimamente, en verdad 
basta con que se anuncie, crea el exilio de aquellos que, por haberla visto y servido 
aun minimamente, han de irse de ella. Y luego en la historia apócrifa sigue en los 
que dentro y bajo ella mas bien se despiertan un dia exiliados. No hay opción 
para ellos, o no se despiertan o se despiertan ya en el exilio.’ That is why: ‘Tiene 
la patria verdadera por virtud crear el exilio. Es su signo inequivoco’ (Zambrano 
2014: 47).
 23. ‘El tiempo, un dios sin máscara [. . .] Dios de la visión: esto se verá con el tiempo, se 
me verá, se verá mi razón con el tiempo, dice entre sí, y a veces balbucea el exiliado, 
y mientras tanto el tiempo lo devora, a él que, como el tiempo – ¿ a imagen y seme-
janza del tiempo? –, no tiene figura, rostro ni máscara alguna. [. . .] ¿Será él, el exili-
ado, un augurio?’ (‘Time, a god without mask [. . .] God of vision: this shall be seen 
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with time, I shall be seen, my reason shall be seen with time, the exile tells himself, 
and sometimes he stutters, and in the meantime times eats him up, him who, like 
time – in the image and resemblance of time? – does not have a shape, a face nor 
any mask [. . .] Could the exile be an omen?’) (Zambrano 2014: 38). Regarding 
liminality, I think it can be said to extend to the most general existential terms 
regarding the exile, those of life and death: ‘El filo entre la vida y la muerte que 
igualmente se rechazan. Sostenerse en ese filo es la primera exigencia que al exili-
ado se presenta como ineludible’ (‘The thread between life and death that repulse 
each other. Maintaining oneself on this thread is the first demand that presents 
itself as inescapable to the exile’) (Zambrano 2014: 36). It cannot but be brought 
into comparison with Axioti’s remark on death: ‘Θάνατος είναι κι αυτός τώρα ο 
χωρισμός. Δεκαεπτά ολόκληρα χρόνια, μακριά από την πατρίδα σου. Θάνατος 
είναι κι ο διχασμός της ζωής’ (‘This separation now is also death. Seventeen full 
years, away from my homeland. This division of life is also death’) (Axioti 2015: 84).
 24. ‘Y luego en la historia apócrifa sigue [la patria] en los que dentro y bajo ella más 
bien se despiertan un día exiliados. No hay opción para ellos, o no se despiertan 
o se despiertan ya en el exilio’ (‘And then in apocryphal history, the homeland 
continues in those that inside and under it wake up one day as exiles. There is 
no option for them, either they don’t wake up or they wake up already in exile’) 
(Zambrano 2014: 48). This can be compared with Cornelius Castoriadis’s striking 
description of the form of hybris. And: ‘el iniciarse del exilio en un instante único, 
sin separación, al modo como en las tragedias se realiza prodigiosamente este 
imposible dar un instante único en varias de sus vertientes o dimensiones’ (‘the 
beginning of exile is one unique moment, without separation, just as in tragedy 
this impossible taking place of one unique instant through its various sides or 
dimensions is prodigiously realised’) (Zambrano 2014: 36).
 25. ‘El encontrarse en el desierto no hace sentir el exilio, sino ante todo la expulsión. 
Y luego la insalvable distancia y la incierta presencia física del país perdido. Y aqui 
empieza el exilio, al sentirse ya al borde del exilio’ (‘Finding oneself in the desert 
does not make one feel the exile, but mostly the expulsion. And then the unsav-
able distance and the uncertain physical presence of the lost country. And there 
starts exile, with the feeling of being already at the border of exile’) (Zambrano 
2014: 36). ‘Comienza la iniciación al exilio cuando comienza el abandono, el 
sentirse abandonado’ (‘The initiation to exile starts when the abandonment starts, 
the feeling of being abandoned’) (Zambrano 2014: 35).
 26. ‘La pasión de Antigona se da en la ausencia y en el silencio de los dioses’ 
(Zambrano 2012: 154). ‘Una soledad [la de Antigona] que únicamente el Dios 
desconocido, mudo, recoge’ (‘One solitude, which is taken up by an unknown 
and mute God’) (Zambrano 2012: 162).
 27. ‘Y esa última dimensión de su condena, la que caracteriza a la tragedia griega, 
resplandeciente hasta el extremo en Antígona: el abandono, el abandono total de 
sus dioses’ (‘And this last dimension of her condemnation, which characterised 
Greek tragedy, is extremely illuminating in Antigone: the abandonment, the total 
abandonment by her gods’) (Zambrano 2012: 152; my emphasis).
 28. ‘Bien es verdad que Edipo tuvo el anuncio de su destino y ninguna potencia 
divina bajó en sua auxilio a la hora de la desdicha’ (‘But it is true that Oedipus’s 
destiny was announced to him and no divine power went down to help him at the 
time of his unhappiness’) (Zambrano 2012: 152).
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 29. ‘Mas la tragedia humana sucede bajo la mirada de los dioses y su sentencia. Y en el 
abandono no se siente esa mirada ni la sentencia, como por momentos se querría. 
En el abandono solo lo propio de lo que se está desposeído aparece, solo que no 
puede llegar a ser como ser propio’ (‘But human tragedy happens under the gaze 
of the gods and their say. And in the abandonment, one can feel neither that gaze 
nor the say, as one would sometimes want. In the abandonment, only that which 
is dispossessed appears, only that which cannot make it to be a being as such’) 
(Zambrano 1990: 32).
 30. ‘Through the abandonment appears the immensity, and this causes the firma-
ment to fall apart, which is otherwise normally firm and a medium, and which 
makes one feel the presence of the Father when he is hidden and sustains his 
presence when he appears’ (Zambrano 2014: 44).
 31. Regarding translation, the poet María Negroni notes that one of its imperative 
conditions is an exile, in which one advances blindly (Negroni 2016: 112).
 32. ‘Para no perderse, enajenarse, en le desierto hay que encerrar dentro de sí el 
desierto, hay que adentrar, interiorizar, el desierto en el alma, en la mente, en 
los sentidos mismos, aguzando el oído en detrimento de la vista para evitar los 
espejismos y escuchar las voces.’
 33. This is a very rare reference to the debate between those who stay and those who 
go (see section 2 of this chapter).
 34. ‘Cuando ya se sabe sin ella, sin padecer alguno, cuando ya no se recibe nada, 
nada de la patria, entonces se le aparece’ (‘When one knows one is without the 
homeland, without any suffering, when one does not receive anything any more, 
nothing from the homeland, then it appears’) (Zambrano 2014: 47).
 35. ‘El exilio es el lugar privilegiado para que la Patria se descubra . . .’ (‘Exile is the 
privileged position in order to discover the Homeland . . .’) (Zambrano 2014: 
47). There is an ambiguity between the title of this fragment and its first phrase: 
‘la patria no solo se descubre en el exilio’ (‘the homeland is not only discovered 
in exile’) and ‘El exilio es desde luego el lugar privilegiado desde el que la Patria 
se descubre’ (‘Exile is, of course, the privileged place from which to discover the 
Homeland’) (Zambrano 2014: 47).
 36. ‘La imaginación lleva y da un ambiente poético y la inspiración inventa en hecho 
poético. El hecho poético no se puede controlar con nada. Hay que aceptarlo 
como se acepta la lluvia de estrellas. Pero alegrémonos de que la poesía pueda 
fugarse, evadirse de las garras frías del razonamiento.’ See <http://federicogar-
cialorca.net/obras_lorca/imaginacion_inspiracion_evasion.htm> (last accessed 6 
February 2017).
 37. ‘εξόριστε Ποιητή, στον αιώνα σου, λέγε, τι βλέπεις ; / τότε, μην έχοντας άλλη 
εξορία, που να θρηνήσει ο Ποιητής, την υγεία της καταιγίδας απο τ’ ανοιχτά του 
του στήθη αδειάζοντας, θα γυρίσει για να σταθεί στα ωραία μέσα ερείπια. / Αλλά 
τα πράματα της καρδιάς τρόπος δεν είναι να χαθούν, έννοια σου, και γι ‘ αυτά οι 
εξορίες δουλεύουν. Αργά-γρήγορα κείνοι που είναι ναν τα βρουν, θα τα βρουν’ 
(‘Exiled Poet, what do you see in your aeon? / having no other exile to mourn, 
emptying the health of his storm from his open breast, the Poet, will return to 
stand in the beautiful ruins. / But the matters of the heart cannot be lost, don’t 
worry, and exiles work for them. Sooner or later, those who are meant to find 
them, will find them’) (Elytis [1959] 1989: 65).
 38. ‘[S]a pulsion d’Éros, indicible en termes de droit, indicible par le citoyen qui, du 
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fait qu’il a transgressé la loi, s’est mis en dehors, dans l’enfer, en situation d’exil: 
en situation poétique’ (Bordes 1996: 28–9) (‘The pulsion of Eros, which is unsay-
able in terms of the law, which is unsayable by the citizen who, having violated 
the law, has situated herself outside, in hell, in situation of exile: in poetical situa-
tion’). ‘[T]out acte poétique naît de l’exil. Et le public pardonne mal à celui qui se 
tient hors de la cité’ (‘Every poetic act is born from exile. And the public does not 
forgive the one who stands outside the city’) (Bordes 1996: 25).
 39.  ‘Tις ημέρες μου άθροισα κι έμεινα μόνος . . .
   κι από κει που με μπόδισαν, ο αόρατος, κάλπασα
   στους αγρούς τις βροχές να γυρίσω
   και το αίμα πίσω να πάρω των νεκρών μου των άθαφτων’
   (‘I added up my days and I remained alone . . .
   and from where I was prevented, I galloped invisibly
   on the fields to turn the rains around
   and take back the blood of my unburied dead’) (Elytis [1959] 1989: 35)
 40. To turn to another example, Pascal Quignard, one of the foremost writers cur-
rently writing in French, decided to leave Paris and the publishing microcosm 
more than twenty years ago. He speaks of theosigie or the silence of God. He 
also speaks of creation as the opposite of judgement. Literature is an écart, he 
says, which instead of ‘gap’, I would translate as ‘making (taking) an ontologi-
cal distance-difference’. I see in this écart, as the opposite of judgement, first a 
putting oneself in the distance, not first a putting the object that I look at in the 
distance, which is important because the step away transports the beholder in a 
space created by the step away, rather than transforming/objectifying the object. 
This needs to be compared with the anachoretic tradition more generally.
 41. ‘Mονάχη έγνοια η γλώσσα μου στις αμμουδιές του Ομήρου, Μονάχη έγνοια η 
γλώσσα μου, με τα πρώτα πρώτα Δόξα Σοι!, Μονάχη έγνοια η γλώσσα μου, με 
τα πρώτα λόγια του Ύμνου!’ (‘My only concern was my language on the dunes of 
Homer, my only concern was my language, with the very first Gloria!, My only 
concern was my language, with the first words of the Hymn!’) (Elytis 1989: 28).
 42. See Borgna (1996: 55), where he explains that in psychosis or depression, there 
is a precipitation into a Lebenswelt that is totally other and that makes us live in 
isolation and loneliness, in estrangement and the loss of familiarity, in unrecog-
nisability and destroyed alterity.
 43. See Zambrano (2012: 27, n.16) on Simone Weil’s understanding of genius as the 
supernatural virtue of humility in the area of thought. This, of course, brings to 
mind Hannah Arendt’s (1994) work concerning the pariah in ‘The Jew as Pariah’.
 44. We noted earlier Castoriadis’s understanding of hybris, whose sudden feature 
we also encountered in Lorca’s poetic fact: ‘one finds oneself in hybris, which 
lies outside any linear continuity with reasonable or expected events. Only after 
transgression can human beings get to know the limits. The creation of a public 
space-time, that is, the creation of the polis aims to the contrary’ (Castoriadis 
2008: 123).
 45. For example, Teignmouth Electron (Dean 1999).
 46. As a closing remark on this section, I would like to point out that the South 
as exile is the converse image of the South as colony. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I have entirely left out the relation between colonisation – one form of 
which is ‘settler societies’, as Louis Hartz (1969) called them – and exile or the 
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‘receiving’ (or colonised) societies. This will be part of a longer effort. However, it 
is important to note, as I did in the very beginning regarding the question of the 
foreigner, that we are still talking about the same coin. Just as the river has three 
banks in the story by João Guimarães Rosa (1984), exile is a coin with more than 
two sides.
 47. See the introduction of García Valdés (2005).
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